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PREFATORY NOTE.
Despite the great,though, in the writer's opinion, 
scarcely merited,popularity of the Essays on Education, 
there does not exist any systematic and complete pres­
entation of Spencer’s educational views. The present 
work aims at bringing together the various expressions 
of his educational creed and seeks to find the key to 
them in Spencer’s social and ethical philosophy. The 
book is not primarily historical; but an attempt has 
been made to sketch the historical background and to 
show the ancestry of Spencer's general point of view. 
Chapters VIII, IX and X are meant to sustain the writer's 
interpretation of "Education: Intellectual, Moral, and 
Physical", and to explain Spencer's attitude to the 
wider problems of education, and especially his hostility 
towards State enterprise in the provision of education.
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CHAPTER I.
THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF SPENCER'S TBffi.
General Survey.
The history of education in the nineteenth century 
is the story of the slow and reluctant steps by which the 
State made itself responsible for the schooling of the 
children of the working classes. It has been remarked 
that voluntary social work is often the laboratory of 
State enterprise; and the generalisation is true so far 
as English education is concerned. The State began by 
subsidising voluntary societies and passed only by very 
slow steps to the direct provision of educational facil­
ities, In Scotland, by the Act of 1872, education was 
taken over by the State from the Church, which to some 
extent before, and to a very great extent after, the Re­
formation had made itself responsible for the secular 
as well as the religious education of the whole people 
of the nation. In England, on the other hand, the Church, 
while it took over nominal control of education at the Re­
formation, tended, at least after the Restoration of 1660, 
to restrict its efforts to education in the knowledge and 
practices of the Christian Church, and to the licensing
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of teachers for the grammar schools. The secular educa­
tion of the children of the poorer classes was left 
largely to voluntary charity organisations; or else it 
formed part of a State system of poor relief. The nation­
al system of education which was embodied in the Act of 
1870 was, therefore, a development partly of voluntary 
enterprise and partly of a State system of poor relief; 
euad it continues to show traces of its twofold origin.
The educational revolution represented by that Act lagged 
far behind the industrial revolution of which it was 
nonetheless a necessary sequel. The causes of this re­
luctance to nationalise education have their roots far 
back in English social history.
The Educational Legacy of the Preceding 
Centuries.
Education in England had always been nominally open 
to rich and poor alike; but the Grammar Schools had in 
coursé of time come to be regarded as institutions for 
the education of the better-to-do. When attempts began 
to be made towards the end of the seventeenth century to 
provide schooling for the poor, they were made in the 
guise of charity, and aimed at giving the children of the 
poor a training befitting their station in life, which 
meant a training in industry and obedience. By the 
Canons of 1604, the control of the educational system 
as it then existed was placed in the hands of the Church. 
The Church therefore through the agency of the grammar 
schools controlled the education of the better classes.
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That of the poorer classes was left to voluntary soci­
eties, working usually under Church auspices. Finally 
there were the children of the destitute poor, for 
whom the State made some little provision in various 
schemes of poor relief. We may thus conveniently con­
sider in turn the part played by each of these three 
agencies: Church, Voluntary Society and State.
(a) The action of the Church was, as we have said, 
indirect. But the fact that the Reformation in England 
resulted in an Established Church representative of 
the nation as a whole enabled the State to hand over to 
it the control of the existing forms of education. No 
schoolmaster was permitted to teach in public or in 
private unless he had been approved as regards qualifica­
tion and doctrine by the Church. It was not indeed un­
til 1779 that Parliament granted freedom of teaching to 
Nonconformists, and not until 1791 that this freedom was 
extended to Roman Catholics. Here then we have a part 
explanation of why the State was so slow in nationalis­
ing education: it could afford to leave it to the care
of the Church which had for so long been associated with 
the provision of education, and which, moreover, was it­
self a State institution.
(b) The voluntary society as provider of education 
appeared early. The Society for the Promotion of Christ­
ian Knowledge was founded in 1698; and in forty years it 
had opened 2000 schools throughout England and Wales, 
with provision for some 40,000 pupils. These schools
6 ,
had as their aim to rescue poor children from ignor­
ance and vice, to bring them to knowledge of the Christ­
ian religion, and to train them in habits of industry 
and obedience. The class distinction between their 
pupils and those of the Grammar Schools or the Dissent­
ing Academies (which came into existence in the course 
of the seventeenth century) was from the outset quite 
marked. During the next century the agrarian and in­
dustrial revolutions had the effect of accentuating 
class distinctions; and the idea of providing education 
as an act of charity became characteristic not only of 
the Church of England but also of the Dissenters. It 
showed itself at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
in the two rival societies, "The British and Foreign 
School Society", directed by the Quaker, Lancaster; and 
"The National Society for Promoting the Education of the 
Poor in the Principles of the Established Church", direct­
ed by Dr. Bell. The origin of this idea of providing 
education as an act of charity is, however, to be traced 
even further back than the date of the founding of the 
S.P.C.K. at the end of the seventeenth century.
A State system of poor relief, which had become nec­
essary as a substitute for ecclesiastical almsgiving, had 
been introduced into England by Queen Elizabeth. At the 
restoration of 1660, the management of the Poor Law had 
been vested in the landowning class; and the system had 
been extended and enlarged by the introduation of a scheme 
of out-relief in the reign of George III. It had re­
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suited in a division of the populace into two classes, 
the propertied class of landowners and merchants, and 
the labouring class of workers and peasants. Agri­
culture was gradually becoming capitalized, commons 
were being enclosed, and instead of peasants supporting 
themselves in semi-independence as agriculturists on 
their own account, they were tending to become merely the 
employes of wealthy landowners. Their standard of living 
was declining, and there was an increasing degree of ig­
norance and illiteracy. It was this gradual change in 
social conditions which made necessary the provision of 
charity schools, and led the State to direct intervention 
in education so far at least as the children of those com­
ing under the Poor Law were concerned.
Nonconformity also tended to accentuate this div­
ision of classes, with the accompanying idea of education 
as a charity due by the one class to the other. Moreover, 
individualism was exalted by the Nonconformists as a 
virtue. Because of this, and because of their hostility 
to the Established Church, the Nonconformists were op­
posed to State intervention in education no less than in 
religion. The Puritans placed self-reliance and hard 
work among their chief virtues. They were ready to con­
demn poverty as a vice resulting from weakness of charac­
ter; and the poor were therefore regarded as a class who 
had by their defects of character brought about their own 
misfortune. If education were to be made open to them, 
it was as an act of charity on the part of the better-to- 
do; and it was to be regarded as a means of reformation
8 .
and rescue. This education might not differ much 
from that provided in a decayed grammar school as re­
gards the subjects taught, but it differed fundament­
ally in aim, which was disciplinary; 'to rescue the 
masses and to ensure their obedience.'
ic) The part played by the State in education up to 
the nineteenth century was confined to authorising the 
provision of instruction for children of the destitute 
_ ,  ^  ^ poor. The Poor Relief Act of 1601 {43 Elizabeth) author-
ised the Churchwardens or Parish Overseers to set to work
j). ((.
the children of destitute parents and 'the putting out of 
such children to be apprentices.' Industrial training 
JoAA/ began to be given in workhouses established in London
(1655), Norwich and Bristol (1697), and was recommended 
for poor children by Locke in 1697. An act of 1723, 
which enabled parishes to form Unions for the establish­
ment of workhouses, contained provisions for education or 
industrial training. Beyond this extension of Poor Re­
lief legislation, the State did not venture to interfere 
in education.
Beginning,therefore, in the schools of the S.P.C.K.
(1698), and continued in similar schools provided by Dis­
senters, popular education continued to be a form of 
charity (or an offshoot of the Poor Law) right up to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.
English Nonconformist Thought on Education in 
the Eighteenth Century: the Tradition which 
Spencer inherited.
There were two eighteenth century thinkers, both orig­
inally Nonconformists, who did much to determine English
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educational ideas and practice in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. These two were Joseph Priestley 
(1733-1804)' and William Godwin (1756-1836). Both were 
spiritual ancestors of Herbert Spencer.
In 1768 Priestl^ published "An Essay on the First 
Principles of Government", in Section 17 of which, en­
titled "In what manner an authoritative code of education 
would affect political and civil liberty", he considers 
the question of the proper relation of the State to educa­
tion. Dr. John Brown^ an Anglican, had written in favour 
of a comprehensive national system of education in con­
formity with the doctrines of the Established Church. 
Priestley's discussion is a reply to this. Postulating 
^ ^  that "the great object of civil society is the happiness
of the members of it, in the perfect and undisturbed en­
joyment of the more important of our natural rights,” he 
goes on to show that a State-"established mode of educa­
tion would be prejudicial to the great ends of civil soci­
ety." His first argument is that State education would be 
harmful to the advancement of the art of education itself. 
Like the other arts of husbandry, architecture and ship­
building, education must have opportunities for free ex­
periment if it is to progress. To establish it as a 
State institution would be to perpetuate its many imper- 
g-yj. factions; it would be like "fixing the dress of a child,
and forbidding its oloaths ever to be made wider or larger";
# Brown, "Thoughts on Civil Liberty, Licentiousness, 
and Faction"; "Appendix relative to a proposed 
code of education" in "Sermon on the female charac­
ter and education."
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"it would prevent all great improvements in futurity." 
Secondly, State education would make for uniformity in
I?. - its products, whereas "the great excellence of human nature
consists in the variety of which it is capable." In the 
third place, to compel children to attend public schools 
would be to infringe one of the strongest of man's natural 
rights, namely, his right to determine his childrens’ educa- 
tion for himself. "Nature seems to have established such 
a strong connection between a parent and his children, at 
least during the first period of their lives, that to drag 
them from the asylum of their natural guardians, to force 
them to public places of education, and to instil into 
them religious sentiments contrary to the judgment of their 
parents, would be as cruel, as obliging a man to make the 
greatest personal sacrifice, even that of his conscience, 
to the civil magistrate." Finally, State establishment of 
education would destroy the balance on which the English 
constitution rests, a balance between "regal, aristocrat- 
ical, and demooratioal power," and between different re- 
A  ligious sects and parties. If the Coirmons chose "the pub­
lic instructors,""we should see a republic rise out of the 
ruins of our present government"; if the Lords, an aris- 
tocracy; if the Court, a despotism. "And when once the 
spirit of despotism was thus established, and had triumph­
ed over all opposition, we might soon expect to see the 
forms of it too, and thereby the very doors shut against 
old English liberty, and effectually guarded against the 
possibility of its return, except by violence; which would 
then be the only method of its re-entrance." In fine.
11.
"the only method of preserving the balance, which at
f). fo%-.
present subsists among the several political and re­
ligious parties in Great Britain, is for each to provide 
for the education of their own children."
After expounding the arguments against State educa­
tion in a way which Spencer in his chapter on National 
Education in "Social Statics" repeats and amplifies, 
Priestley concludes that education is a branch of civil 
liberty which ought not to be handed over to the State 
but "should be inviolably preserved to individuals."
Though he subsequently modified his views to the ex-
U'trC' "Xf
tent of allowing that the State might "appoint wchools in 
every district, or direct in what manner the teachers may 
be induced, by sufficient salaries, or the use of proper 
rooms, etc., to instruct all that offer themselves," and 
pointed to the "judicious establishment of parish schools" 
in Scotland and North America, Priestley, in his distrust 
of State intervention, was typical of the eighteenth cen­
tury Nonconformist thinkers on the relation of the State 
to education.
In 1793 Godwin published "An Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice." He held that government even in its 
best form was an evil end that its coercive power ought to 
be abolished. In Book VI, Chapter VIII, "Of National Educa-
ffj. ci/v tion", he considers "a mode in which government has been
,j).U€. accustomed to interfere for the purpose of influencing
opinion, ... by the superintendence it has in a greater 
or less degree exerted in the article of education." The
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first objection to a system of national education lies 
in the conservatism of established institutions. They 
cZf-., are opposed to progress and change and "include in them 
4^7. the idea of permanence." They teach what is already known 
but forget that more remains to be known. In the knov/- 
ledge taught, universities are a century behind the times; 
and "even in the petty institution of Sunday schools, the 
chief lessons that are taught are a superstitious vener­
ation for the church of England, and to bow to every man 
in a handsome coat." Public institutions of education are 
apt to separate tenets from the evidence on which their 
validity depends, and consequently they teach prejudices 
instead of perceptions based upon direct examination of 
truth. "Secondly, the idea of national education is 
founded in an inattention to the nature of mind. Whatever 
each man does for himself is well done; whatever his neigh­
bours or his country undertake to do for him is done ill.
  He that learns because he desires to learn, will
listen to the instructions he receives, and apprehend their 
meaning. He that teaches because he desires to teach, will 
discharge his occupation with enthusiasm and energy." In 
the third place, national education ought to be discour­
aged because of its obvious alliance with national govern­
ment. Government will employ education to strengthen its 
own hands and perpetuate its institutions. Youth should 
not be instructed to "venerate the constitution, however 
excellent; they should be led to venerate truth; and the 
constitution only so far as it corresponds with their un-
u,
influenced deduction of truth." Even the best and most 
liberal of constitutions contain errors, "and a nation-
VifC-hA'.Uyl.
' al education has the most direct tendency to perpetuate
these errors, and to form all minds upon one model." 
Finally, it is a mistake to suppose that the State need 
undertake education in order to inform people of the 
nature of offences punishable at law. "All real crimes 
are capable of being discerned without the teaching of law. 
All supposed crimes not capable of being so discerned, are 
truly and unalterably innocent." The idea of a national 
education, "or even perhaps of the necessity of a written 
law, would never have occurred, if government and juris­
prudence had never attempted the arbitrary conversion of 
innocence into guilt."
Both Priestley and Godwin began life as Dissenters; 
both were therefore imbued with the Nonconformist ideal of 
individual freedom and distrust of State interference in 
all matters of opinion,including education and religion.
In respect of State intervention in education their views 
agreed with those of Churchmen who claimed education as 
the proper concern of the Church, and who did not wish it 
to become a State enterprise, lest that might tend to de­
stroy the influence of the Church in promoting the religious 
education of the working classes. There was also, in a 
sense, common ground here between the Radicals and the 
Tories. Freedom of the individual in education corresponded 
to freedom of the individual in trade and industry, and 
found favour in an age marked by a general distrust of State 
interference. So far as education was concerned, the ideas
14.
of advanoed Radical thinkers was congenial to the 
early nineteenth century generation whose mottoes were, 
laissez faire, laissez aller, and "way for individual 
enterprise." In this and other respects Priestley and 
Godwin did much to establish the tradition which Herbert 
Spencer inherited; for on both sides of the house Spencer's 
ancestry was marked by strong nonconformity and dissent.
That tradition was inimical to the spread of univers­
al compulsory education. Even while Priestley and Godwin 
were writing, England was rapidly changing from an agri­
cultural to an industrial nation, and its population from 
a rural- to an urban-dwelling one. The State was the only 
institution powerful enough to have provided adequate educa­
tion for the masses, and public opinion was against State 
intervention.
English Education in the Nineteenth 
Century.
The three-quarters of a century from 1800 to 1875 was 
a transition period in the history of Britain. Those seven­
ty-five years witnessed the final transformation of a 
thinly-populated agricultural country into a crowded in­
dustrial State, and the gradual emergence of two new class­
es, a middle class composed of merchants, factory-owners 
and managers, and a vast artisan class huddled together in 
towns and living, in large part, on the margin of subsis­
tence.
Accompanying these changes went a gradual shifting 
of political power from a Tory aristocracy to an industrial 
middle class; a persistent attack upon the exclusive privil-
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eges of the Established Churoh; an insistent demand for 
freedom of the press, of religions belief and of opinion 
generally; the growth of trades unions; a breach with 
laissez faire in industry and education; the establishment 
of Free Trade; the reform of the Penal Code; and a drastic 
reform of the Poor Laws.
The period was one of reconstruction in all depart­
ments of social life. The people were beginning to ac­
quire for themselves the right of self-government, and to 
create agencies by which to exercise it, not only in re­
spect of the country as a whole through a more broadly 
based Parliamentary franchise, but also in the towns and 
country districts, where new Municipal Councils and Boards 
of Guardians were being constituted to discharge public 
utility services. The principle of laissez faire was 
gradually being abandoned as it began to be realised that 
material happiness and prosperity demanded that the State 
should interfere to protect the poor against the rich and 
prevent the new system of industry from exploiting the 
minds and bodies of a helpless and ignorant labouring class. 
Through Public Health Acts, Poor Law Reform and Factory 
Legislation, the initiative of the State was more and more 
being exercised in spheres which hitherto had been left to 
Individual or private philanthropic enterprise.
In education no less than in other departments of 
social life laissez faire was being superseded. But here 
the progress of State intervention was slow. Some of the 
reasons for this have already been indicated. The legacy 
of eighteenth century thought acted as a drag upon pro-
16.
gress. Education was regarded as a sphere which ought 
to be reserved for the individual. The Benthamites were 
certainly zealous in the cause of popular education, but 
they advocated a kind of individualist democracy in which 
the State should refrain from meddling in the concerns of 
its citizens or should consult each individual in regard 
to those duties which it was forced to undertake. Noncon­
formity, organising itself anew in Wesleyanism, was undoubt­
edly desirous of promoting education, but it was naturally 
suspicious of State establishment and clung to the old idea 
of making education a philanthropic enterprise to be pro­
vided by the well-to-do as an act of charity to the de­
serving poor. For these reasons, therefore, it is unfair 
to blame the aristocratic governing classes for their fail­
ure to realise that a new England called for a new system 
of education. During the early part of the nineteenth 
century, the whole spirit of the times was in favour of 
laissez faire and antagonistic to the idea of social re­
sponsibility for education. Even when change began to be 
apparent, the country was too much occupied with the other 
necessary reforms. Poor Law reform, repeal of the C o m  Laws, 
Franchise reform, to have leisure for a comprehensive 
scheme of educational reform. Thus it was almost a hun­
dred years after the Industrial Revolution before a nation­
al system of education was finally introduced in England.
Characteristically, nineteenth century State inter­
vention in education began by an Act passed in 1802 for 
the better treatment of pauper apprentices. This was
17.
"The Health and Morals of Apprentices Act", which be­
sides limiting the hours of labour of parish apprentices 
employed in factories, and providing for their better ac­
commodation, required them to receive an elementary educa­
tion during the day in reading, writing and arithmetic.
This was the earliest of the Factory Acts and also the fore­
runner of a number of Poor Law measures which included among 
their provisions various reforms affecting the education of 
poor children. For example, in 1844 an Act made possible 
the merging of Poor Law Unions or parishes into districts 
for school purposes and authorised expenditure up to one 
fifth of the average rates of the Union on the district 
school. This was the first instance in modern England of a 
local authority being established with rating powers for 
elementary education.
The first grant by Parliament in aid of elementary 
education was made in 1833, the year following the passing 
of the first Reform Bill. The resolution was to the effect 
"that a sum, not exceeding £20,000, be granted to His 
Majesty, to be issued in aid of private subscriptions for 
the erection of schoolhouses for the education of the 
children of the poorer classes in Great Britain." The grarii; 
it should be noted, was made "in aid of private subscrip­
tions" and was intended for "the education of the children 
of the poorer classes." It was dispensed by the Treasury 
through the agency of the National Society and the British 
and Foreign Society, so that a "balance" might be main­
tained between the schools of the Church of England and
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those of the Nonconformists. Half the cost of the build­
ing of new school-houses had to be met by voluntary sub­
scriptions. This grant was continued yearly for six years, 
and in 1835 Parliament voted an additional £10,000 for the 
establishment of a Normal School or Training College for 
teachers. But this project, being opposed by both Church­
men and Nonconformists was dropped.
In 1839 an important step towards a national system 
of education was taken by the creation of the "Committee of 
4^  Privy Council on Education" to "superintend the applica-
If * I 7^^ / /" * *
' tion of any sums voted by Parliament for the purpose of pro-
? M'-
I moting public education." The Committee was constituted
f
r on April 10th, 1839, and at once revived the project for a
National Normal School. This again aroused widespread op­
position owing to religious prejudice, and had to be aban­
doned. More important was the recommendation which the
J Committee carried that grants to schools should be con-
ditional on the "right of inspection ... in order to secure
ff-XtfS. '
' a conformity to the regulations and discipline establish­
ed in the several schools, with such improvements as may 
from time to time be suggested by the Committee." The 
right of inspection by public officials prepared the way 
for a much closer relation between the schools and the 
State. Dr. Kay (afterwards Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth) 
was made Secretary of the Committee, and under his wise.
A tactful and far-sighted guidance the foundations of a 
national system of education began to be laid.
A second attempt was made to promote the national-
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ising of education in 1843, under Dr. Kay's guidance.
This was embodied in the Factory Bill of that year, which 
proposed inter alia that children between eight and thir­
teen were not to be made to work more than six-and-a-half 
hours a day and were to be compelled to attend school for 
three hours. Government loans were to be given towards 
the building of new schools to provide for this compulsory 
education, and the schools were to be supported out of the 
poor rates. But in the eyes of the Nonconformists and the 
Whigs, the damning clause was that which prescribed that 
the schoolmaster was to be a member of the Church of Eng­
land. The outcry against the Bill was so strong that the 
Government was compelled to withdraw it, and be content 
with passing in the following year the non-contentious 
clauses regulating the hours of labour of children in 
factories.
An important outcome of the opposition to the Bill 
was the formation of a group of Dissenters, the Voluntary- 
ists, who denied the right of the State to interfere at all 
in the question of education, since no secular power had 
any claim to interfere in a spiritual question. Noncon- 
* formists had, through the British and Foreign School Soci­
ety, accepted government grants in aid of their schools, 
but now a section of them, mostly Congregationalists and 
Baptists, fearing that the Established Church through the 
National Society would gradually be able to absorb the 
whole grant, turned against all State aid in education. In 
place of State aid and State interference, the Vbluntary- 
ists would substitute self-help and free competition. Two
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organisations were formed, "The Baptist Voluntary Educa­
tion Society", and "The Congregational Board of Education* 
to promote the advancement of Popular Education, upon 
strictly religious principles, free from all magisterial 
authority." The old objections to State education reap­
pear: it tended to uniformity and conservatism in a sphere
where diversity and progress were essential. "Government
"TU <1 can build schools, advance money, employ masters, comlssion
• inspectors, and distribute books; and it can so cover the
(4 land with the means and aspect of education, but it cannot
educate. Soon all this will be found obstructive machinery, 
cumbering the ground. Change will be impossible. School 
books will be as unchangeable as Church books, and for the 
same reason —  their fixed use and immense numbers. A 
vast interest will be created and stand as an insurmount­
able obstacle to spontaneous effort and improvement."
There were other objections put forward. State enterprise 
destroyed interest in education on the part of parents who, 
if forced to make sacrifices to educate their own child­
ren, would see to it that the instructors were competent 
and were kept up-to-date and efficient by wholesome com­
petition. Only when education was voluntary, were philan­
thropists induced to make contributions. Education rates
^ The Congregational Board of Education reprinted as a 
pamphlet the chapter on "National Education" from Spen­
cer's Social Statics under the title of "State Educa­
tion Self-defeating.” The pamphlet went through two 
editions. (Duncan, "Life and Letters of H. Spencer, p. 
60).
In 1902 it was again reprinted by "The Northumber­
land Society for the Liberation of Education from State 
Control," with Spencer's permission. (Duncan, op.oit. 
p.465.)
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which were used partly to teach religious doctrines at 
variance with the creed of many of those taxed, were 
unjust.
The individualistic principles which underlay the 
movement found a ready acceptance in the industrial 
north where the new middle class of factory owners were 
content to apply to education the methods by which they 
had themselves won success in the economic sphere. Op­
posed to State interference in industry, they were equally 
opposed to State interference in education. Indeed, they 
distrusted popular education in any form as likely to make 
their workers discontented with the appalling conditions 
under which they were compelled to labour, and as calcul­
ated to diminish the supply of child labour.
Though voluntaryism was clearly unable to cope with 
the problem of providing education in an industrial State, 
the enthusiasm generated by the movement had remarkable 
results. By 1851, 364 schools and one training college 
had been opened in England. But the districts which most 
needed education were generally the least well supplied; 
and gradually the number of those who supported the volun­
tary principles began to diminish. The Duke of Newcastle's 
Commission, which sat from 1858 to 1861, brought to light 
alarming deficiencies in the provision of elementary educa­
tion, and the educational defects of non-inspected private 
elementary schools. The expense of providing a national 
system of elementary education was gradually seen to be 
beyond the ability of any private agency to meet. Belief 
in laissez faire as a principle applicable to every social
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problem began to break down; and it began to become 
known that State education was achieving good results in 
Germany and the United States.
The way was being prepared for further State action,
A revised Code was issued in 1861, which, by altering the 
method of paying the government grant, resulted in the 
teacher's ceasing to be an employé of the State and be­
coming the servant of the local school managers. The Sec­
ond Reform Bill was passed in 1867; and recognition was 
becoming general of the pressing need to educate the mass- 
C! ^  @8. Agreement was fairly widespread that education would
require to remain State-aided and State inspected; that it 
would need to be universal and compulsory; that each area 
would require to have a local education authority with 
rating powers to supplement voluntary enterprise; and that 
denominational schools must remain as part of the national 
system.
In 1870 the Elementary Education Act was passed.
The Act was a compromise. It established the "dual-control* 
by which non-denominational schools provided by local au­
thorities and maintained out of rates and Parliamentary 
grants, existed side by side with denominational schools 
built by subscriptions aided by Parliamentary grants but 
not by rates, and controlled by non-eleoted managers. A 
compromise was also embodied in the Act as between volun­
tary and compulsory provision of schools. The religious 
denominations were granted time to make good deficiencies 
in any district; but, if they failed to do so, School 
Boards were to be set up, charged with the power of levying |
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rates and compelling the attendance at school of child­
ren between five and thirteen years of age.
With the Act of 1870, the State definitely recog­
nised its obligations with regard to the education of its 
citizens. Thenceforth a gradual extension of State con­
trol occurred. The battle between the "voluntaryists" and 
those who favoured universal education in State schools had 
ended in a partial victory for the latter. But the Act of 
1870 reflected even in its title the class distinction 
which had marked education in England for the past two 
centuries. It was not an Education Act; it was an Element­
ary Education Act. It was not an Act for the whole people 
of England: it was an Act for the children of the class 
that supported itself by manual labour. Even to-day, al­
though the barrier between them is breaking down, there 
are two systems of education in England, an elementary 
system for the poorer classes, and a preparatory and sec­
ondary system for the children of the better-to-do.
Spencer's Attitude to National Education.
Herbert Spencer was from the beginning an uncompromis­
ing opponent of State intervention in education. From the 
date of his first Essays on "The Proper Sphere of Govern­
ment" (1842) to the last year of his life, his attitude 
underwent no change. Conditions in England might change. 
Nonconformists and Churchmen might be won over to a real­
isation of the need for government provision and control 
of schools, but Spencer's views showed no corresponding 
alteration. In his strong antipathy to State action, he
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carried on the individualism of the Puritan tradition.
In his belief in Natural forces as a kind of Providence, 
and in his willingness to let poverty and crime cure them­
selves by a process of gradual extinction without the 
intervention of any social agency, he manifested the stern­
ness of the Puritan view that the righteous should prosper 
by virtue of their own righteousness, and the idle, the 
lazy, and the vicious come to destruction as a just recom­
pense for their slothfulness and sin.
Even after 1870, when the fruits of a national system 
of universal and compulsory schooling began to be apparent, 
Spencer did not abate his antagonism or fail to express 
his disapproval. "The Man versus The State", published in 
1884, like the "Social Statics" (1850), is noteworthy for 
its strong emphasis on individualism, and is pervaded by 
the plea for the enforcement of "State ethics," by which 
among adults "rewards will be in proportion to desert,
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benefit in proportion to merit." State intervention in 
industry, education, charity or sanitation, interferes 
with the process of natural selection whereby the fittest 
survive and the improvident and good-for-nothings are 
eliminated.
late as 1897, in a letter to Dr.Eeatinge, Spencer 
reiterated his objections to State education on the grounds 
of its uniformity, absence of competition and infringement 
of individual liberty. In the very last year of his life 
he wrote a letter to Mr. Laurie Magnus (12 October,1903) 
on the subject of a proposed educational periodical^ School, 
in which he says:
2 5 .
"The only passage in your programme which calls
A. tfiu. .
' / for coïïjiîient and suggests a fundamental doubt is that
which commits me to a belief that 'the training of 
citizens and the preparation for life' should be under­
taken by the State, Now,as from the beginning I have, 
and do still, maintain that the State has no such func­
tions, and have further maintained that it is not for a 
government 'to mould children into good citizens, using 
its own discretion in settling what a good citizen is 
and how the child may be moulded into one', it appears 
to me that my approval just given is cancelled. Only 
if the word 'State' is omitted from the passage in 
question, so reducing the proposition to a self-evident 
one, can I endorse it."
We see in Spencer the typical eighteenth century Noncon­
formist with a rooted belief in individual enterprise, a 
passion for individual liberty and a perfervid hatred of 
State enterprise; rather than the nineteenth century 
rationalist equipped with the new biological knowledge 
and anxious to apply it to the betterment of humanity 
through the agency of the institutions of the State.
REFERENCES:
Spencer: "Autobiography" (London, 1904. 2 vols.):
"The Man versus The Statey(London, 1884.); 
"Social Statics!'(London, 1868. Reprint of 
1850 edition.) ;
Duncan: "Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer."(London,
1908.);
Barker: "National Character’.' (London, 1927.);
"Political Thought from Spencer to To-day." 
(London, 1915.);
Boyd: "History of Western Education." (London, 1921J
26.
REFERENCES (Continued):
Priestley: "An Essay on the First Principles of 
Government." (2nd. edition, 1771.);
"Lectures on History." (2 vols. 1793.);
Godwin: "Enquiry Concerning Political Justice."
(2 vols. 1793.);
Adamson: "A Short History of Education." (Cambridge,
1919.);
Ramsay Muir: "A Short History of the British Common­
wealth. "(2 vols. London, 1922.) ; 
Birchenough: "History of Elementary Education in Eng­
land and Wales." (London,1925, 2nd 
edition.);
Sadler: "Outlines of Education Courses in Man­
chester University." (Manchester,1911,); 
Smith: "The Life of Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth."
(London, 1923.);
Dobbs: "Education and Social Movements, 1700-1850V
(London, 1919.);
De Montmorency: "State Intervention in English Educa­
tion." (Cambridge, 1902);
Adams, F.: "The Elementary School Contest." (London,
1882.);
Butler, J.R.M.: "A History of England, 1815-1918."
(London, 1928.);
Marvin, F.S.: "The Century of Hope." (Oxford,1919.
2nd edition.);
Trevelyan,G.M.: "British History in the Nineteenth
Century."(London, 1923).
See also General Bibliography.
27
CHAPTER II.
SPENCER ' S EQITIPMENT FOR HIS LIFE'S WORK.
Birth, Ancestry and Parentage.
Education during Boyhood.
Education during Adolescence.
Results of Spencer's Education.
Experience as a Teacher —  "A False Start". 
Criticism of Teaching Methods.
28.
CHAPTER II
SPENCER'S EQUIPMENT FOR HIS LIFE'S WORK.
Birth, Ancestry and Parentage.
Herbert Spencer, the first child of William George 
Spencer and Harriet Holmes, was horn at Derby on the 
27th of April, 1820. Of nine children horn of the union, 
Herbert alone survived infancy. One sister, Louisa, a 
year his junior, lived for two years and nine months; 
and among Spencer's earliest recollections were memories 
of playing with her in the garden of their home. The 
other seven children died in the first weeks of infancy ; 
and so it came about that, as Spencer himself says, one 
of his misfortunes was to have no brothers, and, a still 
greater misfortune, to have no sisters. As virtually an 
only child, he was deprived of the society of his con­
temporaries and of the education of the heart and sym­
pathies which the social contacts involved in normal 
family life afford. This fact is not without importance 
in estimating Spencer's character and views, and more 
especially in interpreting his social and educational 
philosophy.
Another significant fact is that on both sides of
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the house, his ancestry was marked by strong non-conform­
ity and .dissent . On his mother's side, Spencer traces 
his origin hack to a stock that twice underwent exile to 
escape religious persecution; on his father's side, two 
traits were conspicuously displayed by his ancestry, the 
one prudence, shown by the comparatively mature age at 
which they married, the other non-conformity, manifested 
by the fact that the Spencers, like the Holm^es, were 
among the earliest of Wesley's followers. Certain moral 
qualities, therefore, were common to both lines of ancestry 
non-conformity to established beliefs; strength of char­
acter shown in a willingness to suffer persecution rather 
than sacrifice independence of opinion; and prudence ex­
emplified in readiness to forego a present benefit for 
the sake of future benefits. "Has there not," asks Spen-
T  fo. ft.
cer, "heen inheritance of these ancestral traits or 
or some of them? That the spirit of non-conformity 
is shown by me in various directions, no one can 
deny: the disregard of authority, political, religious
or social, is very conspicuous. Along with this there 
goes, in a transfigured form, a placing of principles 
having superhuman origins above rules having human 
origins; for throughout all writings of mine relating 
to the affairs of men, it is contended that ethical 
injunctions stand above legal injunctions. And once 
more, there is everywhere shown in my discussions of 
political, questions, a contemplation of remote re­
sults rather than immediate results, joined with an 
insistence on the importance of the first as compared 
with that of the last."
A belief sometimes entertained is that great men 
owe their eminence predominantly to their mothers; but 
this belief is doubtless due to the fact that great men 
commonly exhibit unusual filial piety and tend to ascribe 
their hi&h qualities to the mother as the object of their
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strongest affections. At any rate, in the case of Spen­
cer, it does not appear that he owed much to his mother.
Nor does he take any trouble to conceal his lack of in­
debtedness. Unlike her stock, Harriet Spencer betrayed 
an 'ingrained conformity' and an innate conservatism. "I
never," says her son, "heard her pass any criticism 
X AfA. on a pulpit utterance, or express anyi?idependent judg­
ment on religious, ethical or political questions.
AGO. . . . .  Briefly characterized, she was of ordinary
intelligence and of high moral nature —  a moral 
nature of which the deficiency was the reverse of 
that comtEonly to be observed: she was not sufficient­
ly self-asserting: altruism was too little qualified 
by egoism."
Mrs Spencer seems to have been overshadowed, if not 
overawed, by the much stronger nature of her husband. . Of 
the five brothers, Spencer thinks his father was "the 
flower of the flock". He had inventive ability, artistic 
perception, and considerable skill in draughtsmanship. To 
account for the last quality Spencer names his unusual 
keenness of the senses and delicacy of manipulation.
George Spencer was, like his father, a non-conformist; 
but he carried his non-conformity to extremes. He would 
never take off his hat to anyone, no matter of what rank, 
and he could not be induced to address anyone as "Esquire" 
or"Reverend", all his letters being addressed "Mr". He 
would never put on an^  ^ signs of mourning even for father 
or mother, holding that since such signs were in so many 
cases insincere, they should be discouraged. His "passion 
for reforming the world" was shown in small things as well 
as in large. The publication of his Lucid Shorthand was 
held up time and again because of his intemperate desire
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to alter, amend, modify or improve it. He had a fond­
ness for revising dictionaries, and so strong a liking 
for lucidity of expression that he would habitually ig­
nore or refuse to answer questions put to him by his 
wife if they lacked clarity. This implied tendency to 
faultfinding led to his 'one great drawback,' his lack 
of kindness to his wife. His temper was not always un­
der control, and his sympathies were imperfect. His 
son shared the defect, which was probably the cause of 
his remaining a bachelor to the end of his life. In 
mitigation of his father's shortcoming in this essential 
social quality, Spencer mentions a nervous disorder which 
attacked him soon after his marriage. The lack of physic­
al vitality and a consequent depression of spifits result­
ed in the father's showing less than the usual interest 
in his son's early education, and in denying him the natur­
al expressions of affection which might have remedied a 
defect in his son’s nature —  its one-sided intelleotual- 
ism and lack of emotional warmth. Despite imperfect health 
the father’s mind remained plastic to the end of his life—  
so plastic that he changed his religious opinions after 
he was seventy.
On all counts Spencer owed much to his father. Re- 
fleeting on his nature at the age of 73, he says, "What- 
H, ever specialities of character and faculty in me are due
to inheritance, are inherited from my father. Between my 
mother's mind and my own I see scarcely any resemblances, 
emotional or intellectual. She was very patient; I am
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very impatient. She was tolerant of pain, bodily or 
mental; I am intolerant of it. She was little given to 
fault-finding with others; I am greatly given to it. She 
was submissive; I am the reverse of submissive. So, too, 
in respect of intellectual faculties, I can perceive no 
trait common to us; unless it be a certain greater calm­
ness of judgment than was shown by my father, for my 
father's vivid representative faculty was apt to play him 
false. Not only, however, in the moral characters just 
named am I like my father, but such intellectual charac­
ters as are peculiar are derived from him. " Of these 
Spencer names three. The first is the tendency to look 
for the causes underlying phenomena of all kinds coupled 
with an 'unconquerable belief' in natural causation as 
governing social as well as physical evolution. The sec­
ond is the synthetic tendency exemplified in the father's 
little work on Inventional Geometry, and culminating in 
Spencer's exposition of philosophy as a system of com­
pletely co-ordinated knowledge. Spencer's method was to 
start with what he assumed to be a fundamental principle 
and upon it to build a coherent system of deductions. 
Thirdly, there went along with the synthetic tendency 'an 
almost equal analytic tendency.' "Both subjectively and 
2T, objectively, the desire to build up was accompanied by
an almost equal desire to delve down to the deepest ac­
cessible truth, which should serve as an unshakable found­
ation."
Of Spencer's four paternal uncles, Thomas had most in-
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fluence on his nephew. He began life as a teacher in 
a school near Derby, but he succeeded later in entering 
h . r v . ' B . C a m b r i d g e ,  whence he graduated as ninth wrangler. From 
the University he entered the Church and acquired a liv­
ing at Charterhouse Hinton. There he distinguished him­
self as a social reformer and philanthropist. He built 
a school and appointed a master; organised the cultivation 
of small allotments; established a clothing club; built 
cottages of an improved design; and, in the face of great 
opposition, applied to his parish the provisions of the 
new Poor Law, thereby reducing the rates from £700 a 
year to £200 a year, and at the same time increasing the 
comfort and prosperity of the parish. He was interested in 
Church-reform and was a keen politician, taking an act­
ive part in the agitation for the repeal of the C o m  Laws. 
By writing a pamphlet on Church-reform which offended his 
bishop, he destroyed all prospects of clerical preferment. 
This uncle Thomas was entrusted with the education of his 
nephew Herbert during the impressionable years of the 
letter's adolescence (13 to 16); and the period spent at 
Hinton was the only disciplined and systematic course of 
study which the future philosopher underwent. Thomas was 
without a doubt the most outstanding of the brotherhood.
The brothers were frequent visitors at his father's 
house; and listening to the discussions which went on be­
tween them was by no means the least valuable part of 
Spencer's education. These discussions turned usually on 
social and ethical topics, and were marked by an absence of
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personal gossip and an interest in the general and the 
abstract. "As a boy," says Spencer, "I rarely if ever
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heard among them (the uncles) any talk about royal 
personages, or court doings, or anything concern­
ing bishops and lords, or any agents of the ruling 
powers. Their conversation ever tended towards the 
impersonal. ...... Their discussions never referred
to poetry, or fiction, or the drama. Nor was the 
reading of history carried to any extent by them.
And, though in early life they were all musical, 
the aesthetic in general had no great attractions.
It was rather the scientific interpretations and 
moral aspects of things which occupied their thoughts#"
Independence, self-asserting judgment, the tendency 
to non-conformity, the unrestrained display of sentiments 
and opinions, interest in political, social, religious and 
ethical matters —  in that list Spencer sums up the traits 
common to his uncles, mentioning them because they in­
dicate family characteristics which he himself would be 
likely to inherit. Students of Spencer's life will read­
ily agree that he bred true to type.
Education during Boyhood.
More than most men, Spencer was prone to general­
ise on his own experience; and in his writings on edu­
cation there is abundant evidence that his views were 
coloured by the impressions his own schooling had left up­
on him. It is of importance, therefore, to note the 
kind of discipline he himself underwent,before any attempt 
is made to appraise his contribution to educational thought 
As an only child under a father whom ill-health 
and material cares had somewhat depressed, his early life 
could not have been of the happiest. His most poignant 
memory of his life at Derby up to the age of four was
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that of being left by his nurse shut up in the house 
alone, during which time he first suffered the 'agonies 
of solitude.*
In 1824,the family removed from Derby to New Radford, 
near Nottingham; and there began the desultory instruction 
which lasted until he was seven and the family returned to 
Derby. The father was by profession a teacher, and, de­
spite his irritability, he appears to have been very suc­
cessful in his vocation. His ruling principle was non- 
coercion. Self-help and independent discovery rather than 
passive reception, were his mottoes. These principles he 
applied in the upbringing of his son. He prescribed little 
of the ordinary lesson-learning, partly on principle and 
partly because he believed that his son was not constit- 
utionally strong. "In teaching him his letters," says 
the father, "which I began to do when about 4 years old 
by beginning with the capitals and cutting them out in 
paper for him, although he learned a certain number of 
them with ease, perceiving he did not ask to learn any 
more, nor even to renew his knowledge of those he had 
learned, I ceased to invite him." One result of this 
regime was Spencer's 'repugnance to rote learning," which 
remained a life-long characteristic, and which led to his 
insistence on the method of self-discovery as the "natural" 
method in education. There resulted also the fact that, 
not being able to read with ease until he was seven years 
of age, he was much behind other children in the usual 
scholastic accomplishments. But there were compensations.
i.t- (>%
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He was allowed to ramble freely about a tract of waste 
land bordering his home, and there and then he began a 
habit of first-hand nature-study which was to stand him 
in good stead in his future life-work. There also he 
discovered the charm of adventure in exploring the paths 
among the gorse bushes, and the delight of gathering 
blue-bells and collecting fraients of wool left by pass­
ing sheep.
On the return to Derby the ordinary school-drill re­
mained still in abeyance. But the nature-study went on. 
Young Spencer spent most of his time in the garden attach­
ed to the new home, or in exploring the neighbouring 
districts of Osmaston and Normanton, "now in the spring 
seeking birds’ nests, now gathering violets or dog roses, 
and later in the year collecting sometimes mushrooms, 
sometimes blackberries, sometimes hips and haws, crab- 
apples and other wild products." "Most children," Spen­
cer observes, "are instinctively naturalists, and were 
they encouraged would readily pass from careless observ­
ations to careful and deliberate ones. My father was 
wise in such matters; and I was not simply allowed but 
encouraged to enter on natural history." One branch of 
natural history, entomology, was pursued more systemat­
ically under the father’s direction. Spencer caught and 
reared various insects, made drawings of them, and oc­
casionally added descriptions. Drawing remained a fav­
ourite pursuit all through boyhood; but it was always 
from the actual object, the father objecting to the
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practice of drawing from copies. For Saturday after­
noon and holidays, there was fishing in the neighbour­
ing streams —  a form of recreation to which Spencer 
remained very much attached throughout life.
Spencer’s first experience of regular schooling was 
at a day-school kept by a Mr. Mather, ’a very ordinary 
mechanical kind of teacher, who had no power of interest­
ing his pupils in what they were taught.’ As was to be 
expected, Spencer made little progress. His repugnance 
to rote-learning prevented his acquiring the usual pro­
ficiency in the drill subjects. He objected to the 
learning of Latin grammar because of its ’want of system. ’ 
His disregard of authority resulted in chronic disobed­
ience; and as his father had forbidden punishment, there 
was no curb to the exercise of his excessive self-will.
Mr. Mather’s dogmatism succeeded only in rousing his 
pupil’s opposition. "The mere authoritative statement," 
says Spencer, "that so-and-so is so-and-so, made without 
evidence or intelligible reason, seems to have been from 
the outset constitutionally repugnant to me."
More profit was derived from a period of attendance 
begun at the age of ten at his Uncle William’s school.
Here the method of instruction was more to his liking; 
and some progress was made in experimental mechanics, 
drawing from objects and geography. A beginning was made 
to Greek by tackling a portion of the Greek Testament 
without any preliminary study of grammar.
Up to the age of thirteen, however, informal edu-
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cation contributed by far the most important influence 
to Spencer’s mental development. Reference has al­
ready been made to the discussions which he heard 
carried on by his father and his uncles or other visit­
ors to his home. He was a frequent listener to inform­
al debates on ethical, religious, political or scientif­
ic questions. He took part also in experiments initi­
ated by his father in physios and chemistry. There was 
a constant search for causes; and in this the father 
insisted on self-discovery rather than passive acceptance 
of the explanations of others. Along with this experi­
mentation went a course of miscellaneous reading. As 
soon as he could read tolerably, he began to read fiction 
with avidity. This was carried on by stealth, both his 
parents disapproving of imaginative works, poetry ex­
cepted. The usual nursery books were absent. Sandford 
and Merton first prompted him to read of his own accord. 
Then followed The Castle of Otranto, the stories of 
Mrs Radcliffe and other similar romances. About the age 
of eleven or twelve he passed from fiction to travel and 
history. He read Gibbon and the whole of Rollin’s 
Ancient History. He appears to have forgotten this early 
experience when writing the essay. What Knowledge is of 
Most Worth?, wherein he disapproves of biographical histor# 
for in speaking of this part of his education, he remarks, 
"The epical interest is dominant in early stages, alike
r. />• .
 ^ of the individual and of the race; and I had then more
liking for personal narratives and accounts of striking
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events, for details of battles and sieges, than after­
wards remained with me." Besides books he had access 
to such miscellaneous periodicals as the Lancet, the 
British and Foreign Medical Review, the Medico-Ohirur- 
gical Review, the Athene urn, the Mechanics’ Magazine , 
and Chambers’s Journal* The topics which interested 
him most were those dealing with mechanical, physical, 
medical, and anatomical subjects.
Speaking of the results of his education up to the
age of thirteen, Spencer says, ’’I knew nothing worth
mentioning of Latin and Greek: my acquaintance with 
Latin being limited to ability to repeat very im­
perfectly the declensions and a part only of the con­
jugations (for I never got all through them); and my 
acquaintance with Greek being such only as was ac­
quired in the course of a word for word translation, 
under my uncle William’s guidance, of the first few 
chapters of the Greek Testament. Moreover I was 
wholly uninstructed in English —  using the name in 
its technical sense: not a word of English grammar 
had been learned by me, not a lesson in. composition.
I had merely the ordinary knowledge of arithmetic; 
and, beyond that, no knowledge of mathematics. Of 
English history nothing; of ancient history a little; 
of ancient literature in translation nothing; of 
biography nothing. Concerning things around, however, 
and their properties, I knew a good deal more than is 
known by most boys. My conceptions of physical prin­
ciples and processes had considerable clearness; and 
I had a fair acquaintance with sundry special phenom­
ena in physics and chemistry. I had also acquired, 
both by personal observation and by reading, some 
knowledge of animal life, and especially of insect 
life; but no knowledge of botany, either popular or 
systematic. By miscellaneous reading a little 
mechanical, medical, anatomical, and physiological 
information had been gained; as also a good deal of 
information about the various parts of the world and 
their inhabitants. Such were the acquisitions which 
formed a set-off against the ignorance of those things 
commonly learned by boys.
"Something remains to be named, however. I refer 
to the benefit derived from an unusual mental discip­
line. My father’s method, as already intimated, was 
that of self-help carried out in all directions.
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Beyond such self-help as I have already exemplified, 
there was always a prompting to intellectual self- 
help. A constant question with him was, --'I wonder 
what is the cause of so-and-so;’or again, fnitting it 
directly to me, —  ’Can you tell me the cause of 
this?’ Always the tendency in himself, and the tend­
ency strengthened in me, was to regard everything as 
naturally caused; and I doubt not that while the 
notion of causation was thus rendered much more defin­
ite in me than in most of my age, there was establish­
ed a habit of seeking for causes, as well as a tacit 
belief in the universality of causation. Along with 
this there went absence of all suggestion of the mir­
aculous. I do not remember my father ever referring 
to anything as explicable by supernatural agency. I 
presume from other evidence that he must at that time 
have still accepted the current belief in miracles; 
but I never perceived any trace of it in his convers­
ation. Certainly his remarks about the surrounding 
world gave no sign of any other thought than that of 
uniform natural law.
"Let me add that there was on his part no appeal 
to authority as a reason for accepting a belief. That 
same independence of judgment which he had himself, he 
tended,alike intentionally and unintentionally, to 
foster in others; and in me he did it very effectually, 
whether with purpose or not. Doubtless it existed in­
nately: but his discipline strengthened it."
Education during Adolescence.
It was perhaps fortunate for Spencer that during 
the years from thirteen to sixteen, the years of adoles­
cence, he came under the charge of his Uncle Thomas at 
Hinton. Those three years were the only experience he 
had of systematic instruction and disciplined study. It 
required a Spencer to control a Spencer; and the uncle 
had sufficient of the family self-assertion to impose a 
salutary restraint on the nephew’s self-will.
It was not to be expected that the association would 
run smoothly from the outset. Spencer had been inveigled 
into the discipleship by a stratagem. He had gone with
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his parents, ostensibly on a month’s visit, and when 
he discovered, on the departure of his father and mother, 
that his stay was to be prolonged, he resented the subter­
fuge, and found the unaccustomed restraint irksome to a 
degree. There was besides a violent attack of nostalgia. 
Another lad might have lived it down, and have decided to 
make the best of it. Not so Spencer. He quietly made 
up his mind to run away. With only two shillings in his 
pocket, and without taking copnsel with anyone, he slipped 
away from his uncle’s house at six o ’clock in the morning 
and set out to walk from Hinton to Derby. Without any 
food but bread and water and two or three glasses of beer, 
and without sleep for two nights, he, a boy of thirteen, 
walked 48 miles one day, 47 the next, and some 20 the 
third. It says much for Spencer’s physical stamina but 
more for his doggedness of purpose, resentment of in­
justice, and repugnance to control. The father no doubt 
realised that the escapade had been brought about partly 
by his own lack of frankness, and also no doubt felt some­
what flattered at the implied affection for home on his 
son’s part. So, as a wise man, he made little of the re­
bellion, but after an interval for rest and recuperation 
he sent his son back to the parsonage at Hinton.
From this time on, the relationship between teacher 
and pupil continued to be more or less harmonious, and 
Spencer applied himself to his studies fairly assiduously. 
The regime was not severe. ’’In the morning Euclid and 
Latin, in the afternoon commonly gardening, or sometimes.
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a walk; and in the evening, after a little more study, 
usually of Algebra, I think; oame reading, with occasionally 
chess." Spencer was not a very industrious pupil. He 
thinks that idleness was constt\^utional in him. He needed 
the stimulus of some powerful motive, usually the desire 
to compass some large end. He was still much averse to 
linguistic studies, although he surprised his uncle by 
his extensive acquaintance with words, gained, he thinks, 
by reading all kinds of books and listening to the con­
versation of his elders. Under his uncle he made a be­
ginning to French grammar and continued his study of 
Latin and Greek; but his progress in languages was slight. 
In later life he had difficulty in reading even French, 
and his knowledge of Latin and Greek was still more im­
perfect. His dislike of linguistic study was comprehend­
ed under a wider dislike of dogmatic teaching of any kind. 
The only kind of language study which would have been 
tolerable to him would have been comparative study —  
philology as the science of language in general. The mere 
acceptance on authority that such a symbol means such and 
such a thing he could never tolerate.
With mathematics and science the case was quite 
different# Under a skilful and intelligent teacher, such 
as his uncle was, his progress was rapid. He was delight­
ed with the study of trigonometry. Algebra and geometry, 
where every fact was demonstrable and capable of rigid 
proof, made strong appeal to him. His self-comfidence 
and disregard for authority were shown in his objection
4 3 .
to a statement on the nature of inertia which occurred 
in Arnott's Physics, the text-book employed by his uncle.
The uncle supported Dr. Arnott's opinion, but Spencer, un­
able to resist his tendency to criticize opinions, obstin­
ately defended his own belief in the presence of teacher, 
fellow-pupil and aunt. It is hardly to be wondered at 
that his uncle reported that "the grand deficiency in 
Herbert's natural character is in the principle of Fear;" 
i>. fty. or that his relatives "had to deal with intractable
material —  an individuality too stiff to be easily moulded."
While the scientific studies proceeded satisfactorily, 
there was an almost complete absence of the humanities. 
Spencer more than once insists on his almost complete ignor­
ance of English grammar. The course of education at Hinton 
included no history, 'no culture in general literature,’ 
no reading of poetry or fiction. With the negligible ex­
ception of a smattering of French, Latin and Greek, the 
studies were confined to the abstract sciences, such as 
mathematics, physics and mechanics, together with a little 
chemistry. The concrete sciences were for the most part 
omitted.
The moral discipline was highly beneficial. At home 
the control had been too lax, and had consequently led to 
frequent disobedience and reprimands, resulting in a 
sullenness of mind and a state of chronic rebellion. At 
Hinton the uncle's rule was strong enough to compel obed­
ience; and for the only period of his life Spencer ex­
perienced what it meant to subordinate his will to a
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stronger will. If criticism is to be made at all, it 
is to the effect that the asceticism of the uncle's 
nature led him to neglect the emotions and to deny his 
pupil the outward show of affection which he undoubtedly 
felt for him. It was a childless home into which Spencer 
was received and one in which the amenities of social 
intercourse were rarely experienced. Thomas Spencer had 
little of the small change of polite intercourse and was 
too much absorbed in his schemes of social betterment to 
have time for more than a minimum of entertaining. Spen­
cer' 8 fellow-pupils were too far beneath him in intellect­
ual ability for him to benefit much from their company. 
Their competition was not serious enough to curb his 
somewhat excessive vanity.
One noteworthy event occurred during the three years’ 
stay at Hinton. That was Spencer's first appearance in 
print. At the age of sixteen he wrote two articles for 
a small periodical, The Bath Magazine. One was a letter 
describing the formation of certain floating crystals, 
noted by Spencer in a little experiment on the crystalliz­
ation of common salt. The other took the form of a critic­
al reply to a communication antagonistic to the New Poor 
Law, which had appeared in the first number of the mag­
azine. This topic was suggested by the frequent convers­
ations which Spencer listened to at Hinton. These dis­
cussions undoubtedly had their influence in shaping the 
course of Spencer's later interests, and made their con­
tribution to the train of thought which led to the writ­
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ing of his first considerable work, Social Statics.
lesults of Spencer's Education»
In summing up Spencer's education, we may note 
first the absence of regular school life. His only con­
siderable experience of this was in the school of his 
uncle William, where his attendance was of short duration 
and where he had a somewhat privileged position. In con­
sidering Spencer's criticisms of the ordinary school regime, 
we must remember that his acquaintance with it was largely 
at second hand. It is fair to conjecture, however, that 
Spencer could never have been happy at a public school.
His individuality was too strongly marked, his bent of mind 
was too strongly scientific, his independence too aggressive 
for successful and harmonious co-operation with school­
fellows or for profitable intercourse with schoolmasters.
But the lack of the normal experiences of boyhood had its 
drawbacks. Excessive individualism was fostered rather 
than repressed, one result being that Spencer failed after­
wards to lay proper emphasis on the social side of educa­
tion and tended to regard the process as entirely one of 
instruction.
In the second place, the absence of the humanities 
conËltouted a serious defect in his education. Language, 
literature and history are social studies which demand
for their appreciation a due amount of sympathy and social
^nd which in turn foster the social sympathies and increase 
insight,;^  Spencer had too little of either. As a boy, it 
Isocial insight.
is true, he was for a time much given to day-dreaming,
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which, in moderation, he regarded as beneficial as a 
means of exercising the 'constructive imagination'. 
Accompanying that trait went a strong taste for fiction, 
which, as we have seen, he contrived to indulge to his 
heart's content. There can be no doubt that if he had 
continued to cultivate this taste, and especially if it 
had been guided and refined by a due amount of literary 
and historical instruction, his social and educational 
philosophies would have been saved from an abstractness 
and a one-sidedness which much impair their value. For 
example, his view of the value of history is extraordinar­
ily biased. Anyone who could have allowed himself to 
write of the contribution of Greece and Rome to modern 
civilization as Spencer did, must either have been un­
fortunate in his studies or deficient in historical imagin- 
ation. "To one who never received the bias given by the
7 T Ï7- established course of culture," says Spencer, "and on
whom the authority of traditions and customs weighs but 
little, the state of opinion about the matter appears 
astounding. To think that after these thousands of 
years of civilization, the prevailing belief should 
still be that while knowledge of his own nature, bodily 
and mental, and of the world physical and social in 
which he has to live, is of no moment to a man, it is of 
great moment that he should master the languages of two 
extinct peoples and become familiar with their legends, 
battles, and superstitions, as well as the achievements, 
mostly sanguinary, of their men, and the crimes of their 
gods! Two local groups of facts and fictions, filling 
relatively minute space in the genesis of a World which 
is itself but an infinitesimal part of the Universe, so 
occupy students that they leave the World and the Uni­
verse unstudied! Had Greece and Rome never existed, 
human life, and the right conduct of it, would have 
been in their essentials exactly what they now are: 
survival or death, health or disease, prosperity or 
adversity, happiness or misery, would have been just in 
the same ways determined by the adjustment or non-
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adjustment of actions to requirements. And yet 
knowledge subserving the adjustment which so pro­
foundly concerns men from hour to hour, is contempt­
uously neglected; while the best preparation for com­
plete living is supposed to be familiarity with the 
words and thoughts, successes and disasters, follies, 
vices and atrocities, of two peoples whose intelligence 
was certainly not above ours, whose moral standard was 
unquestionably lower, and whose acquaintance with the 
nature of things, internal and external, was relatively 
small. Still more when from the value of knowledge 
for guidance we pass to the value it has for general 
illumination, may we continue to marvel at the pervers­
ity with which, generation after generation, students 
spend their years over the errors of ancient speculators 
who had no adequate data for their reasonings, while all 
that modern science, having for materials the accumulat­
ed and generalized observations of centuries, can tell 
respecting ourselves and our surroundings, they ignore; 
or if they glance at it, do so at leisure hours as at 
something relatively unimportant. In times to come 
this condition of opinion will be instanced as one of 
the strange aberrations through which Humanity has 
passed."
In the third place, Spencer, as an only child, was 
denied the informal education which comes from intercourse 
with brothers and sisters in the home. He was almost con­
tinually in the society of adults; and his natural pre­
cocity was stimulated and encouraged instead of being 
allowed to develop more naturally, as it would have done 
had there been less attention devoted to his mental devel­
opment. It must not b© thought, however, that Spencer 
was encouraged to overwork himself. Unless when his 
interest was thoroughly aroused, he appears to have been 
by nature an idler. Much as he deplores the forcing pro­
cess which, he thinks, results in premature development 
of mind at the expense of growth, there is no ground for 
thinking that he himself suffered in this way. Non­
coercion was the key-note of his own education# If there
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was a defect here, it was constituted rather by the 
absence of control than by an over-rigidity. A period 
of regular work like that at Hinton but under a master 
other than a Spencer, with an interest in history and 
an enthusiasm for literature,might have done much to 
broaden his outlook and counterbalance the family prefer­
ence for scientific studies.
Spencer never passed an examination; nor did he 
think he could have passed any of the examinations common­
ly set. In estimating how far this lack of academic 
training affected his ultimate success, he comes to the 
conclusion that its advantages outweighed its disadvant­
ages. The disadvantages consist of a want of precision 
in the knowledge of facts, and an absence of readiness 
to apply these facts in ordinary ways. But the defici­
encies are more than compensated for in the greater readi­
ness to think in original ways and in the fuller develop­
ment of the innate potentialities of the mind. Spencer 
thinks that examinations are meant to test acquisition 
rather than power of independent thought and ought to 
be reformed so that they may test the candidate's capacity 
for original thinking.
For the ordinary boy the customary academic discipline 
is doubtless advantageous in so far as it stores the mind 
with useful information and gives a training in how to 
apply that information. For the supernormal boy, on the 
other hand, such as Spencer certainly was, the absence 
of restraint is all to the good. It allows genius to
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unfold itself in its own way and avoids stifling origin­
ality by not forcing the mind to develop on conventional 
lines. In Spencer's case we may conclude that while the 
customary schooling would have been harmful, a little 
more discipline applied with an understanding of his idio« 
synoracies would have been wholly beneficial.
Experience as a Teacher —  "A False Start."
Spencer's systematic education under his uncle 
Thomas ended in 1836, and he returned to his home in 
Derby. There he was left for a year to his own devices, 
and passed the time in miscellaneous pursuits which in­
cluded a little practical surveying, architectural draw­
ing, geometrical study, and angling —  always a favourite 
, , recreation. It was during this period that he discovered
a new property of the circle, which he published with a
proof two years later.
In the early autumn of 1837 a vacancy occurred in 
Mr Mather's school, where Spencer had himself been a 
pupil for a short period in early boyhood; and Spencer 
was offered the post. He accepted it with some reluctance. 
For the next three months he had his first and only ex­
perience of actual teaching. In this he appears to have 
been quite successful. Mr. Mather assigned him 'the 
least mechanical part of the teaching’; and Spencer, taking 
pleasure himself in his lessons, succeeded in creating 
interest in the minds of his pupils. He succeeded so well, 
in fact, that, as he tells us, his weekly lesson in geom-
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etry was eagerly looked forward to. As his later writ­
ings show, he had a natural gift for clear and vivid 
exposition, so that he easily gained and held the at­
tention of his pupils. His strong dislike of coercive 
methods and rigid discipline led to his exercising a 
very mild control over his pupils, with whom his relations 
were entirely harmonious. Later on when circumstances 
threw him into contact with children, he speedily be­
came a favourite; apparently showing a sympathy with 
them which would have stood him in good stead as a teach­
er. It was always his practice to study their individ­
ualities before attempting to enter on terms of familiar­
ity with them.
Would Spencer have been successful if he had follow­
ed the 'ancestral profession'? His own answer to this 
question was —  yes and no. Yes, if he could have ex­
ercised a supervisory function over some new kind of 
educational institution organised in accordance with his 
own ideals and staffed by intelligent assistants willing 
to carry out his instructions. No, if he had had to 
work under the ordinary kind of schoolmaster. The ob­
stacles to success would have been his dislike of mechan­
ical routine, his intolerance of monotony, and the op­
position of parents to the new curriculum he would have 
introduced. He continued to dwell upon imaginary schemes 
for a practical demonstration of his educational ideas, 
involving intellectual culture, moral discipline and 
physical training; but nothing came of these visionary
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projects. His energies were to be fully engaged in the 
grander task of elaborating the synthetic philosophy. 
Like many other reformers, Spencer was more powerful in 
the domain of theory than in the field of practice. His 
mind was ill suited for the trivial round of teaching, 
for the give and take of the schoolroom, and the in­
evitable drudgery entailed in the process of instruction.
Criticism of Teaching Methods.
He had no high opinion of the ordinary schoolmasters
of the time —  "Men who have gone on generation after
-, generation pursuing a mere mechanical routine —  men
who have never brought any analytical faculty to bear 
on the minds of their pupils —  men who have never 
thought of trying to ascertain the normal course of 
intellectual development, with the view of adapting 
their methods to the successive stages reached —  men 
who have, from the earliest stages to tie present time, 
taught abstractions before their pupils have acquired 
any of the concrete facts from which they are abstrac­
tions; such men, I say, have naturally failed to im­
press their fellow citizens. One who, not being a 
slave of tradition, contemplates schools as they have 
been, and as many of them still are, instead of be­
ing struck by the stupidity of the pupils, may more 
reasonably be struck by the stupidity of the masters."
His father was excepted from the general condemnation. 
Spencer justifies the high rank which his father assigned 
to the teacher's office by pointing out that the latter, 
although he had never made a systematic study of mental 
development, had formed some general ideas about it and 
had recognised the need for adjusting the course of in­
struction to the successive stages through which the 
mind passes. "Instead," says Spencer of his father, "ofI>./If
persisting in methods devised in rude times and un­
thinkingly persevered in down to our own, he constant­
ly sought for better methods. Always he aimed to
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secure an intelligent understanding of that which was 
taught: never being content with mere passive accept­
ance of it. And perceiving how involved a process is 
the unfolding of intellect, how important it is that 
the process should be aided and not thwarted, and what 
need there is for invention and judgment in the choice 
of means, he saw that, carried on as it should be, the 
educator's function is one that calls for intellectual 
powers of the highest order, and perpetually taxes these 
to the full. Not in intellect only, but in feeling, 
did his conception of the true educator demand super­
iority. He habitually sought, and sought successfully, 
to obtain the confidence of his pupils by showing sym­
pathy with them in their difficulties and in their 
successes; and thus secured a state of mind favourable 
to intellectual achievement, as well as to emotional 
improvement. "
Although the father was anxious that Spencer should 
follow in his footsteps, he recognised that the lad's bent 
lay elsewhere and wisely refrained from attempting any co­
ercion. Thus when the three months were up, and an offer 
came from London of a post as civil engineer under &Ir. 
Charles Fox, one of the pioneers of the railway enterprise 
then at its height, Spencer eagerly accepted it and enter­
ed on the next phase of his life which was to last, with 
interruptions, until he was twenty-six.
It is not necessary to follow his fortunes as an 
engineer, or his vicissitudes later as a London journalist, 
iintil the time when, at the age of forty, he began the 
stupendous task of writing the Synthetic Philosophy, Ad­
vance in age did little to change Spencer's fundamental 
ideas in education or philosophy; and it is possible to 
find in Social Statics, published when he was thirty, the 
ideas which he was elaborating in the successive volumes 
which he continued to publish or revise right up to the 
year 1900. We may therefore pass at once to consider
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the educational doctrine enunciated in Social Statics.
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CHAPTER III.
NATIONAL EDUCATION.
Early Antagonism towards Government,
Throughout his whole life Spencer maintained a 
consistent opposition to the intervention of the State 
in education. It was characteristic of him that, having 
early come to the conclusions that government is "a 
national institution for preventing one man from infring­
ing upon the rights of another," he never afterwards de­
parted from it; but, as he says himself, he spent much 
of his energy in subsequent years in justifying and 
HiS-, elaborating it. Individualism was characteristic of his
.0 stock. "Individuality was pronounced in all members of 
the family, and pronounced individuality is necessarily 
more or less at variance with authority. A self-depend­
ent and self-asserting nature resists all such govern­
ment as is not expressive of equitable restraint. Our 
family was essentially a dissenting family; and dissent 
is an expression of antagonism to arbitrary control.
Of course a wish to limit State-action is a natural 
concomitant."
This "wish to limit State-action" was first publicly 
expressed in a series of letters (subsequently issued in
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the form of a pamphlet) which Spencer contributed to the 
Nonconformist. an organ of the advanced Dissenters, dur­
ing the course of the year, 1842. The general title of 
the letters was "The proper Sphere of Government"; and in 
them Spencer discussed such topics as Commercial Restric­
tions, A National Church, The Poor Laws, War, Government- 
Colonization, National Education, Sanitary Administration. 
They were the germ of "Social Statics; " "had they never
V a/a .
been written," says Spencer, "Social Statics, which origin­
ated from them, would not even have been thought of." The 
general thesis of the letters is that the function of 
government is "simply to defend the natural rights of Men—  
to protect person and property— to prevent the aggressions 
of the powerful upon the weak— in a word, to administer 
justice." (Autobiogr. I,p.209). Society has its laws just 
zo?. as much as matter or mind; and the "laws of society are of 
such a character that natural evils will rectify themselves 
by virtue of a 'self-adjusting principle'."
"Social Statics."
During the next few years Spencer continued to 
speculate along the lines laid down in ?The Proper Sphere 
of Government"; and the result was the writing of his 
first considerable book, Social Statics, commenced early 
in the autumn of 1848, and published at the very end of 
1850. The title originally selected for the work was 
"A System of Social and Political Morality," but ultimate­
ly the shorter title was preferred. The full title reads: 
"Social Statics: or, The Conditions Essential to Human 
Happiness Specified, and the First of them Developed."
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The book discusses a system of what Spencer calls 
'absolute ethics,' that is to say, the principles which 
will govern human conduct when man is perfectly developed 
and lives in complete adaptation to his environment, phys­
ical and social. 'Relative ethics,' or the principles 
which should govern conduct during the process of transi­
tion from incomplete to complete adaptation, are only 
briefly considered. Spencer looks forward to the time 
when men will have attained to a state of complete equil­
ibrium with their environment, and when progress will no 
longer be possible or desirable. The aim will then be to 
preserve the equilibrium; and that, he thinks, will best 
be done if the law of equal freedom is complied with, 
namely, the law prescribing that each man shall have free­
dom to do all that he wills provided that he infringes not 
the equal freedom of all other men.
Temporary Nature of Governmental 
Institutions.
Still adhering nominally to supernaturalism, Spen­
cer assumes that God wills human happiness. Happiness 
consists in the unrestrained exercise of faculty. Unre­
strained exercise of faculty presupposes liberty of action. 
Therefore the happiness of man is contingent on the ob­
servance of the law of equal freedom. The ultimate state 
of equilibrium constitutes the standard of value by which 
society is to be judged; present conditions must be 
estimated in accordance with the degree to which they ap- 
proximate to the final state. "The ultimate man," Spencer
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tells us,'"will be one whose private requirements coincide 
with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in 
spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally per­
forms the functions of a social unit; and yet is only en­
abled to fulfil his own nature, by all others doing the 
like." The State and its institutions are mere makeshifts 
temporary expedients, destined to pass away when evolution 
is complete. Mankind will then live in a "state of no
ji ’if’k y
government. "
Limited Functions of the State.
When Spencer comes to consider the functions of 
the State in existing societies, he forgets the need for 
its temporary existence, and proceeds to evaluate it 
against the ideal of complete anarchy, which he has set 
up as the end-state of the evolutionary process. Viewed 
in this light, State interference is almost entirely bad.
At every point it infringes the law of equal freedom.
Only two legitimate functions are left to it. In the 
first place, it must guarantee to every citizen liberty 
to do as he wishes subject only to his allowing a like 
freedom to every other citizen. In the second place, it 
may rightly protect society against foreign aggression.
All other functions which the State arrogates to itself 
are unwarrantable interferences with individual "rights."
What the State ought not to do.
In his denunciations of the sins of legislators it 
is easy to detect the influence of Spencer's ingrained 
nonconformity, and his concern for the so-called natural
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rights of the individual. Chapter after chapter of 
Social Statics catalogues the things the State ought not 
to do. It ought not to allow private ownership of land. 
Instead, private ownerships ought to be merged in "the 
joint-stock ownership of the public." Farmers should 
rent their land from the nation; so that all would be 
equally free to bid for a vacant farm, and all would 
alike benefit from the rents paid. The State ought not 
to attempt the regulation of commerce, for experience has 
shown that interference is neither expedient nor just.
The State ought not to endow religion, since the establish­
ing of a State Church assumes that the State can infallibly 
determine which is the true faith, and because State sup­
port of a particular creed argues the weakness of that 
creed to impose itself on men's minds without such support. 
The State ought not to dispense poor-relief. Taxes imposed 
for poor-relief infringe the law of equal freedom, by pre­
venting the complete exercise of faculty on the part of 
those taxed. Besides, poor-relief has the effect, first, 
of drying up the spontaneous sympathy of the individual 
for his less fortunate fellows, and, more serious, of 
interfering with the "stern discipline" of nature, which, 
at the cost of much temporary suffering and misery, ultimate­
ly purges the race of weaklings, and helps on that complete 
adaptation to environment which constitutes the highest 
civilization. Again the State has no right to plant 
colonies, for the planting of colonies leads to expenses 
being incurred by the parent State which have to be met
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out of taxes; and these taxes limit the freedom of its 
citizens in unwarrantable ways. Moreover, colonial 
government infringes the rights of the colonists, for 
the latter are invariably dictated to by authorities 
sent out from the mother-country.
There are other things which the State ought not to 
do. It ought not to institute sanitary enterprises, which, 
besides being more efficiently undertaken by private per­
sons, if undertaken at all, interfere, like poor-relief,
" J @ t 2 . u 6 with the wise severity of nature's discipline. "Partly
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by weeding out those of lowest development, and partly 
by subjecting those who remain to the never-ceasing dis­
cipline of experience, nature secures the growth of a 
race who shall both understand the conditions of exist­
ence, and be able to act up to them." Finally, the 
State ought not to establish a State bank for the issue 
of notes; it ought not to control currency by minting 
its own coins; it ought not to undertake a postal service, 
as that can be most efficiently performed by private enter­
prise; it ought not to construct light-houses, harbours 
of refuge, canals, railways or roads —  all of which enter­
prises are best left to private initiative#
The State and Education#
The State has no right to educate. In order to 
proxvide a national system of education, the State must 
impose taxes; that is, it must take away a portion of 
a man's property, which deprives him of a portion of his 
right to the free exercise of his capacities— a reversal 
of the government's function towards him.
o I .
Alleged Reasons for State Interference.
(a)In considering the pretexts brought forward to 
justify State-intervention in education, Spencer quotes 
from J. S. Mill: "In the matter of education, the inter- 
vention of government is justifiable; because the case 
is one in which the interest and judgment of the consumer 
are not sufficient security for the goodness of the com­
modity," His reply to this is that a similar reason has 
been assigned for all State-interferences whatever. It 
is impossible to say in respect to what articles the 
judgment of the consumer jls sufficient, and in respect 
to what other articles it is not sufficient. Experience 
teaches us that, "in the long run, the interest of the 
consumer is not only an efficient guarantee for the good­
ness of the things consumed, but the best guarantee."
Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the choice of 
commodities— education included— "may be safely left to 
the discretion of buyers."
Ignorant parents have three means of arriving at 
a proper choice. They will be quick to discern the 
effects of good or bad education on the children of others, 
and will act accordingly; they may follow the example of 
those better educated than themselves in the choice of 
schools; or, in the last resort, they have only to look 
to the price charged for schooling, since price is a 
"tolerably safe index of value." Even if some parents 
are lacking in discretion in the purchase of the educa­
tion commodity, their number is bound progressively to 
diminish. "The rising generation will better understand
f« jy ~ 3éf.
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what good education is than their parents do, and 
their descendants will have clearer conceptions of it 
still." Improvement may be slow, but so is all social 
" J l r c Z m / p r o g r e s s ;  and, remembering that "society is a growth,
j). 370.
and not a manufacture," we must have patience.
(b) To say that government interposition is 
justified in order to safeguard the rights of children 
is to misunderstand the law of equal freedom. This law, 
though it applies to children, merely enacts the equal 
liberty of all to exercise every "previously existing 
power to pursue the objects of desire." "Omitting in­
struction in no way takes from a child's freedom to do 
whatsoever it wills in the best way it can; and this 
freedom is all that equity demands."
(c) Finally, it is not true to say that education 
by tending to diminish crime justifies the State in
his 3f4. setting up a national system of education. "Crime is in­
curable, save by that gradual process of adaptation to 
the social state which humanity is undergoing. Crime is 
the continual breaking out of the old unadapted nature—  
the index of a character unfitted to its conditions— and 
only as fast as the unfitness diminishes can crime dim­
inish." Education, as commonly practised, is concerned 
with the intellect. Crime results from the urge of un­
adjusted impulses and sentiments. Hence education, by 
sharpening the intellect, might easily have the effect 
of increasing crime by teaching people how better to
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gratify their passions. The moral benefit which 
education may confer comes from a training of the 
emotions, rather than from a discipline of the intellect. 
"But," exclaims Spencer, "from all legislative attempts
^ . 3^ 5” •
at emotional education may Heaven defend us!"
Difficulties involved in the Claim for 
State Education.
The claim for State education involves its up- 
holders in many difficulties. "Conceding for a moment,” 
says Spencer, "that the government is bound to educate 
a man's children, then, what kind of logic will demon­
strate that it is not bound to feed and clothe them?"
If there is no logical escape from the syllogism, the 
result will be the total annulment of parental respons­
ibility. In the second place, there is the ordeal of 
a definition to be undergone. If the State provides 
elementary education, it must find itself committed 
logically to the provision of university education as 
/3.3G7., well. "Where, between the teaching of a dame-school, and 
the most comprehensive university curriculum, can the 
line be drawn separating that portion of mental culture 
which may be justly claimed of the State, from that which 
may not be so claimed?" If the three R's are State- 
taught, why not also astronomy, mechanics and geology? 
There is no unit of measure by which to determine the 
respective values of different kinds of knowledge. In 
the third place, there is the difficulty of deciding on 
the true aim and method of education. If government 
undertakes the provision of instruction, it must also
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commit itself to a definition of its aim and method.
The results will be a despotic and stringent control 
over the culture of the nation and the complete abolition 
of freedom of thought. "As from the proposition that
J 6îT.
government ought to teach religion, there springs the 
other proposition, that government must decide what 
is religious truth, and how it is to be taught; so, 
the assertion that government ought to educate, 
necessitates the further assertion that it must say 
what education is, and how it shall be donducted. And 
the same rigid popery, which we found to be a logical 
consequence in the one case, follows in the other also."
Dangers of State Education.
If education is left to the interest and judgment 
of a government -- meaning the individual members of the 
Cabinet — , the result will be less satisfactory than if 
it were left to the individual parent. The governing 
classes are conservative by nature and tradition. Their 
ideal of society is either a sentimental feudalism or 
thë static maintenance of 'things as they are*, where the 
people*fehall be respectful to their betters, and 'content 
with that station of life to which it has pleased God to 
call them';" or else it is a State organised for the mere 
production of wealth. Besides being conservative, the 
governing classes are self-interested and selfish, so 
that a State system of education would be administered 
for the benefit of those in power rather than for the 
nation's benefit.
Far from benefiting from the conservatism of rulers, 
the institution of schooling, like all institutions, is 
^ too conservative as it is. "Education, properly so called,
is closely associated with change -- is its pioneer —
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is the never sleeping agent of revolution —  is always 
fitting men for higher things, and unfitting them for 
things as they are," State institutions of education 
will fight against this progressive tendency of "education 
properly so called." They will resist change, and will 
tend to teach the old "safe" subjects which are not like­
ly to shake their pupils out of contentment with "things 
as they are." To illustrate this antagonism to all pro­
gress, change and reform, Spencer adduces examples from 
the time of the Egyptian priesthood downwards to his own 
day, and concludes that State-education will continue to 
"StruiJL show such characteristics "so long as men pursue private
advantage at the expense of the common weal, that is to 
say —  so long as government is needful at all, so long 
will this be true."
State Education Self-defeating.
To think that the State can educate at all is to 
take a very narrow view of the meaning of education. It 
is to identify mere schooling with education in its widest 
sense, to emphasize formal education to the neglect of 
the informal education of life. Indeed "a government 
cannot in fact educate at all, but can only educate some 
by uneducating others? The best kind of discipline is 
the discipline of nature, which sees to it that men are 
adapted to their circumstances. State provision of edu­
cation interferes with this discipline of nature by dimin­
ishing the need for self-restraint on the part of parents 
in begetting children. The labourer is to some extent
/>
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discouraged from marrying unduly early by the thought 
of having to provide education for his children; and 
after marriage the necessity of paying for schooling 
acts as a curb upon the improvident tendencies of the 
poor, "Hence," says Spencer, "a government can educate 
in one direction only by uneducating in another —  can 
confer knowledge only at the expense of character. It 
retards the development of a quality (self-restraint) 
universally needed -- one in the absence of which poverty, 
and recklessness, and crime, must ever continue; and all 
that it may give a smattering of information."
The "Natural" Agency.
The whole claim for the intervention of the State 
in education ignores Nature's "divinely-appointed" means 
of safeguarding the mental and physical development of 
the young, namely, parental affection. The pride of the 
mother and the interest of the father, the "servants and 
interpreters of nature", will see to it that children's 
welfare is duly promoted up to the limit of their parent's 
resources. State educationists shov/ a childish im­
patience and a lack of faith in natural forces in seeking 
to use artificial means of achieving a result which is 
slowly but surely being brought about by a spontaneous 
self-unfolding of the national mind. The voluntary 
system of education may not bring about universal en­
lightenment in a generation; but social progress of all 
kinds is slow, like all great changes taking place in 
the universe. Are not continents upheaved at the rate of
366
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a foot or two in a century? Is not the deposition of 
a delta the work of tens of thousands of years? Y/hy 
then be disappointed that a pitiful fifty years has not 
sufficed for thorough popular enlightenment? Only re­
frain from legislative fingerings, and education will 
look after itself, since it is in the nature of things 
for education to undergo evolution.
Elaboration of Anti-State Arguments in 
"Justice" (1891).
Such are the arguments which Spencer brought forward 
against National Education in Social Statics, published 
when he was thirty. He is only speaking truth when he 
says that his whole subsequent life was spent in elabor­
ating this negative view of State action. For example, 
in Justice.published in 1891 as a section of The Principles 
of Ethics (1895)^ the same views are reiterated. The 
“H uh formula of justice is: —  "Every man is free to do that
which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal free­
dom of any other man." Under their most general aspect,
2J3-/f the duties of the State are to see that in "the incorpor­
ated mass of citizens", "each may gain the fullest life 
compatible with the fullest lives of fellow citizens." 
jj.xxx The "true conception of State-duties, " in industrial
societies characterised by voluntary co-operation, is 
that the State can do nothing more beyond maintaining 
justice without its transgressing justice.
The strongest reason for restricting the range of 
governmental actions is that the highest end of states­
manship is the formation of character, and the formation
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" of character is best left to that "natural moulding" by 
j>.2 s^. which human nature will slowly "adjust itself to the re­
quirements of a fully civilized future." The idea of 
State eaucation is a relic of a time long past when soci- 
A.ifs. ety was predominantly militant. "While war is the chief 
business of life, the training of individuals by govern­
mental agency after a pattern adapted to successful fight­
ing, is a normal accompaniment," and "there naturally 
establishes itself the theory that not soldiers only, but 
all other members of the community, should be moulded by 
the government into fitness for their functions." But 
now that the industrial form of society is supreme, the 
relation of the individual to society is entirely altered. 
Instead of the individual being moulded by society to 
suit its purposes, the former now moulds society to suit 
SlrU-.,l>.-xiy3. his owu individual purposes. "Unlike the Greek, who,
not owning himself was owned by his city, the Englishman
is not in any appreciable degree owned by his nation, but 
in a very positive way owns himself."
Even assuming that the State has any right to edu­
cate its citizens (which it has not) its education is 
bound to be bad. State education must result in uniform­
ity, and uniformity spells death to the human species. 
Without variety there can be no progress; in the absence 
of variety life would never have evolved at all. Again, 
State education must foster submissiveness among the 
pupils, and on no showing can submissiveness be regarded
6. Iff. as a feature in any desirable character. "Whether avow-
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edly or not, part of the desired character must be 
readiness in each citizen to submit, or make his child­
ren submit, to a discipline which some or many citizens 
determine to impose." This faulty result of a State 
schooling is a consequence both of out-worn aims and of 
bad method. As regards aims, these are dependent on 
prevalent ideas and beliefs as to what constitutes fit­
ness for life in society. Now, men inherit not only the 
physical and mental qualities of their ancestors but also 
their ideas and beliefs. "The current conception of a 
desirable citizen must therefore be a product of the past, 
slightly modified by the present; and the proposal is 
that past and present shall impose their conception on 
the future." As regards method, artificial attempts to 
form the character of citizens, violating as they do 
SirU., I>.2.ss. nature ^ s method which is the spontaneous adaptation of 
citizens to social life, are bound to be ineffective. 
History shows that despite centuries of the teaching of 
Christianity by Church, priest and pious book, the world 
is still full of aggressiveness, revengefulness, merci­
lessness and hate. There is little reason for thinking 
that any attempt at moulding character by the State will 
be more successful.
The Individual Parent the Proper Educator.
The proper upbringing and education cf children 4 ^  
considered by Spencer as falling under "The Ethics of 
Individual Life," (1892— Part III of "The Principles of 
Ethics?). Education is part of the individual parent’s
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responsibility and cannot be shouldered upon others 
s/fj. without infringing the ethical code of Nature under its 
evolutionary aspect. Spencer looks forward to the time 
when intrusion into the parental sphere by the State or 
any other social agency will be resisted as a trespass on 
the rights of the individual parent. The general law of 
the prolongation of infancy which now involves a lengthy 
physical care of children will come to involve a long 
and careful psychical nurture of them; ’ànd though the 
higher and more special educational functions will have 
to be discharged by proxy, yet the proxy-discharge will 
be under parental superintendence." Meantime, even if 
parents neglect their duty, Nature in her own stern way 
will apply the cure. The ill-nurtured offspring of such 
parents will succumb in the struggle for existence, and 
the race will be purged of much inferior stock. To think 
that the State can step in and assume what is properly 
parental duty is to ignore a fundamental law of Nature by 
which humanity has evolved thus far. Yet agitators and 
legislators have spread abroad a theory which leads to 
the%onstrous conclusion" that it is for parents to beget 
children and for society to take care of them; "that 
while each man, as parent, is not responsible for the 
mental culture of his own offspring, he is, as citizen, 
along with other citizens, responsible for the mental 
culture of all other men’s offspring." Such an absurd 
theory would never have gained currency had statesmen 
spent their youth in a systematic study of descriptive
/).W.
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sociology rather than wasted their time in the writing 
of Latin verses or learning about the misbehaviour of tiae 
Greek gods.
Spencer’s Life-long Hostility to 
National Education.
Later on we shall have occasion to examine critic­
ally this view of the relation of the State to education. 
For the present we may conclude by showing that, as was 
remarked in our first chapter, Spencer persisted in his 
attitude of hostility to the spread of national education 
right up to his death. When State education had reached 
a point in its development when it was taken for granted 
by thinkers of widely differing views on other social 
problems, Spencer remained unmoved. Writing in 1897 to 
W.A.S. Hewins, he says: "The whole scheme of public in­
struction, be it in Free Libraries or by State Education, 
is socialistic, and I am profoundly averse to socialism 
in every form;" and again in a communication to Dr.
M. W. Keatinge of the same year, there occurs the passage: 
"If, as you apparently indicate, raising the status of 
teachers and giving them better pay implies increase of 
taxation, then you may judge how far I approve of it when 
I tell you that, from my earliest days down to the present 
time, I have been a persistent opponent of all State edu­
cation." In the last year of his life —  almost in the 
last month —  Spencer gave expression to the same opinion. 
The times may have changed, other men may have been con­
verted, but not Herbert Spencer: he remained to the last 
the most persistent of individualists.
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CHAPTER IV.
MORAL EDUCATION.
Early Nineteenth Century Emphasis on 
Moral Education.
It was in Social Statics also that Spencer first 
tackled the specific problems of education. His approach 
was from the moral side. In the Chapter on "The Rights 
éicctc^'’ of Children", he defines the aim of education as "the form- 
ation of character." In thus regarding education, apart 
from the fact that moral training is necessarily concerned 
with the individual and therefore congenial to Spencer’s 
general social outlook, he was merely following a tradition 
common to writers on education at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The French Revolution had produced a 
strong feeling that in the interests of national welfare^ 
no less than in the individual’s interest,a training in 
right behaviour was a first essential. While there was 
difference of opinion concerning the proper agent of edu­
cation —  whether the State or the Church or voluntary 
enterprise ought to be responsible for the process —  
there was general agreement that the education given ought 
to include a sound moral training. This view found ex­
pression not only among English writers, but also on the
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Continent, In Germany the moral aim predominated in the 
thought of Fichte, Herbert, Hegel and Froe bel alike, al­
though they differed otherwise in their views of the 
the
nature 0:1^ educative process; and in France the post- 
Revolution theorists, notably the St. Simonians, struck 
the same ethical note. In Britain, Owen, Spencer and 
Thomas Arnold of Rugby alike looked on education as a 
means of character formation.
"Social Statics" —  Education a Passing 
Necessity.
Spencer’s first criticism of the prevailing educa­
tion (embodied in Chapter XVII of Social Statics) was 
thus a criticism from the moral point of view. In con­
tending that children have equal rights with adults under 
the law of equal freedom, he proclaims a belief in the 
wrongness of the customary relationship between parents 
and children, based as it is upon coercion. The aim of 
education he defines in moral terms as the formation of 
character. Man, he thinks, is still imperfectly fitted 
for the social state into which multiplication of the 
race has forced him. His nature is still semi-savage, 
his impulses still resemble those which are serviceable 
in his original predatory state. That education should 
be necessary at all is due to the fact that evolution is 
still proceeding. Man’s adaptation to his environment 
is still partial and incomplete. Hence children tend to 
develop wrongly, unless care is taken to exercise the 
social sentiments and to deny expression to the pre-social
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impulses which are still present in the human mind. 
Ultimately, however, education will be unnecessary. Once 
"morality shall have become organic", the child's oharac- 
ter will develop spontaneously into a form perfectly 
suited to the social state, and will produce the ideal 
man "whose every impulse coincides with the dictates of 
the moral law." "Education, therefore," says Spencer, "in 
so far as it seeks to form character, serves only a tempor­
ary purpose, and, like other institutions resulting from 
the non-adaptation of man to the social state, must in the 
end die out."
The Futility of Coercion.
Meantime children require to be trained in sympathy 
and self-control, two qualities which are essential for 
life in society. The uselessness of coercive education 
may be estimated in relation to that end, for apart from 
the fact that coercion is gradually being abandoned by 
educational reformers as inexpedient, it can be shown to 
be self-defeating. It is uneducative: deterrent and not 
reformative. The selfish child, aggressive and unsym­
pathetic, who is compelled by force to cease making a 
noise or to stop monopolising his companion's toys, re­
mains unaltered in character by the exercise of authority. 
His impulses are merely repressed for the time being. No 
step has been taken towards training him in habits of con­
sidérât èness or self-control. Good qualities grow strong 
only by exercise. Just as the artist practises drawing, 
or the musician exercises himself at his instrument, or
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the accountant submits himself to a thorough drilling 
in aritlimetic, so the developing child needs to practise 
sympathy and drill himself in self-control. Coercion 
generates hate and fear, sentiments the opposite of those 
it is desired to foster. Parents must first establish 
sympathetic and affectionate relations with their children, 
and then they may go to work through the sentiments on 
the task of character formation. Coercion fits a child 
only for a slave state: it unfits him to live as a free 
man among free men. The most severely disciplined child­
ren are often the wildest of men, for the reason that 
they have had no training in self-government.
Difficulties in training will undoubtedly occur 
even under the best system. They are most often due, 
however, to the faults of the parents. In particular, 
the love of dominion by making parents strive for 
mastery rather than for the reform of their children's 
nature is the cause of the very defects which it is the 
purpose of education to eradicate. Selfish and unreason­
able parents must expect to have selfish and unreasonable 
offspring. Occasionally, it is true, the best children 
will be unamenable to moral suasion, and coercion may 
need to be employed. "Nevertheless," says Spencer,
/ "patience, self-denial, a sufficient insight into youth­
ful emotions, and a due sympathy with them, added to a 
little ingenuity in the choice of means, will usually 
accomplish all that can be wished."
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Second Thoughts: Education a Permanent
Necessity.
The implication of this criticism of the ordinary 
methods of dealing with children is that in the ideal 
State, as a result of the operation of the process of 
evolution and of the law of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics —  in which Spencer, following Lamarck, 
firmly believed —  children will in course of time be 
born capable of developing spontaneously into individuals 
perfectly adapted to their environment and qualified to 
enjoy complete freedom to exercise their faculties.
Later on, however, Spencer modified his view that educa- 
* ' ,  tion "must in the end die out." In the Principles of 
Sociology, he tells us that while the family will con- 
tinue to exist, there will take place such a development 
in altruistic sentiment that parents, on the one hand, 
will manifest greater care for their children, and child­
ren, on the other hand, will in the latter days of life 
show greater filial care of their parents. Family educa- 
tion will then be so good that, together with "a spon- 
^ t a n e o u s  unfolding of the juvenile mind," no further
education will be required, except the instruction need­
ed for "special cultures" which will still have to be 
given by other teachers than the parents.
"Moral Education."
In approaching the problem of moral education in 
the essay with that title in the work on Education.
Spencer has in view things as they are, rather than as 
they will be in the ideal State which is to be the end
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product of human evolution. The essay was written dur­
ing the early part of 1858 and published in the British 
Quarterly in April of that year. Spencer had about a 
year before (in December, 1856) gone to live with a 
family in which there were several young children. He 
had profited by the opportunity thus presented of ob­
serving the treatment they received and their reactions 
towards it. This experience, he thinks, proved useful 
to him in writing his essay, on the general principle 
that by-standers often see most of the game.
Evolutionary Ethics.
The general thesis, which it is the purpose of the 
essay to establish, is that the proper system of moral 
discipline is the discipline of natural consequences. 
Evolution of all kinds has taken place through adaptation 
of structure and function to the needs of a changing en­
vironment. This adaptation has, in the case of man, been 
achieved "by the discipline of enjoying the pleasures 
 ^ and suffering the pains which followed this or that kind
of conduct." The development of the moral and emotion­
al nature of the individual must be effected by the same 
means. In the moral training of children, while there 
should be no needless restraints, the needful restraints 
should, like Nature’s reactions, be unvarying and ir­
resistible. The ultimate aim of this discipline is to 
produce a self-governing being, subject to no restraints 
except those imposed by the nature of things or the law 
of equal freedom.
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Education the Supreme Study.
The essay opens with a brief discussion designed 
to show the importance of a knowledge of the right meti od 
of bringing up children as a preparation for one of the 
most essential functions in life, that of parenthood# No 
subject is more neglected in ordinary systems of educa- 
tion; and yet "the subject which involves all other sub-
/6. / 2-7.
jects, and therefore the subject in which education should 
culminate, is the Theory and Practice of Education."
Limitations of the Process.
Despite the supreme importance of education as an 
agency in human development, it must not be supposed that 
a perfect system of education will produce an ideal human­
ity. There are three obstacles. Children are not all 
born good: although they are not b o m  evil in knowledge, 
they are born evil in impulse. In the second place, 
parents are themselves imperfect and cannot be expected 
to administer an ideal system of education. Finally, 
society is still imperfect. Despite these obstacles, 
enthusiasm for education is justified since it is one of 
the agencies which co-operate to bring about social re­
form by slow degrees.
Compensations for these Limitations.
No one need regret the fact that an ideal education 
is impossible while children, by the law of hereditary 
transmission of character, inherit the defects of their 
imperfect parents. The proximate aim of education being 
to prepare a child for the business of life, to produce
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a citizen who, while he is well-conducted, is also able 
to make his way in the world, —  that is, to engender a 
certain fitness for the world as it now is, —  a perfect 
education would defeat its own end. Society is still far 
from ideal, and as with government, so with the family, 
the average character of the people determines the qual­
ity of the control exercised. But that does not imply 
that to reform the system now in vogue is neither prac­
ticable nor desirable. It merely implies that reform 
in domestic government must go on pari passu with other 
reforms. Those reforms will be hastened if we know where 
the right lies.
In the case of domestic government, an ideal must 
be set up in order that there may be gradual approxima­
tions to it. The constitutional conservatism of human 
nature is strong enough to prevent a too speedy approx­
imation to this ideal in advance of similar reforms in 
other social institutions.
Hedonistic Ethics: Discipline by Natural 
Consequences.
To begin with it is necessary to establish a 
criterion by which to estimate the rightness or wrong­
ness of any particular act of conduct. This Spencer 
proceeds to do in hedonistic terms. "All theories of 
^ morality agree that conduct whose total results, im­
mediate and remote, are beneficial, is good conduct; 
while conduct whose total results, immediate and remote, 
are injurious, is bad conduct." In bodily injuries and 
their penalties we have misconduct and its consequences
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reduced to their simplest forms, and such bodily con­
duct may be classed as right or wrong in precisely the 
same way as all other conduct, namely, according to the 
beneficial or detrimental results produced. "When a 
child falls, or runs its head against the table, it 
suffers^pain, the remembrance of which tends to make it 
more careful; and by repetition of such experiences, it 
is eventually disciplined into proper guidance of its 
movements. If it lays hold of the fire-bars, thrusts 
its hand into a candle-flame, or spills boiling water 
on any part of its skin, the resulting burn or scald is 
a lesson not easily forgotten, Now in these cases,
Nature illustrates to us in the simplest way, the true 
theory and practice of moral discipline,"
The theory and practice of moral discipline, there­
fore, centre on the proper method of punishment; and 
Spencer's whole discussion is negative —  not how to pro­
mote good conduct but how to prevent bad. First of all 
physical transgressions are considered. Nature sees to 
it that physical "sins" bring about their own painful 
reactions. Those reactions, which we call punishments 
for want of a better word, are not artificial and un­
necessary inflictions of pain; they are simply the béné­
ficient checks to actions that are essentially at vari­
ance with bodily welfare. They are the unavoidable 
consequences of the deeds which they follow, the 
inevitable reactions entailed by the child's actions.
As punishments, these natural consequences possess many
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merits, which we now proceed to enumerate.
Advantages of Punishment by Natural 
Consequences.
In the first place, Nature’s reactions are pro­
portionate to the transgressions. A slight accident 
brings a slight pain; a more serious one, a severe pain. 
In the second place, the reactions are constant, direct, 
unhesitating and not to be escaped. In all its dealings 
with inorganic Nature a child finds an unswerving persist­
ence, which listens to no excuse and from which there is 
no appeal; and very soon, recognising this stern though 
beneficent persistence, it becomes very careful not to 
transgress. In the third place. Nature's method has 
the advantage of giving rise to right conceptions of 
cause and effect, and of affording an insight into the 
essential nature of good and evil conduct. Artificial 
rewards and punishments, on the other hand, produce a 
radically wrong moral standard by shielding the youth 
from the natural reactions and substituting parental 
or tutorial displeasure. A fourth advantage of this 
natural discipline is that it is a discipline of pure 
justice, and will be recognised as such by every child. 
"Whoso suffers mo thing more than the evil which in the
fgl. f i f j -  ^.
'' order of nature results from his own misbehaviour is
much less likely to think himself wrongly treated than 
if he suffers an artificially inflicted evil; and this 
will hold of children as of men." A fifth merit is 
that the tempers of both parents and children are much 
less liable to be ruffled under this system than under
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the ordinary system. Finally, under this sort of dis­
cipline consequent on the last-named advantage, the 
relationship between parents and children, being more 
friendly, will be a more influential one. Anger in a 
parent towards a child, and in a child towards a parent, 
is exceedingly detrimental, because it weakens that bond 
of sympathy which is essential to beneficent control.
Application to Cases of More Serious 
Misconduct.
The discipline applicable to those physical trans­
gressions constituting minor misbehaviour is applicable 
also to more serious cases of misconduct such as steal­
ing or lying or ill-using younger brothers or sisters. 
For the proper treatment of these cases it is necessary, 
in the first place, to establish friendly relations be­
tween parent and child. This can best be done if the 
system of punishment by natural consequences has all 
along been carried out; for, as we have seen, this 
kind of discipline is not likely to cause resentment 
on the part of the child, or estrangement between child 
and parent, but rather is likely to generate a feeling 
of active friendship. On the existence of this friend­
ly relationship depends the successful treatment of the 
graver offences. Such offences indeed are likely to be 
both less frequent and less grave under the regime we 
have described than under the ordinary regime. The 
bad behaviour of many children is itself a consequence 
of that chronic irritation in which they are kept by 
bad management.
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Offences of the graver kind will noii^heless occur 
occasionally under the best system. What is to be done? 
Once again, Spencer answers, let the discipline of natur­
al consequences be applied. But in those cases the prob­
lem is not so simple. The natural consequences are not 
so natural, although Spencer still professes to think 
them so. When a child is caught stealing, the "natural" 
consequences are, he says, of two kinds, direct and in­
direct. The direct consequence, as dictated by pure 
equity, is that of making restitution either by return 
of the object stolen, or, if it has been consumed, by 
giving an equivalent, which, in the case of a child, 
may be effected out of its pocket money. The indirect 
and more serious consequence is the grave displeasure of 
parents —  a consequence which inevitably follows among 
all peoples civilised enough to regard theft as a crime. 
The manifestation of strong parental displeasure will 
be potent for good, just in proportion to the warmth of 
the attachment existing between parent and child. The 
'moral pain’ experienced by the child consequent on hav­
ing for the time being, lost so loved a friend as the 
parent, stands in place of the physical pain usually in­
flicted; and proves equally, if not more, efficient.
Thus, Spencer concludes, the discipline of "natural" 
consequences is applicable to grave as well as trivial 
faults; and the practice of it conduces not simply to 
the repression, but to the eradication of such faults 
by checking the egotistic feelings and by bringing into
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play the altruistic feelings which check criminal acts.
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Objection: Is not Parental Disapprobation 
’Natural'?
There is the objection to consider that parents, 
as it is, by venting their anger on their children in con­
sequence of their misdeeds, are simply applying the natur­
al reactions to cases of ill-oonduct. Spencer answers the 
objection by pointing out that the prevalent form of dis­
cipline while relatively right is absolutely wrong. It 
is right in relation to the present state of society made 
up as it largely is of ill-controlled adults. "The bar­
barous children of barbarous parents are probably only to 
be restrained by the barbarous methods which such parents
spontaneously employ .....  Conversely, the civilized
members of a civilized society will spontaneously manifest 
their displeasure in less violent ways.... Thus it is 
true that, in so far as the expression of parental feel­
ing is concerned, the principle of the natural reaction 
is always more or less followed.” But the expression of 
parental feeling does not constitute a good domestic dis­
cipline. In the first place, parents, out of regard 
for effete dogmas, often inflict punishments which are 
either too severe or too mild in the hope of immediate 
perfection. In the second place, "the discipline of 
chief value is not the experience of parental approbation 
or disapprobation; but it is the experience of those re­
sults which would ultimately flow from the conduct in the 
absence of parental opinion or interference. The truly
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instructive and salutary consequences are not those in­
flicted by parents when they take upon themselves to be 
Nature’s proxies; but they are those inflicted by Nature 
herself."
Some Illustrative Cases.
The difference between natural reactions and 
artificial reactions is illustrated by Spencer in four 
specific cases of childish misbehaviour.
Case I» If a child makes a litter, the usual consequence 
is that he receives a scolding while the parent or nurse 
collects the toys or shreds. The ’natural' consequence 
is that the child should be made to put the things in 
order himself. If he refuses, he should be denied the 
use of his playthings the next time he desires them. 
"This," says Spencer,"is obviously a natural consequence,
/)• Z44. -
. neither increased nor lessened; and must be so recognised 
by a child."
Case II. If little Constance is habitually late for her 
daily walk, the ’natural* result is that of being left be­
hind and losing the outing. This penalty would be far 
more effective than that perpetual scolding which ends 
only in producing callousness.
Case III. If a child breaks or loses an article given to 
him, the natural consequences are, first, the lack of the 
lost or damaged article and the resulting inconvenience, 
and, second, the expense of replacing it. Parents should 
not step in and take the penalty on themselves by replac­
ing it; otherwise the child will miss a valuable lesson
88.
on the essential nature of good and bad conduct.
Case IV. If a boy, habitually reckless of his clothes, 
tears them in hedges or soils them in the mud, the 'natural* 
consequence is not being beaten and sent to bed, but being 
made to clean off the mud with which he has covered himself 
or to mend the tear as well as he can. If that does not 
serve, and if the suit is prematurely spoiled, the boy, 
having no decent clothes to go in, should be debarred from 
joining the rest of the family on holiday excursions or 
fête days. Hd will not fail to trace the chain of causation 
or to perceive that his own carelessness is the origin of 
it, without experiencing any feeling of injustice.
Natural Consequences Applicable throughout 
Youth and Adult Life.
This same type of moral discipline through the agency 
of natural consequences is not only applicable during child­
hood: it applies equally well throughout adult life. But in 
the latter period the transition which Spencer has already 
made from inorganic nature to human nature, —  that is, 
from natural consequence to social consequence, —  becomes 
still more clearly apparent. In adult life it is not 
physical pain but social disapproval that disciplines;
"there comes into play a discipline like that by which the 
^  young child is trained to self-guidance." "If the youth
entering on the business of life idles away his time 
and fulfils slowly or unskilfully the duties entrusted 
to him, there by-and-by follows the natural penalty: 
he is discharged and left to suffer for awhile the 
evils of a relative poverty. On the unpunctual man, 
ever missing his appointments of business or pleasure, 
there continually fall the consequent inconveniences,
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losses and deprivations. The tradesman who charges 
too high a rate of profit loses his customers, and 
so is checked in his greediness. Diminishing practice 
teaches the inattentive doctor to bestow more trouble 
on his patients. The too credulous creditor and the 
over-sanguine speculator, alike learn by the diffi­
culties which rashness entails on them, the necessity 
of being more cautious in their engagements. And so 
throughout the life of every citizen. In the quotation 
so often made a pronos of such cases —  "the burnt 
child dreads the fire" —  we see not only that the 
analogy between this social discipline and Nature's 
early discipline of infants is universally recognized; 
but we also see an implied conviction that this dis­
cipline is of the most efficient kind."
Having thus satisfied himself that this "social dis­
cipline" of adult life is of essentially the same nature 
as the physical discipline of bodily misconduct in infant- 
life, Spencer argues that the discipline of natural con­
sequences will be equally beneficent throughout the inter- 
mediate period of youth. "As 'ministers and interpreters
hk- fi4-0~ f -' Of nature' it is the function of parents to see that their
children habitually experience the true consequences of 
their conduct —  the natural reactions; neither warding 
them off, nor intensifying them, nor putting artificial 
consequences in place of them."
Maxims deducible from Principles 
Enunciated.
Having thus stated the principles which should 
govern moral education, Spencer goes on to mention a few 
of the chief maxims or rules which he thinks are deducible 
from them.
The first is. Do not expect from a child any great 
amount of moral goodness. Children must recapitulate 
the barbarous stage of the race's development; and con­
sequently they should not experience very urgent incite-
90,
meats to good conduct lest a detrimental moral precocity 
be the result. The higher moral faculties like the high­
er intellectual ones are comparatively complex, and pre­
mature growth will be at the expense of ultimate develop­
ment. Leave your child to suffer the discipline of natur­
al consequences and save both his temper and your own.
The second rule is. Do not seek to behave as a 
passionless instrument altogether. Your own approbation 
or disapprobation is also a natural reaction; and while 
it should not be substituted for the other penalties 
which Nature has established, it should accompany them.
In your show of feeling, however, avoid extremes. Do 
not scold and then forgive almost in the same breath; and 
yet, on the other hand, do not continue unduly to show 
estrangement of feeling, lest you accustom your child 
to do without your friendship, and so lose your influence 
over him.
Thirdly, Be sparing of commands, but whenever you 
do command, command with decision and consistency. The 
best rule in education as in politics is pas trop go^erner. 
and it is wise to rely not on coercion but on dispens­
ing with the need of coercion. When a penalty is in­
curred, however, it should be like the penalties in­
flicted by inanimate Nature —  inevitable. If you, the 
parent, are equally consistent —  if the consequences 
which you tell your child will follow specified acts, 
follow with like uniformity, he will soon come to re­
spect your laws as he does those of Nature.
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The fourth maxim is, Remember that the aim of your 
discipline should be to produce a self-governing being; 
not to produce a being to be governed by others. Aim at 
diminishing parental government as fast as you can sub­
stitute for it in your child's mind that self govern­
ment which arises from a foresight of results. Let the 
history of your domestic rule typify, in little, the 
history of our political rule: at the outset, autocratic
control, where control is really needful; by and by an 
incipient constitutionalism, in which the liberty of the 
subject gains some express recognition; successive ex­
tension of this liberty of the subject; gradually ending 
in parental abdication.
Fifthly, Do not regret the display of considerable 
self-will on the part of your children. That is a natur­
al result of the diminished coercion so conspicuous in 
modern education. Both factors indicate an approach to 
the system of discipline here advocated, under which 
children will be more and more led to rule themselves 
by the experience of natural consequences; and both 
are accompaniments of our more advanced social state.
Lastly, Recollect always that to educate rightly 
is not a simple and easy thing, but a complex and ex­
tremely difficult thing —  the hardest task that devolves 
on adults. You will have habitually to consider what are 
the results which in adult life follow certain kinds of 
acts; and you must then devise methods by which parallel 
results shall be entailed on the parallel acts of your
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children. You must analyse the motives of juvenile con­
duct and must more or less modify your method to suit 
the disposition of each child and to suit changing dis­
positions at advancing ages. You will have to carry on 
your own higher education at the same time as you are 
educating your children. Intellectually, you must study 
to good purpose that most complex of subjects —  human 
nature and its laws, as exhibited in your children, in 
yourself, and in the world. Morally you must keep in 
constant exercise your higher feelings and restrain your 
lower. The last stage in the mental development of each 
man and woman is to be reached only tlirough a proper dis­
charge of the parental duties.
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CHAPTER 7.
WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS OF MOST WORTH?
T. fy.33.
«7 J àjt^ La * '
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The essay which forms Chapter I of Spencer's 
Education: Intellectual. Moral, and Physical was the last 
of a series of four articles contributed to various 
quarterly Reviews between 1854 and 1859. Writing to his 
father on January 10th, 1859, Spencer says, "I have 
agreed with Chapman to do an article for him on the re­
lative values of different kinds of knowledge. I have 
not fixed the title yet. But its chief aim is to go in 
for more science." The essay was published in the West­
minster Review for July, 1859, under the title, "What 
Knowledge is of Most 7/orth?"
The Appeal of Science to Individual Reason.
As we have already seen, Spencer was very proud of 
having escaped the usual literary and classical education. 
He speaks of the lack of "culture in 'the humanities'" 
as part of his "negative equipment" for life; and thinks 
that "the absence of those studies, linguistic and his­
torical, which form so large a part of the ordinary 
education," left him free from "the bias given by the
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plexus of traditional ideas and sentiments." it is 
not surprising, therefore, that in an essay on the 
curriculum, Spencer should have exalted science as the 
knowledge of most worth and have belittled literary in­
struction. Science appeals to individual judgement: 
literature and language must be accepted as expressions 
of the social mind. "Linguistic culture," says Spencer, 
"is based on authority, and as I rebelled against it, the 
acceptance of things simply on authority was not habitual. 
On the other hand, the study of Mathematics (conspicuously 
Geometry and Mechanics), with which my youth was mainly 
occupied, appeals at each step in a demonstration, to 
private judgment, and in a sense recognises the right of 
private judgment,"
Science Ethically Justified as Fostering 
Economic Self-sufficiency.
But there was another reason for preferring science 
to the humanities, and that reason appears most clearly, 
not in the essay immediately under consideration, but in 
a chapter entitled "Culture" in Part III of the Principles 
of Ethics ("The Ethics of Individual Life.") Although 
this later discussion was published in 1892, thirty-three 
years after "What Knowledge is of Most Worth?", there was 
■'F/SUo';  ^ little change in Spencer's views. Culture, we are told,
means preparation for complete living, and complete living 
demands that the individual should possess the greatest 
I^rU j? s efficiency in "self-sustentation and sustentation of
family.” For these purposes the best preparation is to
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be had through a discipline in science. Complete liv­
ing also, it is true, includes the fullest possible ex- 
ercise of the faculties at large, so as to fit them "for 
utilizing those various sources of pleasure which Nature 
and Humanity supply to responsive minds;" and therefore 
complete living demands some commerce with the arts. But 
while self-preservation and the maintenance of family are 
.^5*///. "ethically enjoined," the pleasurable exercise of faculty 
involved in the appreciation of literature and the fine 
arts has merely an "ethical sanction." Peremptory oblig- 
/>.r23. ation is not to be alleged concerning it. "Most of our 
pleasures are to be accepted as concomitants of those 
various expenditures of energy conducive to self-sus- 
tentation and sustentation of family; yet the pursuit of 
pleasure for pleasure’s sake is to be sanctioned, and 
even enjoined, when primary duties have been fulfilled."
Literature and the Arts Promote Mere 
Sociableness.
The ultimate end of human development is the com- 
pletest possible ’individuation': to that end man’s social 
/>-5a/ development is subsidiary. Hence "the egoistic motives 
for culture" come first, and these motives prompt one to 
seek such knowledge of the sciences as is useful for 
guidance, for increasing one's efficiency in earning a 
livlihood for self and family. The "altruistic motives" 
for culture are secondary and subsidiary. These arise from 
y>.iT22. the desire to become a "pleasure-yielding person", which 
is a social duty. Literary culture, Spencer tells us, 
increases our social effectiveness: "in the absence of
I’J2d.
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It conversation is bald." Hence literary and 
aesthetic culture are to be pursued with a view to in­
creasing our ability to gratify those around us, and 
enlarging our own capacity for pleasure. While those 
are legitimate uses, however, Spencer thinks that, as 
things are, aesthetic culture is carried to excess and 
involves a great waste of time.
"V/hat knowledge is of Most Worth?"
To return to the essay on "What Knowledge is of Most
Worth?". We find the main thesis to be that the teaching 
of science, being of far more practical value in life 
than language, literature and the fine arts, should dis­
place the latter in the work of the school. Spencer, 
free from the "bias given by the established course of 
culture," and little influenced by the "authority of 
traditions and customs," desired to effect what he con­
sidered a long overdue reform and substitute the kind of 
education he had himself received from that which was 
still conventionally regarded as the best.
The essay sets out to find the answer to a question 
which Spencer had asked nine years before, namely, the 
question of how to determine the relative values of
different kinds of knowledge. Education, it is assumed,
is largely concerned with the imparting of knowledge; 
and if a better system is to displace the present un­
satisfactory one, what is required is a standard by which 
to judge the comparative worths of the different know­
ledge subjects —  a desideratum not hitherto as much as
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recognised, far less satisfied. As it is, fashion 
rather than utility determines the content of study.
People are not satisfied with quietly unfolding their own 
individualities to the full in all directions, but are 
bent on acquiring, and having their children acquire, 
ornamental knowledge of merely conventional value, for the 
sake of impressing or subordinating others# In this re­
spect education is but a reflex of current social ideas. 
Society is still partly militant in type, its chief feature 
being control by government of individuals. Conventional 
education, by the accomplishments and social prestige it 
confers, "aids in weaving that ramified network of re­
straints by which society is kept in order."
The Criterion: Value as Preparation for
Complete Living.
In order to formulate a rational curriculum of studies, 
the first requisite is to determine the aim of education. 
This Spencer now defines as preparation for complete liv­
ing, by which he means the completest possible exercise of 
faculty in a full life —  "a. life which is high alike in 
respect of intensity, breadth, and length." Utility, in 
this sense, is therefore the criterion we are in search of. 
All are agreed that knowledge to be useful must have some 
bearing on life; but since every kind of information can
^  Note: Rather a close parallel exists between Spencer and
Claude Marcel in the expression of this idea of utility. 
Marcel ("On Language", I, p.77.) says: "The various
branches of knowledge have latterly been so multiplied 
that it is impossible for a single individual to em­
brace them all; and some sciences have been carried so 
far that it almost requires the exclusive exertion of 
a long life to reach their utmost extent :-
(over.
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be shown to have a bearing on human affairs, it becomes 
necessary to classify in their true order of importance 
the activities which constitute 'complete living.* They 
may be divided into:- 1. those activities which directly 
minister to self-preservation; E. those activities which, 
by securing the necessaries of life, indirectly minister 
to self-preservation; 3.those activities which have as 
their end the rearing and discipline of offspring; 4.those 
activities which are involved in the maintenance of pro­
per social and political relations; 5. those miscellaneous 
activities which fill up the leisure part of life, devoted 
to the gratification of the tastes and feelings.
'One science only can one genius fit.
So vast is art, so narrow human wit.'—  Pope,
Essay on Criticism
"However, if the iiiimense variety of arts and 
sciences does not permit short-lived beings, such as 
we are, to possess them all, their admirable connection, 
by aiding the memory, furnishes us with an easy means 
of acquiring an extensive portion of them. We should 
principally aim at those which suit our particular 
station or profession in society, and at those also 
which are calculated efficiently to improve our fact, 
ulties."
Spencer says;(Education", p.8):
"Had we time to master all subjects we need not be 
particular. To quote an old song:- 
Could a man be secure 
Th4t his days would endure 
As of old for a thousand long years,
What things might he ÿnowl 
What deeds might he do!
And all without worry or care.
'But we that have but span-long lives' must ever bear 
in mind our limited time for acquisition. And remem­
bering how narrowly this time is limited, not only by 
the shortness of life, but also still more by the busi­
ness of life, we ought to be especially solicitous to 
employ what time we have to the greatest advantage."
(For further parallels, see Chapter XIII of the present 
work.)
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Those are the activities which constitute 'com­
plete living,' and as thus stated they stand in their 
'true order of subordination.' An adequate education 
must prepare for the satisfactory performance of all 
those activities; but while the ideal would be complete 
preparation for all, in practice it will be found necess­
ary to maintain a due proportion between the degrees of 
preparation for each. The average man will find it most 
useful to have exhaustive training in the activities which 
constitute the greatest part of his life; which means,ac­
cording to Spencer, those activities which find their 
centre in the individual, namely, direct self-preservation 
and the earning of a livelihood. In effect, Spencer has 
abandoned the idea that the aim of education is the un­
folding of individuality to the full in all directions, 
for the aim of preparing the adult man for economic self- 
support and complete adaptation to his environment.
Different Kinds of Knowledge and their 
Applicability for Guidance or Mental Discipline.
This preparation is to be got through knowledge; 
and the problem comes to be that of selecting the most ap­
propriate kinds of information for the purpose. Knowledge 
has three kinds of Value* intrinsic, quasi-intrinsic and 
conventional. The truths of science are of intrinsic 
value, since they will bear on human conduct ten thousand 
years hence as they do now. Linguistic knowledge is of 
quasi-intrinsio value, since it is useful only as long as 
the language lasts. Historical information, as commonly 
imparted in school, is only of conventional value, since
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it has no bearing on present day affairs, and serves 
merely to protect its possessor from the social dis­
approval its absence would entail. Knowledge, further­
more, may be valuable for the guidance it affords in 
life's duties, or for the discipline of faculty it confers. 
It follows that the most useful knowledge would be that of 
intrinsic value which, while affording men guidance in 
practical concerns, at the same time confers also a mental 
discipline.
Science as Applicable to Life's Duties.
What is that knowledge? The answer depends on the 
class of activity under consideration.
(a) Preserving Life and Health.
1. First in importance come the activities bearing 
directly on the preservation of life, bodily health and 
physical vigour. Fortunately for man. Nature to some ex­
tent sees to this herself. The child is endowed with in­
stincts which prompt it to seek safety in flight when 
danger threatens; and it learns in a practical way, by 
immediate contact with the physical environment, know­
ledge of the greatest use to it for self-preservation and 
bodily development. All that is necessary at this stage 
is to prevent "stupid schoolmistresses" from hindering 
the spontaneous physical activities which children de­
light to indulge in.
In later life, however, more than this is needed. 
Physical sensations which ought to warn us are habitually 
neglected. Disease, ill-health and death are the conse-
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quenoes of ignorance of the laws of life. The adult re­
quires to have some acquaintance with the principles of 
physiology as a means to complete living. Not that this 
information alone will guarantee healthy living, for in­
clination will often override prudence; but the right 
knowledge impressed in the right way will do much to secure 
right living; and knowledge of the laws of health is a pre­
requisite to their being fully conformed to. Thus some ac­
quaintance with the science of physiology is an all-essen­
tial part of a rational education.
(b) Earning a Livelihood.
2. For indirect self-preservation or the earning of a 
livelihood, Science is again of paramount importance.
Most men are directly or indirectly engaged in the produc­
tion, preparation or distribution of commodities. For the 
efficient discharge of those occupations a knowledge of 
various sciences is indispensable: logic for the large 
producer or distributor; geometry for the carpenter, the 
bridge-builder, the surveyor, the architect, and even the 
farmer; mechanics for the engineer, the factory-owner, and 
the ship-builder; physics for the metal-worker, the miner, 
the optician, the mariner and the printer; chemistry for 
the dyer, the smelter, the sugar-, soap- or gunpowder- 
maker, the brewer and the cultivator; astronomy for the 
sailor; geology for the prospector and the speculator in 
mining shares; biology for all who have to do with agri­
culture or cattle-rearing; sociology for the investor, 
the merchant end the manufacturer. All alike need a know—
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ledge, rational or empirical, of science in some form 
for the efficient discharge of activities bearing upon 
livelihood. Yet this is the knowledge which, for the 
sake of imparting dead formulas, schools systematically 
neglect to teach, leaving it to be picked up in nooks 
and comers as opportunity arises.
(c) Bringing up a Family.
3. While schools do to some extent prepare their pupils 
for earning a livelihood by teaching reading, writing and 
arithmetic, nowhere is any preparation given for the third 
class of life's activities, the rearing and discipline of 
children. Parents begin the difficult task of bringing 
up their offspring without having acquired any knowledge 
of the underlying sciences. For the correct physical 
training of children some knowledge of physiology is need­
ed; for moral guidance an acquaintance with "Ethology," 
the science of character formation, is requisite; and for 
intellectual training, surely psychology can render in­
dispensable aid. Parents should at least be familiar 
with the general principles underlying these three sciences, 
before they essay the responsible task of bringing up a 
family.
(d) Intelligent Voting.
4. The search for the right kind of knowledge to pre­
pare a man for the proper discharge of his social and 
political functions leads Spencer to a denunciation of the 
TJznz, kind of history which in his opinion was commonly taught in 
Schools. Instead of being made to learn the gosspp about
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kings and their matrimonial adventures, about court in­
trigues, plots, usurpations and the like, children ought 
to be introduced to the science of society. An acquaint­
ance with The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World will 
be of no help to anyone in regulating his conduct as a 
citizen. Instead, what he ought to know is the natural 
history of society: the evolution of government, politic­
al and historical; ceremonial and other customs; religious 
creeds and superstitions, industrial organization; in­
tellectual, artistic and moral development. In short, the 
only history that is of practical value is Descriptive 
Sociology. But descriptive sociology is useless without 
keys by which to interpret it. Those keys are to be found 
in Science. Rightly to interpret social phenomena, and 
in order properly to apply the interpretation to every-day 
affairs, some knowledge of the generalisations of biology 
and psychology is required. Thus to prepare a man to act 
properly in his political and social capacity— to help him 
to vote intelligently— knowledge of Science is again es­
sential.
(e) Employing Leisure Aright.
5, We come finally to the miscellaneous activities which 
occupy the leisure part of life, the enjoyment of Nature, 
of Literature and of the Fine Arts. Although placed last 
in order of importance, these pursuits are by no means to 
be neglected. "Without painting, sculpture, music, poetry, 
and the emotions produced by natural beauty of every kind, 
life would lose half its charm." But after all, those
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enjoyments represent the efflorescence of civilization. 
They are made possible only by a due discharge of the 
preceding functions; and so in relative importance they 
rank after the other activities. In present-day schools 
the positions are reversed: the plant is neglected for the 
sake of the flower. Just as they occupy the leisure part 
of life, so should the fine arts occupy the leisure part 
of education.
But strange as it may seem at first consideration, 
Science is again essential not only for the production 
but also for the appreciation of Art. Granted that know­
ledge of science alone will not qualify a man to be a 
sculptor, painter, poet or musician —  the artist of 
every type is born not made — ; yet without a knowledge 
of the sciences underlying his art no man can achieve the 
highest greatness. The greatest artists have always 
possessed, if not a systematic, at least an empirical 
knowledge of the facts of the science appropriate to their 
art; and in so far as their knowledge has been defective, 
their productions have shown resulting defects, here 
violations of mechanical principles in sculpture and there 
breaches of the laws of physics in painting. "Only when 
Genius is married to Science can the highest results be 
produced."
For the appreciation of the fine arts, no less than 
for their production, is Science essential. The adult 
has a fuller appreciation of a picture than a child, for 
the reason that he has a fuller acquaintance with the
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truths which the picture portrays. Similarly for 
poetry, the wider the experience of the objects and 
actions expressed, the greater the pleasure. Thus to 
feel the highest gratification from a work of art, the 
spectator, the listener, or the reader must have the 
fullest knowledge of the realities which the artist has 
expressed.
Moreover Science is itself poetic; It cultivates 
the imagination and opens up realms of beauty unknown to 
and undreamed of by the unscientific person. Romance and 
beauty are to be found in geological strata, in sea-side 
pools, or in the high heavens by those who know where to 
look for them. It is better to try to understand the 
architecture of the heavens than to be interested in 
some contemptible controversy about the intrigues of 
Mary Queen of Scots.
Science Provides both Intellectual and 
Moral Discipline.
Having thus demonstrated that Science is of chiefest 
value for guidance, Spencer has next to consider what kind 
of knowledge is of most value as a mental discipline. The 
quest is short and easy. It would, he says, be utterly 
contrary to the beautiful economy of Nature, if one kind 
of culture were needed for the gaining of information and 
another kind were needed as a mental gymnastic. Science, 
of most value for guidance, is of most value also for 
mental discipline. As a means of training the memory, it 
is superior to language-learning, for the number of facts 
to be memorised in almost any science far exceeds the
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number of words to be learned in any language. But that 
is not all. The kind of memory exercised in linguistic 
training is rote-memory, whereas science strengthens the 
rational memory. While the former exercises memory only, 
the latter exercises both memory and understanding. Science 
also cultivates the judgement. The student of a language 
is concerned largely with extending his acquaintance with 
words, whereas the science student is interested in causes 
and effects. As a result of his habit of drawing conclu­
sions from data, and then of verifying those conclusions 
by observation and experiment, he strengthens his powers 
of judgement.
Science, again, is best for moral discipline as well 
as intellectual discipline. It makes a constant appeal 
to individual reason. Every conclusion is based on evid­
ence which the pupil is always at liberty and is often re­
quired to test for himself. Hence a scientific training 
strengthens independence of character and makes for in­
dividual freedom of thought. On the other hand, the 
student of language must accept his facts on the authority 
of others —  teacher, dictionary-maker, or grammar-book 
writer. Language-1earning, therefore, tends to increase 
the already undue respect for authority, and produces the 
servile and submissive, rather than the free and independ­
ent, character.
The Religious Value of Science.
To crown all. Science is essentially religious. So 
fa,p from science and religion being antagonistic, it is
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the neglect of science that is irreligious. How can eoiy- 
one contemplate the Great Cause of the Universe without 
trying to understand its wonders? Science generates a 
belief in, and a great respect for, the uniformity of 
natural law. The student of science sees that these laws 
are both inexorable and bénéficiant; that all things work 
together towards a greater perfection and a higher happi­
ness; and that progress is a law of nature. Science alone 
can give us true conceptions of ourselves and our relation 
to the mysteries of existence. It brings us face to face 
with the Absolute and the Unknowable. Only the genuine 
man of science can know how utterly beyond human conception 
is the Universal Power of which Nature and Life and Thought 
are manifestations.
Manual Skill an added Requirement.
To this comprehensive, if one-sided^programme of 
Science as the knowledge of most worth, Spencer, in his 
chapter on Culture as part of the Ethics of Individual Life, 
adds the requirement of manual skill. For those who are 
destined to undertake occupations in productive industry 
there can be no question of the great value of an adequate 
training in manipulative dexterity and keenness of percep­
tion. Schools either neglect this aspect of culture al­
together, or leave it to be acquired through games, which 
do not cultivate the right kinds of skill. But even for 
persons who aim at higher careers than those which in­
dustry offers this sort of training is not negligible. 
Everyone must learn to adjust his movements to objects
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and actions of his environment if he would avoid slight 
mishaps or serious accidents, or be able to rectify mis­
chief so caused. Hence for all, preparation for complete 
living must include appropriate exercises of limbs and 
senses, not indeed of a formal kind, since "the shaping of 
all education into lessons is one of the vices of the 
times," but as embodied in the carrying out of practical 
projects which make direct appeal to the interest of the 
learner.
Literature and the Arts as Amusements.
Literature, too, is again allowed to have a place in 
the curriculum in this later expression of Spencer's edu­
cational creed, but complaint is made about its occupying 
too great a space on the school time-table. History, bi­
ography, fiction and poetry call forth mental exertion of 
an easy kind and yield a pleasurable excitement without 
much effort. Accordingly such subjects are more attractive 
to the majority than science, but they are not nearly so 
useful as "that knowledge of the order of things at large 
which serves for guidance." They have a place, but it is 
a secondary and subordinate place. They are necessary 
for the all-round development of the faculties, which is 
ethically sanctioned when once economic independence has 
been achieved, and they may be prosecuted from motives 
A . o f  benevolence, that is, to make one a 'pleasure-yielding' 
person to others. It turns out, however, that painting, 
sculpture, light literature, the drama and music are best 
classified under "Amusements." As relaxations they are
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approved by hedonistic ethics; they have a physiological 
justification since the emotional satisfaction which they 
yield exalts the vital functions and raises the tide of 
life; and finally on evolutionary grounds they are sanc­
tioned as forms of play by means of which faculties which 
have not been exhausted by daily activities are exercised. 
They are to be classed along with games, sports^ travel, 
exploration and other "superfluous activities which primar­
ily yield self-happiness,"
The Sciences versus The Classics.
Science remains the subject of most worth, and its 
pursuit that of highest ethical value to the individual.
It above all is the subject which should displace the 
Classics in the esteem of educators, since it is the sub- 
ject which throws light on the "adjustments or non-adjust- 
ment8 of actions to requirements," and gives knowledge of 
man's own "nature, bodily and mental, and of the world, 
physical and social, in which he has to live." "Had 
Greece and Rome never existed,"— we repeat Spencer's 
words,— "human life and the right conduct of it would have
*^Note: From a general condemnation of field sports as
involving the dhect infliction of pain on inferior 
creatures, Spencer partially exdmpts the sport of 
fishing on the ground of the remoteness of the 
victim from human beings and their feelings, and 
because the chief pleasure is that derived from 
the exercise of skill. Fishing was his own fav­
ourite sport!
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been in their essentials exactly what they now are: 
survival or death, health or disease, prosperity or 
adversity, happiness or misery, would have been just 
in the same ways determined by the adjustments or non­
adjustments of actions to requirements." The answer 
to the question of what knowledge is of most worth 
is therefore, and without possibility of doubt, SCIENCE.
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CHAPTER VI.
INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.
Introduction.
The chapter on Intellectual Education, first called 
"Method in Education," was eventually published in The 
North British Review for May, 1854, as "The Art of 
Education."
Spencer tells us that the subject had at the time 
a threefold interest for him. Some observations and ex­
periments of his own seemed valuable enough to deserve 
publication; the topic of the essay had a very close con- 
neotion with psychology, a subject then much occupying 
his mind; and mental development was. he saw, but one in­
stance of the general principle of development which he 
bad borrowed through Coleridge from Schelling. The in- 
tention was to treat Method in education from the psycho- 
logical and developmental point of view.
It is characteristic, however, of Spencer’s general 
mental habits, that two principles which appear in the 
essay as being derived from the general idea of mental 
development were really uppermost in Spencer’s mind from 
the outset. These were the notions that education should 
be largely a process of self-instruction, and that it 
should as a consequence be pleasurable. Those, as we have
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seen, were the guiding principles in his own education 
as directed by his father, and it is to his father that 
Spencer acknowledges his indebtedness for them. "There 
remained," he tells us, "but to justify them by affiliat­
ing them on the Method of Nature." The conclusions were 
present in his mind at the beginning, and biology and 
psychology were subsequently appealed to to provide them 
with an evolutionary setting.
Nature’s Method.
What is the Method of Nature which is to serve as 
a pattern for Method in Education? It is the method by 
which Nature proceeds in physical and mental organisation 
from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to 
the heterogeneous, from the indefinite to the definite. 
Method in education must be a kind of objective counter­
part to method in organisation. Just as evolution in 
general, and development of mind in particular, is a pro­
cess, from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite coherent heterogeneity, so education must par­
allel that process in the method it adopts and the ex­
periences it seeks to present to the developing minds
of the pupils.
There is a physical analogy. Every organism is in 
its initial stages simple and ends by being relatively 
complex; the features of an unfolding germ are vague, 
while in the adult they become distinct; in simple organ­
isms there is little differentiation {much homogeneity), 
while in higher animals there is much differentiation
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(great heterogeneity). Now the organisation of mind 
obeys the same laws as the organisation of body; and 
since education is a process which seeks to aid the 
organisation of mind, education must conform to the laws 
governing all organisation whether of matter or mind.
Spencer expresses this process of mental develop- 
ment in First Principles (originally published in 1862,
(yj>. ii-f-iS.
the year after Education) as follows: "At first the in-
tellectual functions are much alike in kind —  recog­
nitions and classifications of simple impressions 
alone go on; but in course of time these functions 
become multiform. Reasoning grows distinguishable, 
and eventually we have conscious induction and de­
duction; deliberate recollection and deliberate im­
agination are added to simple unguided association 
of ideas; more special modes of mental action, as 
those which result in mathematics, music, poetry, 
arise; and within each of these divisions the mental 
movements are ever being further differentiated. In 
definiteness it is the same. At first the infant 
makes its observations so inaccurately that it fails 
to distinguish individuals. The child errs contin­
ually in its spelling, its grammar, its arithmetic. 
The youth forms incorrect judgments on the affairs of 
life. Only with maturity comes that precise co­
ordination of data which is implied by a good adjust­
ment of thoughts to things. Lastly, with the in­
tegration by which simple mental acts are combined 
iiito complex mental acts, we see the like. In the 
nursery you cannot obtain continuous attention —  
there is inability to form a coherent series of im­
pressions; and there is a parallel inability to 
unite many coexistent impressions, even of the same 
order: witness the way in which a child’s remarks on 
a picture show that it attends only to the individual 
objects represented, and never to the picture as a 
whole. But advancing years bring the ability to 
understand an involved sentence, to follow long trains 
of reasoning, to hold in one mental grasp numerous 
concurrent circumstances."
One further guiding idea has still to be mentioned. 
Spencer adopted from Comte the proposition that the un­
folding of the child’s mind repeats the stages by which 
the mind of the race unfolded; and from this he deduces
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the corollary that education should be a repetition of 
civilization in little. Along with this goes the be­
lief in Lamarck’s doctrine of the inheritance of ac­
quired characteristics.
Plan of the Essay.
The essay itself is divided into two sections.
The first deals with the science of education, and is 
concerned largely with a statement of the principles 
underlying mental development. The second treats of the 
art of education, and is devoted to an application of 
the foregoing principles. In confining his illustrations 
in this second section to sense-training, object-lessons, 
nature-study, drawing and geometry, Spencer disavows the 
intention of writing a detailed treatise on method in 
education. Those subjects are to be considered simply 
as illustrations of the method dictated by the general 
psychological principles previously specified. There is 
no mention of language-teaching, history, the humanities 
generally, or the*appreci&tlon*subjects in the essay, save 
an exclamation against that ’intensely stupid’ custom of 
teaching grammar to children. It is a significant omission. 
Literature and the humanities are based on the authority 
of tradition and cannot be divorced from their social 
setting. The sciences are more individual in their appeal 
and accord better with Spencer’s social philosophy, based 
as it is on a code of individual natural rights.
Reforms of the Past Fifty Years.
The essay begins by observing that education re­
117.
fleets the ideas current at any particular stage of 
social development. Corresponding to the development 
of the modern idea that government is an institution 
which should he allowed to grow from within, rather 
than be reformed from without, goes the belief that 
mental evolution is a natural growth which cannot be dis­
turbed without injury to the process. The change of out­
look has been one leading from uniformity to diversity 
in the educational methods employed, just as the tend­
ency towards individuation has in the ecclesiastical 
sphere produced diversity of sects, and in the political 
sphere, a multiplicity of political parties. All these 
social changes are the result of one great urge towards 
the assertion of individual liberty. In the resulting 
diversity of educational methods lies the hope of find­
ing the true method. Hence it becomes profitable to 
survey the changes which have taken place in educational 
method during the last fifty years, causing the abandon­
ment of old practices and the adoption of new.
Of the modifications of old practices, the first 
has been a change from excessive preoccupation with in­
tellectual development to a concern for bodily welfare 
as a prerequisite to sound mental culture. People are 
now beginning to realise with Emerson that the first 
requisite to success in life is to be a good animal. ‘
In the second place, learning by rote is giving place 
to rational learning, and more attention is being paid 
to meanings than to symbols. Thirdly, the teaching of
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rules is being superseded by the teaching of principles. 
First come the particulars, then follows the general­
ization. It is this change that has prompted the abandon­
ment of the practice of teaching grammar to children.
”As grammar was made after language, so ought it to be 
taught after language: an inference which all who recog­
nise the relationship between the evolution of the race 
and that of the individual, will see to be unavoidable."
As regards the new practices introduced, first comes 
the attempt to train the powers of observation by means 
of well-conceived but ill-conducted system of object- 
lessons. This sense-training is based on an increasingly 
held belief that the spontaneous activity of the observ­
ing faculties of children in play has a meaning and use, 
and contributes material to the mind on which to build 
all other attainments, artistic, scientific or philosoph­
ical. In the second place, knowledge is increasingly be­
ing presented to the child in concrete form rather than 
in the abstract. This is exemplified in the use of the 
ball-frame in arithmetic, of actual weights and measures 
in mensuration, and of models in geography and geometry.
It is being recognised that the child learns as the race 
has learnt; first by contemplating the truths of number, 
form and position as exemplified in concrete objects, 
and then by a process of abstraction. Finally attempts 
are now being made to render the acquisition of knowledge 
pleasurable rather than painful. It holds of mind as of 
body that the natural activities are pleasurable, and
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that conversely pleasurable activities at each age 
are likely to be natural. Hence all instruction ought 
to aim at arousing a pleasurable excitement in the pupils.
The Merits and Defects of Pestalozzianism.
In thus showing increasing conformity to the methods 
of Nature, educational methods are but approximating to 
the doctrine long ago enunciated by Pestalozzi, ’’that 
alike in itw order and its methods, education must con­
form to the natural process of mental evolution —  that 
there is a certain sequence in which the faculties 
spontaneously develop, and a certain kind of knowledge 
which each requires during its development; and that it 
is for us to ascertain this sequence and supply this 
knowledge."
But if education is to conform to the methods of 
Nature, does that not imply that any kind of interference 
with mental development is harmful and unnecessary? Is 
there not a spontaneous principle of growth in mind which 
will cause it to seek the experiences necessary for its 
development at each particular stage, so that intervention 
by a teacher is not required? No; these inferences are 
unjustifiable. Just as the most highly developed organ­
isms are the longest time dependent on the parent organ­
isms for nourishment and protection, so the mind of man, 
being the most complex of all minds, is long dependent on 
adult nurture and guidance. It is for the educator to 
maintain the conditions of proper mental growth. He 
must provide suitable content, present it by appropriate 
methods, and at fit times. Thus there is ample room
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left for education to play its part without disturb­
ing the normal process of mental evolution.
Having commended Pestalozzi’s doctrine in theory, 
Spencer proceeds to criticise it in practice. Its ex­
ponents have lacked the philosophical insight of its 
founder, and accordingly they have failed to do justice 
to his principles. Pestalozzi had grasped the general 
idea that education ought to conform to mental develop­
ment, but had failed to realise what the initial stages 
of mental evolution are. The result is that many of 
his methods are utterly unpestalozzian. Along with a 
belief that education must conform to Nature, must go 
a knowledge in detail of how the faculties of mind do 
unfold. In other words, a right method in education 
must be based upon an adequate psychology; a satisfactory 
art of education must await the development of a true 
science of education. This psychology is not yet estab­
lished, but there are certain ascertained principles 
which approximate to the truth and on these method in 
education must be based.
Psychological Foundations of Educational 
Method.
The general principles of mental development are 
three in number.
1. The mind as it develops progresses, like all 
developing organisms, from the homogeneous to the heter­
ogeneous. Accordingly the educative process, being the 
objective counterpart of this subjective process, must 
proceed from the simple to the complex alike in each
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particular subject and in the curriculum as a whole.
2. The development of mind is an advance from 
the indefinite to the definite. Thus in education we 
should content ourselves at the start with setting crude 
notions before our pupils* minds and gradually making 
them clearer and clearer as experiences accrete.
3. The development of mind in the individual follows 
the development of mind in the race. Consequently the 
education of the child must agree both in method and ar­
rangement with the education of mankind considered histor­
ically. If there has been an order in which the human 
race has mastered its various kinds of knowledge, as 
there has undoubtedly been, it follows as a result of
the inheritance of acquired characteristics that there 
will arise in every child an aptitude to acquire these 
kinds of knowledge in the same order. Hence in deciding 
upon the right method in education, an enquiry into the 
course of civilisation will help to guide us.
The Educational Methods deducible from the 
Laws of Mental Development.
1. Lessons ought to start from the concrete and 
end in the abstract, to accord with the process of mental 
development from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, 
from the simple to the complex. Abstract generalisations 
are simple only in comparison with the whole mass of con­
crete facts which they summarise. They are more complex 
than each of these facts separately. Hence the mind 
should be introduced to principles through the medium of 
examples, and so should be led from the particular to the
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general, from the concrete to the abstract.
2. Each branch of instruction should proceed from 
the empirical to the rational. In the development of 
the race an art has invariably preceded the development 
of the corresponding science; and before knowledge can 
be organised, some of it must be possessed. Therefore 
every study should have a purely experimental intro­
duction; grammar, for example, being placed, not before 
language, but after it.
3. In education the process of self-development 
should be encouraged to the uttermost. This maxim is 
based on the fact that humanity has progressed solely 
by self-instruction. If the subjects be put before him 
in right order and right form, any pupil of ordinary 
capacity will surmount his successive difficulties with 
but little assistance. He should be told as little as 
possible, and be induced to discover as much as possible 
for himself,
4. The right kind of instruction should create a 
pleasurable excitement in the pupils, in accordance with 
the principle that any mental activity which is natural 
to a child is also pleasurable. That is the proper test 
to apply to determine the suitability of any study at any 
particular stage. Unless interest is aroused, the subject 
is unsuitable. Educator#s ought to consider the child's 
'intellectual instincts' rather than their own reasonings.
Advantages of the above Methods.
Method in education will therefore conform to the
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laws of mental development previously enunciated in so 
far as it progresses from the simple to the complex, 
from the indefinite to the definite, from the concrete to 
the abstract, from the empirical to the rational; and 
satisfies the further requirements, that education cân- 
9sa±sam shall be a repetition of civilisation in little, 
that it shall be as much as possible a process of self- 
instruction, and that it shall be pleasurable.
The last two requirements, if satisfied, justify 
the belief that the method adopted is conforming to the 
dictates of abstract psychology. If education can be made 
a process of self-instruction, it follows that the order 
of presentation will correspond to the successive stages 
in the evolution of the child's faculties. Moreover, 
knowledge which is self-discovered makes a far more vivid 
impression on the mind than mere rote-learned knowledge. 
Again, self-acquired information is being actively organ­
ised in the mind, brought to bear on the solution of new 
problems, and thus turned into faculty as soon as it is 
taken in. The moral culture involved is also advantage­
ous. Auto-education fosters courage in attacking diffi­
culties, patient concentration of the attention, and 
perseverance through failure.
Similarly, the requirement that instruction Shall 
be pleasurable has many advantages. It aids the memory 
and stimulates the attention. It reacts upon the temper­
ament and health of the pupil. "No one can compare the
faces and manners of two boys —  the one made happy
by mastering interesting subjects, and the other made
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miserable by disgust with his studies, by consequent 
inability, by cold looks, by threats, by punishment—  
without seeing that the disposition of the one is 
being benefited and that of the other injured. Who­
ever has marked the effects of success and failure 
upon the mind, and the power of the mind over the 
body, will see that in the one case both temper and 
health are favourably affected, while in the other 
there is danger of permanent moroseness, of permanent 
timidity, and even of permanent constitutional de­
pression. "
Again when instruction is made a pleasure, it improves 
the relationship between teachers and pupils and conse­
quently strengthens the influence of the former over the 
latter. Lastly it enhances the probability that educa­
tion will not cease when school-days end but that pupils 
so taught will continue through life that process of self- 
instruction which they commenced in youth.
Application of the Foregoing Principles 
and Methods.
Passing now from the theory of education to the 
practice of it, we have to consider the course of in­
struction which psychology dictates.
(a) Sense Training.
Education, as Pestalozzi recognised, should begin 
from the cradle. The earliest exercises should take the 
form of a training of the senses. For this purpose the 
infant should be presented with a succession of objects 
offering markedly different degrees and kinds of re­
sistance, and reflecting different amounts and qualities 
of light. He should hear also a variety of sounds wide­
ly contrasted in their loudness, their pitch and their 
timbre. Thus the senses of touch, sight and hearing
will be trained in accordance with the general law of
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evolution from the indefinite to the definite, by which 
the mind discriminates first of all between markedly 
contrasted sensations and subsequently proceeds to differ­
entiate between more nearly allied impressions.
(b) Object Lessons.
A natural continuation of this primary culture of 
the senses is found in object lessons, not as commonly 
given, but as suggested by Nature's method. Teachers 
need only systematise the natural impulse which prompts 
children to discover the qualities of things for them­
selves. Mothers can encourage their children to find out 
the qualities of the surrounding objects so that, inspir­
ed by the joy of self-discovery and delight in the real­
isation of their own powers, they may proceed to ever 
more complicated observation, and ever-increasing nicety 
of discrimination. This course is the one best calculated 
to establish a habit of exhaustive observation, and is 
a natural continuance of that spontaneous process of 
self-evolution which was going on during the previous 
period.
(c) Nature Study.
Object lessons extend gradually into a more com­
prehensive nature-study. Beginning with the contents of 
the house, these studies extend into the garden, the 
fields, the hedges, the quarry and the sea-shore, and 
merge insensibly into the investigations of the natural­
ist and the man of science. Again we are but following 
Nature's guidance. "Where can be seen an intenser de-
f>' foZ.
light than that of children picking up new flowers and
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watching new insects, or hoarding pebbles and shells." 
Later on children may be supplied with "the apparatus 
needful for keeping larvae of our common butterflies 
and moths though their transformations —  a practice 
which, as we can personally testify, yields the highest 
gratification; is continued with ardour for years; when 
joined with the formation of an entomological collection, 
adds immense interest to Saturday-afternoon rambles; and 
forms an admirable introduction to the study of physi­
ology. "
To the objections that such pursuits are useless as 
a preparation for the business of life and result in a 
waste of time and energy, the reply is that these ob­
jections imply very crude ideas of what constitutes edu- 
!? fos cation and very narrow conceptions of utility. "If men
are to be mere cits, mere porers over ledgers, with
no ideas beyond their trades,  then indeed it is
needless to learn anything that does not directly 
help to replenish the till and fill the larder. But 
if there is a more worthy aim for us than to be drudges 
.... if the pleasures which poetry and art and 
science and philosophy can bring are of any moment; 
then it is desirable that the instinctive inclination 
which every child shows to observe natural beauties 
and investigate natural phenomena should be encouraged."
But even on grounds of utility it can be shown that a
knowledge of the laws of life, which underlie not only
all bodily and mental processes, but by implication all
the transactions of the house and street, all commerce,
all politics, all morals, is more important than any
other knowledge whatever, because, without it, neither
personal nor social conduct can be rightly regulated.
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The facts which the child learns for himself by ob­
servation of Nature will one day serve as material for 
"those great generalisations of science by which actions
f>- /o6 •
may be rightly guided,"
(d) Drawing.
Drawing is another of the natural elements of 
education. From the earliest, children spontaneously de­
light in trying to render pictorially men, houses, trees 
and animals; and this tendency constitutes a further in­
structive exercise of the perceptions and a training of 
the powers of observation. These spontaneous efforts 
should serve as a guide to the teaching of this subject. 
The natural models are those real objects round which 
the child’s pleasurable associations cluster —  human 
beings from whom it has received so many emotions; cows 
and dogs which interest by the many phenomena they 
present ; houses that are hourly visible and strike by 
their size and contrast of parts. These should be de­
picted in colour, the drawing of outlines being kept 
secondary to colouring. Masters who begin with outline- 
drawing and drawing from the copy reverse the natural 
process. The object in teaching drawing is not to pro­
duce good drawing, but to develop the child’s faculties, 
to give him some command over his fingers and some 
crude notion of likeness, and to exercise the powers of 
observation. Later on exactness can be insisted on and 
the laws of perspective taught experimentally.
(e) Geometry.
Nature’s method in education can be further il-
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lustrated, from the teaching of geometry. Definitions 
in the early stages should he eliminated. Instead the 
pupil should be familiarised with a stock of geometrical 
conceptions by being encouraged to handle and experiment 
with various solids; from which he may learn the meaning 
of points, straight lines, curved lines, parallel lines, 
angles, parallelograms, surfaces plane and curved, and 
their relations. Then he may proceed to the drawing of 
figures on paper, and the testing by eye of the correct­
ness of their proportions. His knowledge may then be 
applied experimentally in the construction and decoration 
of cardboard toys and the like. From this experimental 
introduction advance may gradually be made to empirical 
geometry, that is, geometry dealing with methodical 
solutions, but not with the demonstrations of them. The 
pupil should be left to find out these solutions for him­
self, and should not as a rule be told the answers.
After some years of study of this empirical kind, a 
transition may finally be made to rational geometry as 
found in Euclid, which ought to present no difficulty to 
pupils who have stored their minds with geometrical facts, 
and who have learned to solve practically problems which 
they now learn to solve theoretically with logical demon­
strations. They may even progress to the making of 
original demonstrations; and this process of self-dis­
covery will constitute not only an intellectual but also 
a moral discipline. Such a study of geometry follows 
the method of Nature, for in the early civilisation of
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the child, as in the early civilisation of the race, 
science is valued only as ministering to art; and the 
proper preliminary to geometry is therefore a long 
practice in those constructive processes which geometry 
will facilitate.
Conclusion,
These five subjects are chosen by Spencer to illus­
trate the methods in education which 'psychology dictates. 
They are to be regarded as examples only. To have ex­
tended them further would have been to write a detailed 
treatise on education, an intention which Spencer dis­
claims. The methods he has illustrated have, he claims, 
followed wholly, as most modern improvements in education 
have followed partially, the natural system, conforming 
to the psychological principles previously expounded and 
following the suggestions which the unfolding mind it­
self gives. In these respects the method here exemplified 
is a very close approximation to the natural method.
Intellectual education, thennis to be based on the 
laws of mental development; and its methods are to follow 
psychological principles, which will ensure that they 
are in conformity with Nature. If no mention is made of 
the. humanistic subjects, the implication is that limits 
of space make it necessary to leave it to the teacher to 
make the requisite application of the general principles 
enunciated to the teaching of literature, history and the 
fine arts. We shall have to consider later, however, 
whether the humanities are capable of being taught on
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Spencer's method; and whether the implied reason for 
omitting to discuss them in the Essay was the real 
reason; or whether they were left out because of Spen­
cer's distrust of traditional knowledge and his inability 
to fit them into his natural system.
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CHAPTER VII.
PHYSICAL EDUCATION.
The essay on Physical Education was written in 1858 
for the Quarterly Review but was not published there be- 
cause, as we are told, its anti-ascetic conceptions did 
^ not accord either with the editor's theological views or
with the ideas with which his public-school life had im­
bued him. Instead, it appeared first in the British 
Quarterly Review for April, 1859, and was subsequently 
republished along with the other three, in 1861, in 
Education; Intellectual. Moral, and Physical.
Conformity to Nature the Keynote.
The key-note of the essay is conformity to Nature. 
For bodily welfare the most trustworthy guide is natural 
instinct, regard for the sensations as the "physical con­
science." With the young of man, as with the young of 
animals, the period of growth and development must be a 
period of shielding from stress and strain, physical or 
mental, a period when much must be given and little de­
manded. The claims of the body must be satisfied before 
care is expended on the development of the mind, pre­
mature mental development is at the expense of bodily
growth; and early life should be so regulated as to fav­
or
our development of the body and postpone any great^con-
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tinuous mental effort to a later age.
In the essay an attempt is made to expose the bad 
effects of under-feeding, scanty clothing, under-exercise 
and over-pressure in education; and to apply the establish­
ed truths of physiology to the proper nurture of children 
at home and at school. Spencer begins by contrasting the 
almost universal interest displayed by men in the rearing 
of animals of one kind or another,from the pigs of Hodge 
and Giles to the squire's hunters, with their lack of in­
terest in the upbringing of their children. The latter 
is left almost entirely in the hands of the women, and 
the women lack any preparation for this important duty. 
"Mammas who have been taught little but languages, music, 
and accomplishments, aided by nurses full of antiquated 
prejudices, are held competent regulators of the food, 
clothing, and exercise of children." And yet the matter 
is of national importance. Alike in war, in commerce, and 
in the competition of modern life in general, the first 
requisite to success is to be a good animal; and to be a 
nation of good animals is the first condition of national 
prosperity.
Food.
Applying the "law" of the universality of rhythm, new­
ly hit upon, to domestic habits, Spencer finds that in 
matters of dietary there has been a swing of the pendulum 
away from excessive indulgence in food and drink towards 
excessive abstemiousness. There is now a decided leaning 
towards underfeeding rather than overfeeding of children,
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although parents sometimes conveniently refrain from 
applying the food restrictions to themselves.
As regards quantity of food, appetite is the best , 
guide. Children rarely overeat, unless they have been ac­
customed to unnecessary restrictions. Their liking for 
sugar is especially sound, since physiologists have dis­
covered that sugar plays an important part in the vital 
processes by generating muscular energy and heat. Ripe 
fruit is also beneficial, since the vegetable acids act 
as tonics and laxatives. Children's instinctive appetite 
for fruit of all kinds is therefore sound and should not 
be denied gratification. Nature is the best guide.
Not only should food be abundant in quantity, it 
should also be rich in quality. Children should have a 
more nutritive diet than adults, because, in addition to 
repair of muscular tissue used up by their greater ex­
penditure of physical energy, they have, unlike adults, 
to make provision for bodily growth. It is not enough 
to give an increased amount of a "low diet," because the 
greater work the digestion of it entails diminishes the 
energy left for growth and action. Thus an exclusively 
vegetable diet is productive of diminished energy. The 
sheep is less active than the dog; the peasant boy is 
greatly inferior in mental and physical vivacity to the 
son of a gentleman; and the history of the world shows 
in general that the well-fed races have been the energet­
ic and dominant races. Abstinence from meat, as Spencer 
himself found after a six-months' experiment, entails dim­
inished energy of both body and mind.
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Food abundant in quantity and sufficiently rich in 
quality should also be varied in nature. Physiology has 
clearly shown that no one food, however good, supplies 
in due proportion or in the proper forms all the elements 
required for carrying on the vital processes in a normal 
manner. Thus both a periodical change of food and a 
variety of food at every meal are advisable.
Clothing.
In clothing the same ascetic tendency shows itself 
in an undue scantiness, in the interests of a hardening 
process, in spite of the fact that not a few children 
have been hardened out of the world. Sensation is again 
the trustworthy guide. Clothing should be adequate in 
amount to prevent an abiding sensation of cold no matter 
how slight. Insufficient clothing may produce hardness 
in a person of strong constitution, but it does so at the 
expense of growth. In order to preserve the bodily heat 
there is a using up of food substances which would other­
wise be available for building up the frame. Clothing is 
merely an equivalent for a certain amount of food; and as 
children lose more heat relatively than adults owing to 
their greater surface area relative to bulk, they need 
not less but more clothing than adults.
Not only is scantiness of covering harmful; fre­
quently the style of dress is detrimental to physical 
well-being by preventing healthful activity. Unsuitable 
colours and fabrics having been chosen, children are 
interdicted from unrestrained play in order that they
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'€!acuuiuA«L."y?>.2<,a, may not soil or tear their clothes. "We do not hesitate," 
declares Spencer, "to say that, through enfeebled health, 
defective energies, and consequent non-success in life, 
thousands are annually doomed to unhappiness by this un­
scrupulous regard for appearances: even when they are
not, by early death, literally sacrificed to the Moloch 
of maternal vanity." Instead of flimsy cotton, linen, 
or mixed fabrics, clothing should be made of some good 
non-conductor such as coarse woollen cloth; and its 
strength and colour should be such as will not suffer 
soon from use and exposure.
Exercise.
Girls suffer from lack of proper physical exercise 
more than boys. Their constitution is not so unlike 
their brothers' as not to need the same health-giving 
exercise. They have the same promptings to active play 
as boys; but the fashion among schoolmistresses is to 
regard rude health and abundant vigour as unladylike 
And vulgar. Girls suffer in two ways: in physique and 
in their chances of matrimony. Men are more attracted 
by rosy cheeks and sparkling eyes than by profound 
erudition. It is in the interests of the race that it 
should be so. "A cultivated intelligence based on a 
bad physique is of little worth, since its descendants 
will die out in a generation or two: and conversely. . . 
a good physique, however poor the accompanying mental 
endowments, is worth preserving, because, throughout 
future generations, the mental endowments may be indef-
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initely developed."
A formal system of gymnastics, though better than 
nothing, is no substitute for spontaneous, unrestrained 
play.* Gymnastic exercises, being less varied than youth­
ful sports, do not secure so equable a distribution of 
action to all parts of the body and thus produce fatigue 
sooner. Again, formal exercise will tend to be deficient 
owing to lack of interest. Above all, the quality of the 
exercise is inferior. "The extreme interest felt by child-
ji- Î-0 ^ '
ren in their games, and the riotous glee with which they 
carry on their rougher frolics, are of as much importance 
as the accompanying exertion. And as not supplying these 
mental stimuli, gymnastics must be radically defective."
Over-Study.
Compared with past generations, the present generation 
gives signs of being undeveloped in height and bulk. ?/hy? 
The reason is probably manifold. Under-feeding, under­
clothing and under-exercise all contribute to produce 
physical deterioration. But perhaps the most potent reason 
has been excess of mental application. Modern conditions, 
owing to the intenser competition which marks business and 
professional life, impose an increasingly greater strain 
on parents and children alike. In the case of the parents
* Note: Spencer shares with Schiller the credit of having
enunciated the "surplus energy" theory of Play. See 
"Principles of Psychology," Vol. II, Sections 
533-540.
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their constitution^ is weakened by harder work and fewer 
relaxations, and this weakened constitution is bequeath­
ed to their children, who have thus to facë a severer 
struggle with a weakened power of resistance. In order 
the better to prepare them for the competition of life, 
they are required to submit to a much harder mental dis­
cipline. The result is seen in the number of instances 
of debility produced by over-study, a debility which 
tends to become hereditary. Even training colleges for 
teachers, which express the ideas of the educated, are 
great sinners in respect of the excessive amount of time 
given to mental work and the deficiency of time allowed 
for physical exercise and recreation. The reasons which 
make most persons agree that infant precocity is detri­
mental to ultimate development, appear not to influence 
them when over-stimulation of youth is in question. Yet 
just as a forced development of intelligence in childhood 
entails either physical feebleness, or ultimate stupidity, 
or early death, so throughout youth the same truth holds. 
jy.xq. "There is a given order in which, and^given rate at which, 
the faculties unfold. If the course of education con­
forms itself to that order and rate, well. If not— if the 
higher faculties are early taxdd by presenting an order 
of knowledge more complex and abstract than can be read­
ily assimilated; or if, by excess of culture, the in­
tellect in general is developed to a degree beyond that 
which is natural to its age; the abnormal advantage 
gained will inevitably be accompanied by some equivalent.
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or more than equivalent, evil."
The amount of vital energy which the body at any 
moment possesses is limited. If an excessive amount 
of it is used up in brain work, there must occur a 
corresponding deficiency in bodily growth. If the ex­
cess of brain-work is moderate, there will be a corres­
pondingly slight decrease in ultimate height or bulk or 
deterioration in quality of tissue. If the brain is pre­
maturely exercised to a greater degree, the result may be 
prejudicial to the full growth of the brain itself. This 
is in accordance with the well-known law, first pointed 
out by St. Hilaire, that there is an antagonism between 
growth and development, that is^between increase of size 
and increase of structure. For example, a girl develops 
more rapidly in body and mind than a boy,and her growth 
stops correspondingly earlier. The same law holds in 
respect of one part of the organism as compared with the 
rest. If the brain is prematurely stimulated, its de­
velopment will be at the expense of ultimate growth, thus 
accounting for the fact that precocious children often 
stop short and disappoint the high hopes of their parents.
More disastrous are the effects of over-education 
on the health, resulting in undermined constitution, en­
feebled energies and morbid feelings. The brain has 
immense influence over the functions of the body —  
digestion, circulation, bodily metabolism in general —  
and if over-stimulated there is a resulting disturbance 
of physiological processes. Yet success in life depends
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more on energy than on information.
Even from the point of view of the acquirement 
of knowledge, excessive study is a mistake. The mind 
can assimilate only at a certain rate. If facts are 
supplied at a greater rate, they do not pass into facul­
ty, but are rejected. At the same time study is bound 
to become distasteful because of the painful results of 
over-pressure, and as a consequence subsequent self- 
culture, instead of being fostered, is made less likely. 
Then too, acquisition of knowledge is not everything: 
organisation of knowledge is more important, and that 
demands time for spontaneous thinking.
Conclusion.
Over-pressure in education is the result of a pass­
ing phase of civilization. In primitive times when soci­
ety was militant, the civic virtues were bodily strength 
and courage. Education was almost wholly physical. Now 
that society is peaceful, and social success of nearly 
every kind depends very much on mental power, education 
has become almost exclusively mental. Both attitudes 
are extreme; they must be combined. The physical under­
lies the mental, and the mental must hot be developed at 
the expense of the physical. Adequate care for the body 
may be expected to be observed in proportion as the be­
lief becomes current that the preservation of health is 
a duty. Few men are aware that there is such a thing 
4 physical morality. "The fact is, that all breaches
of the laws of health are -physical sins. When this is
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generally seen, then, and perhaps not till then, will 
the physical training of the young receive the attention 
it deserves."
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CHAPTER VIII. 
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY.
Introduction.
The key alike to the educational and to the 
political philosophy of Spencer is to be found in his 
conception of the nature of the relation between the 
individual and society. Accordingly, some account of 
his social philosophy is an indispensable preliminary 
to a discussion of his educational doctrine. Spencer's 
social philosophy may be said to have begun and ended 
with a preconceived belief in individual rights. De­
spite his protests that society is to be regarded as 
a growth and not an artefact, the individual is for 
him the fundamental unit in the social "aggregate".
But the individual with whom Spencer begins is an iso­
lated being who has no social ties and is therefore 
abstract and non-human, "a mere abstraction, a logical 
' ghost, a metaphysical spectre". Although he did more 
than any other writer of his time to popularise the 
notion of the social 'organism', he himself never
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really allows the conception to influence his thought.
On the analogy of the organism, it might have been ex­
pected that Spencer would have regarded the social 
whole as greater than the units which constitute it, 
and have found in it a unity of differences, an inte­
gration of individual purposes in a greater purpose.
But owing to his ingrained individualism he never gets 
beyond the parts. Society remains an aggregate of 
individuals, and is to be understood only by studying 
the individuals who compose it.
The Development of Spencer's Social 
Philo sopliy.
The social philosophy is developed mainly in 
the following works: Social Statics (1850), The Social 
Organism (1860),Specialised Administration (1871),
The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1 (1876), and 
The Man versus the State (1884); and although the Essays 
on Education were written in the interval between the 
appearance of the first and second of these writings, 
all five works are important as a background to Spencer's 
views of the nature of education. The reason for this 
is that with Spencer, more perhaps than with most think­
ers, mental development came to an end quickly, and his 
early views influenced all his later thinking. It will 
therefore be expedient to consider briefly the success­
ive views expressed in these five works, before examin­
ation is made of their influence on his educational 
doctrine.
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The Nature of Individuality,
Social Statics, although it contains Spencer's 
early views on the relation of the individual to soci­
ety, continued to represent his fundamental ideas to 
the end. The book begins in characteristic fashion 
by laying down the method to be adopted in the enquiry. 
"There,is no way of coming at a true theory of society," 
Spencer tells us, "but by enquiring into the nature of 
its component individuals." This is indeed a promis­
ing beginning, and might well serve as a guiding prin­
ciple in social enquiry, if taken in conjunction with 
its converse, namely, that there is no way of coming 
at an understanding of the individual but by enquiring 
into the nature of society. Spencer, however, fails 
to apply the converse. The nature of society does not 
arise out of the "accident of combination" (p.28), but 
is a consequence of "certain inherent properties of the 
beings themselves" who compose it. In other words, 
society does not add anything to human nature; it mere­
ly emphasises qualities which are present in the indiv­
idual apart from society: The individual is thus pre­
social. Individual welfare rests not on any law 
«presupposing a state of aggregation", but on some at­
tribute of the "social atom", man.
This attribute is the "Moral Sense"which Spencer, 
following Adam Smith, postulates as a primitive constit­
uent of human nature. It comprises appetition, in­
tuition and emotion. It prompts us to act rightly to
147,
one another ; it shows us how to act thus ; and it 
affords us a feeling of satisfaction at so acting. 
Starting from this assumed moral sense, we may deduce 
a systematic doctrine of morality. But before we can 
do so, we have to determine the end for individual man. 
Man's chief end, as willed by the Creator, is happiness. 
This happiness, however, is ultimate happiness, not im­
mediate happiness.- Ultimate happiness is attained 
when there is perfect adaptation between man and his en­
vironment. Hence it follows that "absolute ethics" 
takes no account of imperfectly adapted man, that is, of 
man as he is, in his present crooked state, but deals 
with the straight man as he will be, by virtue of a uni­
versal law of progress (p.78), which, by necessitating 
a continual adjustment of faculties to their environment, 
will bring about a state of perfect equilibri-um.
Before we can establish the first principle of 
this absolute ethics, we must further determine the con­
ditions in which man must live. First and foremost 
there is the social state. Spencer, while admitting 
l>.S3. that the social state "is needful for the support of
the greatest sum of life", departs from his previous 
resolve to discover the nature of society by examining 
the 'inherent properties" of its members. All he can 
^ say is that "in the preordained course of things, men
have multiplied until they are constrained to live more 
or less in presence of each other", and that, since we
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find this state established and likely to continue, 
we must examine how it conditions the life of its members.
Even if this failure to give any adequate account 
of the origin of society be overlooked, Spencer has still 
a chance to show how society reacts upon and modifies its 
members, and how the latter may find their nature com­
pleted in and tnrough social institutions. But it is 
manifest that he lacks any true insight into the nature 
of society. He starts with the individual man and 
never gets beyond him. Individual happiness is the end. 
Individual happiness consists in the completest possible 
exercise of faculty; and to this the social state makes 
a mere negative contribution, by necessitating a limit­
ation of the exercise of faculty in order to secure that 
no one individual limits the right of any other individ­
ual to exercise his faculties..
If we ask what right the individual has to ex­
ercise of faculty, Spencer's answer (converted in his 
later works from theological into biological terms) is 
that God has willed human happiness, and happiness con­
sists in the exercise of faculty. But since each mem­
ber of society has faculties, we can readily understand 
the need for some limitation to their exercise. Hence 
social happiness depends on the individual's readiness 
to limit his freedom in such a way as not to infringe 
the freedom of others to exercise their faculties.
Social Morality has therefore as its first principle
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the law of equal freedom: "Every man has freedom to do
all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
freedom of any other man".
This is the primary limitation to be put upon the 
individual's absolute freedom; and, in effect, it turns 
out to be the sole one. For if society establishes 
any secondary limitations, they will inevitably constit­
ute a breach of the first. This comes to mean that if 
the State (by which Spencer means the government) at­
tempts anything in the nature of positive regulation 
or adjustment, it violates the law of equal freedom; 
for some men (members of the government) must necessar­
ily claim a greater amount of freedom, by enforcing re­
strictions, than other men (the governed) have if they 
are compelled to accept these restrictions (p.l06).
As we have just seen, this claim to equal free­
dom rests upon an assumed innate moral sense, Man has 
//Q what Spencer terms an instinct of personal rights, "a
feeling that leads him to claim as great a share of 
natural privilege as is claimed by others." This feel­
ing is natural in the sense of being innate and pre­
social, and hence this instinctive craving for liberty 
gives rise to man's natural rights. These natural 
rights, which are "merely arbitrary subdivisions of 
the general liberty to exercise the faculties", when 
they come to be universally recognised in the perfect 
society, will enable men to fulfil the universal law
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of life, namely, the development of the completest 
possible individuation. Mankind will then live in a 
"state of no government", a final anarchy. That will 
be a state in which every desire will be satisfied and 
man will do "just what he would spontaneously do", and 
be "that which he naturally is". Society (if indeed 
it can be called society) will be so organised that 
"the individual is everything and the state nothing."
Borrowing from Coleridge (who derived it from 
Schelling) "the true idea of life", which is the tend­
ency to individuation, Spencer shows how this tendency 
is manifested throughout the animal kingdom, the lowest 
animals having little individuality and the highest, 
man, the most marked individuality. Human progress is 
towards a greater and more universal adherence to the 
moral law, the law of equal freedom, under which in­
dividuation becomes perfect, and all governmental re­
straints and individual aggressions cease, so that "in 
the ultimate man perfect morality, perfect individuation, 
and perfect life will be simultaneously realised."
The Nature of Society.
So far Spencer has concerned himself with the 
individual who, by pressure of numbers, has found him­
self compelled to live more or less "in presence of" 
other men. It now falls to him to consider society —  
a condition which, having come about, is likely to 
continue. Starting from the individual with his
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natural rights, Spencer finds that society, as re­
presented in the State, can he thought of best as a 
jy.Soz. joint stock protection company —  "men voluntarily
associated for mutual protection". The State as an 
organ of society has, like every organ, but one function. 
That function consists in protecting the liberty of its 
members —  enforcing contracts and warding off foreign 
aggression. "So long as our joint-stock protection 
society confines itself to guaranteeing the rights of 
its members it is pretty certain to be coextensive with 
the nation". If it tries to do anything else, it in­
evitably infringes the moral law, the law of equal free­
dom. Hence the State, which Spencer regards as equiva­
lent to the nation, has a purely negative function; and, 
as we have seen, the greater part of Social Statics is 
occupied with a discussion of the things the State ought 
not to do.
Society as an Organism.
That is the position to which Spencer’s preoccup­
ation with the individual has brought him. It is one 
of extreme individualism. But towards the end of 
Social Statics, he comes to consider society from the 
point of view of its ultimate form, the fully-evolved 
condition of ideal, divinely ordained, static repose.
Here the conception of society as an organism makes its 
yif.7 0. first appearance. "So completely", says Spencer, "is
society organised upon the same system as an individual 
being, that we may almost say that there is something
152.
more than an analogy between them". On the strength of 
this "something more than an analogy", he is led to in­
sist that complete individuation coexists with complete 
mutual dependence. No one can break the law of equal 
freedom without the breach recoiling on his own head.
As the development of society proceeds, "the welfare of 
each is daily more involved in the welfare of all", and 
all men’s business is each man’s business. Thus we ar- 
rive at the "salutary truth that no one can be perfectly 
free till all are free; no one can be perfectly moral 
till all are moral; no one can be perfectly happy till 
all are happy".
It is obvious tiiat between the view of society 
as 'a joint-stock protection company’ in the interests 
of individual liberty, and the view of society as an 
organism in which the individual members exhibit extreme 
mutual dependence, there is a marked inconsistency, an 
inconsistency which is the result of the failure of the 
two strands in Spencer’s thought to come together. His 
early belief in individual rights, which prevented him 
from reaching any adequate view of the nature of soci­
ety and hence from appreciating what individuality means, 
will not allow him to make full and profitable use of 
the analogy which his biological thinking had suggested 
to him.
How near Spencer came to a realisation of social 
purpose is shown in a passage at the end of Social Statics, 
where he endeavours to illustrate the paradox that the
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progress of humanity (he always assumes progress to be 
^ universal law) is "at once towards complete separate­
ness and complete union", and takes as an example the 
reproductive and parental instincts. If individual man 
had no relations with other beings, those instincts and 
the domestic affections to which tney give rise would 
be denied scope for their expression. Hence life would 
be incomplete; the faculties would be prevented from 
exercising themselves; and individuality would be shorn 
of its fair proportions. Consequently the perfection 
of the individual depends upon his relationship with 
other individuals; or, in other words, society is a 
necessity. If society is necessary to enable man to 
realise his sexual nature, it would seem to be no less 
essential to enable him to realise his nature otherwise. 
And from this to a realisation that it is society that 
helps to create man's nature seems a short step. But 
Spencer, beginning with the individual and his faculties, 
fails to take it. Individuality is something apart from 
the fact of the social state and merely "finds in each 
social arrangement a condition answering to some faculty 
in itself," but not really necessary for the expression 
of that faculty. "The ultimate man will be one whose 
private requirements coincide with public ones. He will 
be that manner of man, who, in spontaneously fulfilling 
his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of 
a social unit; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil own 
nature by all others doing the like". Society adds no­
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thing to a man’s stature, but is merely an external 
condition of his realising a predetermined nature, which 
needs only the presence of other individuals to find its 
expression.
Further Development of the Analogy 
of the Organism.
In the decade which elapsed between the appearance 
of Social Statics and the essay on The Social Organism, 
Spencer had further developed the biological view of 
society. The Social Organism opens with a criticism of 
the popular notion that society is a manufacture and not 
a growth. Spencer is anxious to show that social organ­
isation is made neither by "the hero as king" (a hit at 
Carlyle) nor by legislative enactment, but is a result 
of ’general natural causes’. The natural process of 
social development may best be explained by comparing 
it, not indeed to the development of the human body in 
particular, but to the development of individual organisms 
in general. And this comparison it is the main business 
of the essay to make. The analogy is illustrated with 
a wealth of detail; but in general, there are four re­
semblances and four differences between the social organ­
ism and individual organisms. Societies resemble individ­
ual organisms in that they grow from small aggregates to 
large aggregates; develop in structure from simple to 
complex, from little specialisation of function to great 
specialisation; change from a state of mutual independ­
ence of parts to a condition of mutual dependence of parts; 
and survive the death of component units. Societies
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differ from individual organisms in that they have no 
specific external form; in that the living elements of 
a society do not form a continuous mass, but are dis­
persed over some portion of the earth’s surface; in 
that the elements of the social aggregate are not fix­
ed but are capable of moving from place to place ; and —  
most important difference of all —  in that all the 
members of a society are endowed with feeling, while in 
the body of an animal only a special tissue is endowed 
with feeling. As we shall see, Spencer makes much of 
this last distinction in the Principles of Sociology. 
Here he contents himself with pointing out this differ­
ence as the reason why the corporate life must be sub­
servient to the lives of the parts, instead of the 
lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate 
life; or, in other words, why the individual with his 
natural rights must take precedence over society with 
its civic claims.
Towards the end of the essay, however, Spencer 
develops the analogy in a way which runs counter to his 
original intention when he began it. There are, he says, 
certain tissues in living organisms which have their 
counterpart in society. The blood of a living body, 
bringing nutriment to the different organs, is compar­
able to the circulating mass of commodities in the 
7 body politic. The circulatory system of arteries and
veins which is perfected in the higher organisms is 
matched in advanced societies by a developed railway
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system with its double lines conveying currents of 
commodities in opposite directions. Finally the 
nervo-motor systems, which become specialised in higher 
organisms, are represented in advanced societies like 
our own by a deliberative Parliament and its Executive. 
The brain in the higher animals has as its function to 
interpret and combine the many stimuli conveyed to it 
from all parts of the body and to harmonise the result­
ing motor responses in the interest of the whole organ- 
ism. So in the most advanced societies. Parliament 
has to interpret and combine the wishes and complaints 
of all classes and localities and to regulate public 
affairs as much as possible in harmony with the general 
wants. "We may," says Spencer, "describe the office of
a Parliament as that of averaging the interests of 
the various classes in a community; and a good 
Parliament is one in which the parties answering to 
these respective interests concede to each class as 
much as consists with the claims of the rest."
This admission would appear to justify the critic 
in regarding Parliament, an institution representing the 
community as a whole, as having the right to exercise 
control over the community. Spencer would thus seem to 
imply that society liue the individual organism, has its 
own appropriate nerve-centre charged with the function 
of co-ordinating its various activities and adjusting 
. the claims of the various parts in the interests of the 
general welfare. This would very much enlarge the duty 
of the State towards its members and would give a posit­
ive interpretation to the right of the State to inter-
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fere with the liberty of the individual. It would 
even appear to open the way for a justification of a 
form of State socialism.
Modification of the Organism Analogy.
The seeming inconsistency was taken up by Huxley 
in an article on Administrative Nihilism, in which he 
points out that the real force of Spencer's analogy is 
"totally opposed to the negative view of State function". 
Accordingly, Spencer decided to write another essay, 
"Specialised Administration", in order to make his mean- 
ing clear. "The'interests' to which I refer", he tells
/ji. /ifif-s
' us in this essay, "as being averaged by a representative
governing body, are the conflicting interests between 
class and class as well as between man and man —  conflict* 
ing interests the 'balancing of which is nothing but the 
preventing of aggression and the administration of justice' 
This is Spencer's view of the'negatively regulative' 
function of State government. In order to arrive at it, 
he incurs grave suspicion of developing his analogy 
ad hoc. He first makes a distinction between the outer 
and inner systems of tissues in organisms, the outer 
comprising those needed for catching prey, escaping 
danger and the like, the inner comprising the digestive, 
circulatory and respiratory systems; and shows that, 
while the outer require a complex and centralised nerv­
ous system exacting speedy and complete obedience, the 
inner are only indirectly under the control of the cen­
tral system, but have their own sympathetic system which
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which holds a very mild sway over the digestive system, 
for example. The latter functions best when left alone, 
and only when a derangement occurs does it require active 
interference by the higher nervous system.
Now all this has its oarallel in the social organ-
h.fS^ , ism. "A society, like an individual, has a set of
structures fitting it to act upon its environment —  
appliances for attack and defence, armies, navies, 
fortified and garrisoned places. At the same time, 
a society has an industrial organisation which carries 
on all those processes that make possible the national 
life."
The- structures which serve for protection and aggression, 
i.e. the army and navy, require strong government exact-t
ing unquestioned obedience. On the other hand, the 
industrial organisation works most smoothly and efficient­
ly when it is self-regulative and is not subject to out­
side interference. The Executive which controls the 
defence organisations is not required to interfere with 
the industrial activities, except to act as a general 
restraining influence in order to prevent aggression 
direct or indirect. Its functions are limited to secur­
ing fulfilment of contracts and the administration of 
justice (which means meting out regards in proportion to 
desert).
The limits of State Action.
The analogy applies in another way, Among in­
vertebrates there is frequently an evolution from a 
creature with limbs and sense organs, but scarcely any 
alimentary system, to an animal with a highly developed 
visceral system adapted almost exclusively to aliment-
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ation and the propagation of the soecies. Similarly 
societies develop in general from the militant type to 
the industrial type. In the militant society (e.g. Sparta) 
everyone is a soldier under rigid discipline; the central 
authority regulates all social activities, down to the 
details of each man's daily conduct; the welfare of the 
State is paramount and the individual completely sub­
ordinate. The pacific or industrial society shows 
opposite characteristics. The central government is 
relatively feeble, interfering little with the private 
actions of the citizens; and the State exists for the 
benefit of private individuals. Thus the industrial 
organisation, corresponding to the stomach, is now re­
garded by Spencer as the higher type, and the implied 
injunction is. Hands off the stomach! The government 
must confine itself to negatively regulative control 
and must specialise in that, while the leaders of in­
dustry, the merchants and factory-owners, mind their own 
business, which is that of providing the necessaries of 
life for the community under a system of laissez faire.
"So long as order is maintained, and the fulfilment of 
contracts is everywhere enforced —  so long as there 
is secured to each citizen, and each combination of 
citizens, the full return agreed upon for work done 
and commodities produced; so long as each may enjoy 
what he obtains by labour, without trenching on his 
neighbour's like ability to enjoy; these (industrial) 
functions will go on healthfully —  more healthfully ' 
indeed than when regulated in any other way." ,
Specialised administration means, then, that the State
should specialise on its negatively regulative function,
and abandon all positive interference with the private
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rights of the individual citizen. It exists externally 
for war, and internally for the enforcement of contracts; 
and that exhausts its functions.
From Militant to Industrial Society:
Status to Contract.
That was the position at which Spencer had ar­
rived in 1871. His next main contribution to social 
theory was embodied in the first volume of The Principles 
of Sociology, published in 1876. Here he introduces a 
new word, "super-organic", a word which raises hopes that 
he is about to recognise those ideal elements which char­
acterise society as a union of minds for the promotion 
of the good life; but these hopes are disappointed. Super- 
T organic evolution includes "all those processes and pro-
fy-u.
ducts which imply the co-ordinated actions of many in­
dividuals —  co-ordinated actions which achieve results 
exceeding in extent and complexity those achievable by 
individual actions". The results are more complex and 
greater in extent, but are not in essence different 
from those achieved by the individual man in his develop­
ment. The Principles of Sociology is, therefore, note­
worthy mainly for the development of the analogy of the 
social organism, first sketched in Social Statics and 
elaborated in the two essays just mentioned. Once again
attention is drawn to the three systems of organs which 
are found alike in the individual organism and in the 
social organism, viz., the sustaining system, the regu­
lative system and the distributing system. In early
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societies, the sustaining system is represented by the 
slaves who provide the means of subsistence for them­
selves and their overlords; the regulative system is 
represented by those same overlords who, as warriors, 
carry on offensive and defensive activities with neigh­
bouring societies; the distributive system is represent­
ed by such agencies as exist for transferring commodities. 
Societies may, however, be classified into two opposing 
types, the predominantly militant and the predominantly 
T industrial. In the militant society, "the claims of the
unit are nothing and the claims of the aggregate every­
thing "; the regime of status is supreme; the co-operation 
which exists is compulsory co-operation; and the will of 
the individual in public and private affairs alike is 
controlled by the will of the government. In other words, 
the militant society shows the regulative system supreme, 
and the sustaining system completely subordinate to it.
The industrial society is almost entirely the opposite 
of the militant. In the former, the state exists for 
the benefit of the individual; the regime of status gives 
place to that of contract; there is voluntary instead of 
compulsory co-operation between the citizens, individual 
freedom takes the place of government regulation; and 
private enterprise does, and does better, what was for­
merly done by the government. The industrial society 
shows the sustaining system supreme and the regulative 
system more or less in abeyance. The regulative system 
is renresented by a government elected by popular vote and
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having as its sole function the administration of 
justice, which, being defined, means seeing that each 
citizen gains benefits in proportion to his individual 
merits, and preventing any artificial distribution of 
benefits.
Defects in the Organism Analogy.
The lesson which Spencer intends to convey by this 
comparison is that individual freedom and governmental 
laissez faire characterise the industrial or higher type 
of society, while State interference and, as he thinks, 
the consequent negation of individual liberty characterise 
the militant or lower type of society. Thus despite the 
analogy between the social organism and the individual 
organism Spencer is still in the same position as when he 
wrote Social Statics, a quarter of a century before. It 
is, therefore, hardly necessary to point out the incon­
sistency, which he himself recognised, whereby in the in­
dividual organism the "higher" nervous system is shown as 
restraining the sustaining or "lower" system, while at 
the same time the industrial type of society (manifesting 
a supremacy of the sustaining system) is regarded as 
superior to the military type of society (manifesting a 
supremacy of the regulative system/. This was, in effect, 
the criticism of a French student, Henri Marion. Spencer 
'^77- admitted the inconsistency but justified himself by con­
trasting the different ends of the two "organisms". The 
individual organism has as the prime law Oo. its exist­
ence self-preservation, while the highly developed social 
organism (industrial society) aims not at self-preserv-
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ation but at furthering the welfare of its individual 
members. "Social organism is to be considered high in
 ^ proportion as it subserves individual welfare, because
in a society the units are sentient and the aggregate 
insentient; and the industrial type is higher because 
it subserves individual welfare better than the milit­
ant type."
Towards the end of the first volume of the Soci­
ology Spencer decides to abandon the analogy altogether, 
but not before he has destroyed its real usefulness.
There is this one cardinal difference, he finds, between 
the social organism and the physical organism. In the 
latter consciousness or sentience is confined to one part 
of the aggregate, while in society each individual pos­
sesses the capacity for happiness or misery. "As, there-
fore, there is no social sensorium, it results that the 
,p ,\L,i2S2 . welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that
of the unit^ is not an end to be sought. The society 
exists for the benefit of its members ; not its members 
for the benefit of the society".
Leaving aside the question of whether it is proper 
to speak of any organism as an "aggregate", or to regard 
mind as residing in any one part of it, we may note the 
implication of this significant conclusion. The implic­
ation is that the individual is somehow prior to society 
and finds society merely a convenience for the further­
ance of his individual ends. There is no room for the 
view that society makes the individual what he is, or 
that an individual can only be an individual in society.
It is implied that the individual could exist apart from 
society and has become social merely because he judged it 
expedient to do so. In fact, the individual must have
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liberty^-if he so wills it, to contract out of society.
"The Man versus The State."
Some twenty years after Volume I of the Principles 
of Sociology was published, Spencer wrote four essays for 
the Contemporary Review, which were subsequently embodied 
in a little book bearing the significant title of The Man 
versus The State (1884). Individualism and the doctrine 
of laissez faire are even more prominent in it than in 
the Sociology. In fact, Spencer reverts substantially 
to the thesis of Social Statics: that the law of equal 
freedom ought to be the sole guiding principle in social 
organisation.
The central doctrine of The Man versus The State is 
the doctrine of natural rights. There are several ways of 
regarding these rights. We may consider them (1) from the 
point of view of the individual; or (E) from the point of 
view of society; or (3) from the point of view of the 
proper sphere of government.
Natural Rights from the Point of View 
of the Individual.
Prom the point of view of the individual, these 
rights originate in a law of "nature", whereby the individ­
ual is impelled to the fullest possible exercise of 
faculty. Self-preservation is "nature's" first law. To 
ensure self-preservation, a man must perform acts essen­
tial to life. Such acts can be performed only if indiv­
iduals are allowed certain liberties and claims. These 
liberties and claims are therefore the origin of natural
165.
rights. But man not being a solitary animal, these 
liberties can not be absolute. They must be limited by 
the need to allow other men similar liberties to exercise 
of faculty. The presence of other men in the community 
imparts an ethical character to man's 'natural' rights, 
since there are now some acts which the individual may 
not do. He may not do anything which encroaches on the 
liberty of other men to a similar exercise of faculty.
It would seem from this that the so-called natural 
rights have now become social rights, but that is not 
Spencer's view. He ridicules Bentham's assertion that 
government fulfils its offices by creating rights which it 
confers on individuals; and asks how a right can be obtain­
ed by a people's creating an agent, which creates the right 
and then confers it on its creator. Instead of the rights 
being created by laws, the alleged creating of rights is 
nothing else than giving a formal sanction and better 
definition to those assertions of claims and recognitions 
of claims which naturally originate from the individual 
desires of men who have to live in presence of one an­
other. Spencer thus implies that the individual possesses 
a number of abstract natural rights which are, by implic­
ation also, at the same time ethical rights. Ultimately, 
however, they depend, not apparently on social recognition 
expressed either by custom or legal enactment, but on 
Spencer's a priori view of human nature as having a 
faculty which makes the individual restrict his claim to 
liberty in order to allow a like liberty to all other men.
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Natural Rights from the point of View 
of Society.
Regarded from the point of view of society, 
natural rights imply the doctrine of the Social Contract. 
In Social Statics Spencer had explicitly rejected the 
view {which he supposed to be Rousseau's view) that an 
actual contract liaü been entered into by the members of 
" J i t c A C s o c i e t y .  At the same time, however, the assumption was
there made of an implied contract. Now in The Man versus 
The State the hypothesis again appears. The question to 
be asked about any community, says Spencer after "dis- 
missing all thought of any hypothetical agreement to co­
operate heretofore made", is, "what would be the agree­
ment into which citizens would now enter with practical 
unanimity?" Citizens would 'with practical unanimity' 
agree to co-operate only for two, or possibly three, pur­
poses. First of all the resisting of invasion and de­
fence against foreign aggression would, with the exception 
of the Quakers, command the assent of practically all 
citizens. Secondly,only criminals would demur to the de­
fence of person and property against external enemies.
In the third place,—  but there are difficulties here 
which Spencer had come to recognise since writing Social 
Statics,—  all men would willingly agree to co-operate in
the right use of the territory they inhabit. For most 
other purposes State interference to effect compulsory
co-operation would fail to win practical unanimity. Hence
compulsory co-operation beyond these narrow limits breaks
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the impliecL agreement men make when they find themselves 
obliged to live in presence of one another, or co-operate
because of anticipated advantages to be derived from co­
operation.
Natural Rights from the Point of View of the 
Proper Sphere of Government.
Regarded from the point of view of the proper sphere 
of government, the doctrine of natural rights teaches us 
that ’^the liberty which a citizen enjoys is to be measur­
ed, not by the nature of the governmental machinery he 
lives under, whether representative or other, but by the 
relative paucity of the restraints it imposes on him”. 
Parliamentary government, no matter how broadly based the 
franchise may be, is yet a limited government, limited, 
that is, by the implied contract in accordance with which 
it is constituted. 'The great political superstition' is 
the belief in the divine right of Parliaments.
In a review of past and present legislation Spencer 
seeks to show that natural rights are best observed in an 
industrial society characterised by laissez faire, such 
as Britain was developing into for a generation after the 
Napoleonic wars; and least observed in a militant society, 
such as Spencer believed this country was tending to re­
vert to at the time he wrote (1884J. The old liberal
party, formerly occupied in the struggle to remove from 
the individual restraints and disabilities in industry,
commerce and religion, has now become a new tory party,
which, under colour of promoting the general good, vies
with the nominal tories in passing coercive measures of
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all kinds and in imposing additional taxes, local and 
national, for the carrying out of measures of social re­
form, education included, in such a way tiiat individual 
freedom is being more and more diminished and State co­
ercion proportionately increased.
The Arguments against Governmental 
Interference.
If it be argued that governmental interference is 
less vexatious now that the government is a represent­
ative government instead of an oligarchical one, the re­
ply is that slavery is slavery whether the masters be 
irresponsible despots or popularly-elected parliamentary 
rulers. This is the substance of the complaint made in 
the essay on The Coming Slavery. Two main arguments are 
there used against State interference. One, which may 
be described as the 'thin edge of the wedge’ argument, 
is that in practice State interference is hard to limit. 
If, argues Spencer, people are taxed to supply free 
education, why not taxes to supply free food and clothing? 
If we have State telegraphs, why not State railways? If 
the State undertakes charity (which had best be left to 
private benevolence; why should it not undertake insur­
ance? There is thus, thinks Spencer, an ever increasing 
momentum which, heaping precedent on precedent, will end 
in reducing the individual to a condition of complete 
slavery to the State; the implication of the argument 
being that what the individual does for the benefit of 
society must diminish proportionately his power to work 
for his own benefit. Spencer will not contemplate the
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idea that social welfare may comprehend individual wel­
fare, or that society may represent the individual at 
his best and wisest. ”If, without option, he has to 
labour for the society and receives from the general stock 
such portion as the society awards him, he becomes a slave 
to the society.”
The second argument against State encroachment on 
natural rights is a biological one. It is to the effect 
that laissez faire is an aid to the operation of the 
natural law of the survival of the fittest, while State 
interference is a hindrance to that law. State charity. 
State education. State insurance and the like, have, as 
a result of the sins of past legislators, led to the sur­
vival and multiplication of the unfit and the improvident, 
and to the handicap of the fit by the resultant burdens 
imposed upon them. In particular, the successful busi­
ness man, by having to pay larger taxes for schemes of 
social betterment, is hampered in his enterprises and is 
consequently unable to pay such high wages as he might 
otherwise do. Free libraries, free education, free baths, 
etc., represent supplements to workers’ earnings, but at 
the same time they involve a decrease in their money earn­
ings, owing to the burden on industry which rates and 
taxes represent. State enterprise in these matters is 
based on the assumption ’’that all suffering ought to be 
prevented, which is not true: much suffering is curative, 
and prevention of it is prevention of a remedy.”
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Family StMcs and State Ethics.
This same biological argument again appears in 
the essay entitled The Sins of legislators, of which the 
main purpose is to emphasise a sermon which Spencer had 
previously preached, namely, that the proper education 
for a legislator is a study of comparative sociology.
The law of the survival of the fittest is now used in con­
junction with a distinction which Spencer makes between 
family-ethic8 and State-ethics. In the family where the 
members are for a time immature and helpless, the benefits 
they receive must vary’’inversely as the power or ability 
of the receiver”; whereas in the State, where the members 
are adult, ’’benefit must be in proportion to merit —  re­
ward in proportion to desert: merit and desert in each 
case being understood as ability to fulfil all the re­
quirements of life -- to get food, to secure shelter, 
to escape enemies.” When the State, owing to the sins of 
badly educated legislators, introduces paternal govern­
ment by passing charitable measures and the like, and 
thereby applies family ethics to a sphere where State 
ethics should rule, fatal results ensue. The process 
of natural selection is hindered, the improvident and 
good-for-nothings are enabled to survive and multiply 
at the expense of the provident and good-for-somethings. 
"Society in its corporate capacity cannot without im­
mediate or remote disaster interfere with the play of 
these opposed principles (juvenile dependence and adult 
independencej under which every species has reached such
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fitness for its mode of life as it possesses, and under 
which it maintains such fitness.” While generosity must 
be the essential principle of the family, justice must be 
the essential principle of the State -- justice meaning 
respect for the individual's natural rights, so that each 
may receive benefits in proportion to merits. Government, 
"begotten of aggression and by aggression”, must be re-
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duced to a minimum, and confine itself to seeing that 
there be freedom to enter into contracts and due fulfil­
ment of such contracts as are entered into. The question 
to be asked by the individual citizen about any govern- 
ment is not ’’whether this machinery is or is not one 
that he has shared in making”, but whether its actions do 
or do not ’’increase such restraints beyond those which
are needful for preventing him from directly or indirect-
—  needful, that is, for maintaining the liberties of his 
ly aggressing on his fellows/against his invasions of
fellows
them: restraints which are therefore to be distinguished
as negatively coercive, not positively coercive'.'
The Influence of Spencer’s Social Philosophy 
on his Educational Views.
Such a review as has been given of his social writ­
ings must have made it clear that Spencer was very far 
indeed from possessing a just or adequate conception of 
the nature of society or the value of its institutions. 
Beginning, as he did, with the individual, he fails to 
appreciate what individuality really means. Spencer dis­
trusts society, for it seems, to him to limit individual 
freedom. Social restraints are disliked, because they 
appear to him as wholly negative, instead o± making
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possible the larger liberty. Thus we are not sur­
prised to find his educational views permeated by this 
limited individualism and imbued with an anti-social bias.
In the next chapter we shall see how his distrust 
of State interference with individual liberty leads him 
to deny any place in the social economy to a national 
system of education. Meantime, confining our attention 
to the essays on Education, we may examine how far they 
reflect the social philosophy just sketched.
The title of the first essay, "V/hat Knowledge is 
of Most Worth?”, is itself significant. Spencer pays 
but grudging tribute to the social training which the 
child receives through habit, imitation and suggestion, 
in those arts which subserve individual well-being. He 
demands for each individual a knowledge of the main 
principles of physiology and hygiene as the best guar­
antee for his becoming a good animal. The aim of edu­
cation he defines as preparation for "complete living”, 
which appears to mean giving the individual man scope 
for the fullest possible exercise of faculty. Of the 
activities which constitute complete living, the fore­
most are those which minister to self-preservation, and 
the least important are those which are concerned with 
appreciation of the arts, the most truly social of human 
products. The knowledge which is of most worth is the 
knowledge which bears upon the individual’s physical 
welfare and his efficiency and success in competitive 
industry and commerce. The knowledge of least worth
173.
A.4.3.
is that which records social achievements and aspir­
ations, namely, history and literature. In other words, 
’unorganisable knowledge' is of little account, while 
science is of "chiefest value". Science can be verified 
by the individual himself: language and literature must 
be taken on trust on the authority of others. A scient­
ific education makes for individual freedom; while a 
literary education, as a result of the social prestige 
enjoyed by those who have received it, "aids in weaving 
that ramified network of restraints by which society is 
kept in order". There is little place in Spencer’s 
scheme of education for that informal education which 
takes place through the unconscious handing on of social 
tradition. Knowledge acquired in that unsystematic, non- 
deliberate way is of no worth at all. The individual can 
be sure of asserting his natural rights only if he is in 
possession of scientific knowledge, which he need not ac­
cept on authority but can put to the test of his own 
reason.
After self-preservation and the proper discharge of 
domestic duties, "complete living" involves certain civic 
functions. But if we seek to discover what is comprehend­
ed in a proper civic life, the only answer is —  judicious 
voting at the next election. To guide a man in his polit­
ical life, ordinary history, we are told, is of no use. 
What is required is a knowledge of the "natural history of 
society", "the ultimate laws to which social phenomena 
conform", "the right principles of political action".
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This knowledge must be sought in a study of descriptive 
sociology, or, perhaps, in such a book as Spencer after­
wards wrote, namely, The Man versus The State.
Turning now to the second essay, we find that the 
guiding principle in Intellectual Education is that edu­
cation should be a process of self-instruction. Mental 
development is but one instance of a universal principle 
of evolution ("the idea of life"j which issues in a final 
individuation. Educational method should therefore eschew 
dogmatic teaching and confine itself to providing the ap­
propriate conditions of mental growth. This means, in 
effect, that education should consist largely of sense- 
training and the cultivation of the powers of observation, 
so that learning may go on by means of self-discovery. 
While there is a place for the teacher, his function is 
not to act as a communicator of the accumulated experi­
ence of the race, but to provide suitable exercises for 
the developing faculties. The subjects of instruction 
which Spencer discusses are sense-training, object 
lessons, nature-study, drawing and geometry. There is no 
mention of language-work, literature, history or the fine 
arts, ostensibly because Spencer did not profess to deal 
with the whole field, but really because they could not 
conveniently be fitted into the principle of self-develop­
ment. There is no spontaneous process by which the mind 
is able to assimilate the social heritage, and the social 
heritage is exactly what Spencer most distrusts. Just as 
humanity. In Spencer's opinion, has progressed solely by
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self-instruction, so the individual must develop by a 
process of self-education. In other words, education is 
an individual affair, not a social process.
The third essay is, perhaps, most significant of all 
as an example of the influence exerted by Spencer's in­
dividualism. As we iiave already seen, Spencer first ap­
proached the subject of education from the moral side, 
when in Social Statics he took up the question of the 
rights of children. Education he there defines as the 
formation of character. The formation of character de­
pends upon the exercise and training of sympathy and 
self-control. Coercion is the worst method to employ. 
Coercion on the part of parents is akin to active govern­
ment on the part of the State, and government, like co- 
ercion, is the "offspring of immorality". Coercion may 
restrain: it does not train. Parents must first estab­
lish sympathetic and affectionate relations with their 
children, and then they may set to work on the task of 
character formation through the sentiments.
When Spencer again comes to deal with moral education 
in the third essay, he is still preoccupied with the 
question of punishment ; and it is on the right method of 
punishment tiiat the whole discussion turns. He has first 
to define morality, and this he does in evolutionary 
terms, connecting good and bad conduct with perfect and 
imperfect adaptation of the individual to his physical 
 ^ environment. "From whatever assumptions they start", he 
tells us^  "all theories of morality agree that conduct
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whose total results, immediate and remote, are bene­
ficial is good conduct; while conduct whose total results, 
immediate and remote, are injurious is bad conduct." 
Spencer makes it pretty clear that these results have no­
thing to do with society, but are physical consequences 
good or bad for the individual. In other words, morality 
is not connected with social approval or disapproval, but 
with individual welfare. He shows us how "in bodily 
injuries and their penalties we have misconduct and its 
consequences reduced to their simplest forms", and im­
plies that there is no difference between an offence 
like stealing or lying and a child's running its head 
against a table or burning its hand in a candle-flame.
This individualist theory leads Spencer into diffi­
culties when he gets outside the simple environment of 
the home, and tries to apply the discipline of natural 
consequences to adult life. In adult life, he says in 
an unguarded moment, it is not physical pain but social 
disapproval which disciplines: "there comes into play a 
discipline like that by which the young child is trained 
to self-guidance". Here, of course, a transition has 
been made from inorganic nature to human nature, but 
Spencer will not admit that. Accordingly he withdraws 
the concession that "social discipline" may be necessary 
for more serious offences, and goes on to say that "the 
discipline of chief value is not the experience of parent­
al approbation or disapprobation but it is experience of 
those results which would ultimately flow from the con-
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duet in the absence of parental opinion or interference. 
The truly instinctive and salutary consequences are not 
those inflicted by parents when they take upon themselves 
to be Nature's proxies; but they are those inflicted by 
Nature herself."
How "Nature" would punish a lie or theft in the ab­
sence of a social code, it is impossible to conjecture. 
Spencer in his anxiety to make morality an individual 
matter and a result of evolutionary processes fails to 
make a distinction between physical nature and human 
nature, or to regard morality as essentially social.
And that also, perhaps explains why this essay on moral 
education is wholly negative, being concerned rather with 
the question of how to punish bad conduct than how to 
bring about good conduct. Even the possibility of punish­
ment ' s bringing the offender to a realisation of his own 
better nature and prompting an inward resolve to reform 
his conduct quite escapes Spencer's recognition. For him 
punishment is objective and has no subjective reference.
It is the same for the animal as for the man; and man by 
becoming social has learnt nothing except obedience to 
the law of equal freedom.
General Criticism of the Social 
Philosophy.
It will be a convenience if we now attempt to sum­
marise our incidental criticisms of Spencer's social 
philosophy by grouping them around four points; the analogy 
of the organism; the doctrine of natural rights; the 
theory of a social contract; and the educative value of
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society and social products.
(a) Society as an "Organism".
Beginning: with the analogy of the organism, we may 
point out that it was no doubt inevitable that Spencer, 
wholly devoid of a historical sense and interested from 
his earliest in the study of biology, should approach the 
study of society with biological preconceptions and should 
think of it under biological categories. It was doubtless 
also natural that a comparison should be drawn between 
society and the individual organism. There is always a 
temptation to read the more complex in terms of the more 
simple. The individual organism is a tangible reality 
open to examination, while society is intangible and not 
liable to investigation by the methods of natural science. 
Up to a point the metaphor of the social organism may be 
useful as an aid to the understanding of the social unity, 
but the temptation is always present to forget that it is 
a metaphor and to interpret the one entirely in terms of 
the other. Spencer gives way to the temptation and re­
gards the resemblance as "almost more than an analogy", 
until finally even the conception of the social organism 
proves too menacing to his rooted belief in individual­
ism, and is in danger of destroying the natural rights 
of the individual man.
The truth of the matter is, of course, that society 
is something quite different from an organism despite 
superficial resemblances. Society represents a union of 
individual minds and purposes which aims at realising
179.
those purposes and giving fuller expression to those 
minds. Hence society is to be adequately described only 
in terms of mind and not by analogy with any lower "organ­
ism". It is pfoperly described as "super organic" if by 
that we mean a form of association between individual men 
which, unlike that between the cells of a body, involves 
on all sides common purposes, similar ideals, a common 
experience and, in general,mental links of connection. It 
is a union of conscious beings impelled by their nature 
to unite in the interests of their own highest develop­
ment and the leading of the good life. And this union 
reacts in turn upon the individuals who compose it, de­
veloping in them qualities which they could not otherwise 
give expression to, and making possible a kind of life 
which could not be otherwise lived.
Spencer professes to find the clue to the nature of 
society in the nature of the units which compose it. It 
is a sound enough procedure. But the whole question 
turns on the meaning one attaches to individual nature.
If the nature of a being is not what it begins as, but 
what in the course of development it ends by becoming, 
a very different view from Spencer's must be taken of 
what is natural in human life. If there are potencies 
present in man's mind which impel him to realise himself 
by the aid of social relationships and institutions, in­
cluding the institution of governmental coercion, then 
these relationships and institutions are as natural as, 
for example, the impulses to self-assertion and pugnacity.
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Hence the restraints which society imposes on its 
members are not to be regarded as restrictions on in­
dividual liberty, but as checks on impulses which are 
less than human, in order to make possible the larger 
liberty and the fuller self-realisation. "V/e might", 
says Rousseau in The Social Contract, "add to the gains 
of the civil state the moral freedom which alone makes 
man master of himself; for the impulsion of appetite 
alone is slavery, and obedience to the law which we have 
prescribed to ourselves is liberty",
Spencer's choice of the organism analogy, even if 
it be regarded as unsatisfactory, might have led him to 
see in society an enlargement of the individual self in 
the social'self"which society sustains. After all, an 
individual organism is a unity which cannot be subdivided 
without destroying it. Similarly society is a unity 
which cannot, except in thought, be broken up into the 
physical individuals who comprise it without causing 
them to become less than human.
Spencer came very near to expressing a significant 
truth when he dropped his analogy on the grounds that 
society is conscious in all its units, while the individ­
ual organism is conscious in only one of its tissues, i.e. 
the brain. If he had gone on to say that each individual 
in the society is capable of becoming conscious, however 
dimly and intermittently, of the purposes which animate 
the whole group, and may therefore be held to acquiesce 
in the laws and institutions which embody these purposes.
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he might have reached beyond the analogy to some genuine 
understanding of the expansion of individual nature which 
society is capable of achieving. But as it happened, the 
analogy was abandoned not in the interests of a truer 
view of society, but in the interests of a supposed in­
dividual liberty which could, in Spencer's opinion, only 
be realised in the absence of social restraints. Society, 
he tells us, differs from an organism in that it exists 
for the private benefit of each of its units (considered 
apart from their social relations); whereas in the organ­
ism the different tissues exist and function for the good 
of the whole.
(b) Natural "Rights".
The natural rights which are thus, in the main, pre­
served in society are, says Spencer, merely subdivisions 
of the general right to exercise the faculties. The ex­
istence of society as a fact in man's life does nothing 
positive to promote this end. On the contrary, at the 
best it imposes restrictions on this natural right by the 
need it lays on man to obey the law of equal freedom; and 
at the worst, by the multiplication of governmental re­
straints, it seriously curtails the development of his 
individuality. Hence the right to exercise the faculties 
is itself non-social, and only the encroachment on that 
right which the fact of society necessitates is social.
"The ground of the right to live, as here stated, is 
simply the recognition that life is&good; and if the 
positive element of this good is non—social and only the 
negative is of social origin, and this alone is ethical.
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it seems clearly to follow that the making the most of 
life —  its positive expansion and intensification 
^"complete living"! —  is excluded from the ethical as­
pects of individuality, and, indeed, that individuality 
has no ethical aspect at all."
What the basis of this natural right is, Spencer no­
where tells us, unless it be, as he says in Social Statics, 
the divine will. It is impossible, however, to regard it 
as a right in the absence of any recognition of it as 
such; and recognition of it implies recognition by some 
individual or individuals other than the self; that is, it 
implies a society. Rights are meaningless claims apart 
from social recognition of them as rights. Society recog­
nises rights as inhering in individuals as a means of 
their developing their individualities to the full; for 
the essence of society is a realisation on the part of 
its members that it is the natural medium by which and 
in which they can achieve the kind of life their nature 
points to. Rights, indeed, lead to restraints and pro­
hibitions, but these restraints and prohibitions are 
welcomed by the individual as a means towards a fuller 
and more perfect development. In other words, social 
restraints have a positive reference: they make for a 
greater liberty; they do not constitute a diminution of
an imaginary fund of natural liberty.
(c) The "Social Contract".
A belief in natural rights, which are in part sur­
rendered when a man enters society, implies a belief
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that society rests upon some sort of social contract; 
and Spencer accepted a hypothesis of this sort. As we 
have shown, he did not postulate any actual contract, 
hut had recourse to the supposition of a tacit agreement. 
In return for the surrender of part of their natural 
liberty, by agreeing to observe the law of equal freedom, 
men ask from society protection and the enforcement of 
contracts. Beyond that their implied bargain does not go. 
Society can give them nothing more. Governmental re­
straints, other than those necessary for the two purposes 
mentioned, are unwarrantable interferences with individ­
ual liberty, and constitute a breach of faith. Society 
is, therefore, reduced to the level of a joint-stock 
company for mutual protection.
A more adequate view of the origin of society would, 
of course, have been to see it arising out of man’s 
mental needs and as satisfying the requirements of his 
spiritual nature. This is a view which goes as far back as 
Plato and Aristotle; but Spencer, brought up on science 
and distrusting traditional views, could not, perhaps, be 
expected to have embraced it.
(d) The Educative Value of Society and 
Social Products.
His very limited view of the function of society in 
its relation to the individual effectively prevented Spen­
cer from appreciating its educative value, or the educat­
ive value of those subjects like art and literature,which, 
if they are not social in the sense of ministering to the 
economic needs of man in society, are nevertheless the
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- P iinest expression of that higher self which attempts to
realise itself in and through society. As the creation 
Ithey make an appeal to all minds in so far as these minds 
of the best minds^^can rise to the appreciation of them.
But it is not only art and literature and traditional 
knowledge which are educative. The institutions into 
which the child is born, answering as they do to human 
needs and purposes, are themselves educative. They ex­
press ideas and purposes far beyond the power of the 
average individual mind, much less the immature mind of 
the child, to conceive unaided, and in doing so they 
help to awaken the purposes and ideas which are immanent 
in the child's mind. But the child cannot appreciate 
them by a process of self-discovery. The teacher, re­
presenting the social community, must contrive to give 
his pupils a training in the art of citizenship.
So it is also with the machinery of law and punish­
ment, whether within the family community or in the 
wider community of society organised as a State. This 
machinery is not an artificial mechanism devised by 
some outsider and imposed upon the community. It is an 
expression of the real will of the group and is accepted 
by them as such. A child who is punished, whether by 
"natural consequences" or social agencies, and does not 
come to feel that the punishment is somehow in his own 
best interest, may be effectively restrained, but he is 
not being educated. If, on the other hand, he realises, 
however vaguely, the appropriateness of the penalty, 
and, best of all, if he welcomes it as a means of
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reinstating himself in his own regard and in the re­
gard of the group to which he belongs, it matters . 
little whether the penalty is natural in the sense of 
being a consequence of the physical constitution of 
the universe, or social in the sense of being a mark 
of public disapproval and a means of bringing a de­
sired reform in the offender’s conduct or nature.
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The State•
In the interests of clearness we may begin our dis­
cussion of the relation Of the State to education by de­
fining what we mean by the State,— a necessary prelimin­
ary, since Spencer is rather vague on this point. He 
tends to use the three tems, society, State, government, 
as if they were interchangeable; and owing to this con­
fusion he is led to make mistakes with regard to the end 
and limit of State action, mistakes over and above those 
caused by his misleading and unwarrantable antithesis of 
the Man versus the State.
We may note, in the first place, that society is 
not the same thing as State. If we regard the State as 
society organised, unified and equipped with force, we 
see that there is a sense in which society is prior to 
the State, and a sense in which society remains distinct 
from the State. "The State arises, according to Hegel, 
from Society, to ensure that the individual shall be 
fully realised, chiefly through his own conscious action. 
The State guarantees him his individuality, which society 
with its self-seeking struggle of competitors tends to
efface."
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Society has many institutions, family, trade,
Church, etc., each making its claims on the loyalty of 
the citizen. But the State is rightly regarded as the 
institution which has power to adjust the claims of these 
lesser institutions in the interests of the comiaon good.
It is in this sense that the State may free the individ­
ual from the tyranny of some smaller social group within 
itself, and is able to do so because it is more likely 
to be free from the limitations of the lesser institution. 
The State as the embodiment of the social purpose or "gen­
eral will" may be expected to foster and encourage a 
better idea of the good than any one institution within 
it, since it may be said to stand for and upon the best 
elements of that public opinion which it reflects and 
on which its continued existence depends.
The End of State Action.
. The State, as Aristotle tells us, originates in
the bare needs of life, and continues in existence for 
the sake of a good life. This remains an admirable sum­
mary of the end of State action; for the promotion of 
the good life is the justification of all action on the 
part of the State. But it is too general a statement to 
help us to understand how the State should act. We need 
to enquire first how the State originates, and this can 
very conveniently be done by a criticism of Spencer's 
idea of the State; since it is the purpose of the present 
chapter to examine Spencer's views on the part the State 
should play in the education of its citizens.
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The title of Spencer’s little work which we 
have analysed in the preceding chapter strikes the key­
note of his treatment of State interference. He sets up 
the antithesis, the Man versus the State, implying that 
the development of individuality and the growth of the 
institutions of the State are antagonistic processes.
Any interference hy the State with the natural "rights" 
of the individual is bound to result in a diminution of 
individual liberty. The latter he regards as a fixed 
amount which somehow exists by "natural right" prior to 
the appearance of the State. The state or government 
(Spencer uses the two terms as convertible) is contin­
ually seeking to interfere with this liberty, and the 
efforts of the "old" liberals have been directed towards 
the end of diminishing State interference and increasing 
individual liberty. The "new" liberals have gone beyond 
their brief, and by insisting on State enterprise in 
many spheres have seriously diminished the freedom to 
which the individual man had attained, and which he must 
never surrender, no matter what specious arguments are 
used to make him think he is acting in his own interests 
or in the interest of his own fullest development as an 
individual.
Spencer’s mistake is to regard the individual as 
prior to the State and consequently as having his claims 
versus the State. The exact opposite is the truth. As 
we have already seen, an individual human being, divorced 
from all social ties, and leading a life of isolation, is
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inconceivable: "it" would be an animal. It is society 
that makes the individual, and it is the State which 
guarantees the highest development to his individuality. 
The relationship between individual citizen and State is 
not one of unit in an aggregate, as Spencer, despite the 
organism analogy, constantly implies. It is one of in­
dividual mind and purpose in a greater mind and purpose. 
Nor is it necessary that the individual should consciously 
realise.his community of interest with the interest of the 
State: it is only necessary that his interest should in 
fact be part of the common interest, capable of being 
brought to consciousness under suitable conditions. A 
fact is none the less a fact, even if it be not conscious­
ly recognised as a fact.
What is meant is that there are qualities immanent 
in human nèture which lead men to seek the association of 
their kind in order to achieve the end which is implicit 
in their nature, namely, the living of the best life.
These qualities account for the existence of society, 
which may take, and has taken, many forms; but if the 
nature of a thing is, as Aristotle said, not what the 
thing is, but what it has in it to become, then society 
would seem to have been impelled by its own nature to de­
velop into the politically organised State. In other 
words, in order to realise themselves most fully men have 
been driven to seek some form of association which gives 
power to itself to order the lives of its members with a
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view to enabling them to satisfy distinctively human 
aspirations in the life of a well ordered State, Men 
may have on occasion to be "forced to be free". The 
State is, therefore, to be regarded as ’natural’, just 
as much as is society. "If ...," says Bosanquet, "you
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start with a human being as he is in fact, and try to de­
vise what will furnish him with an outlet and a stable 
purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities —  a 
satisfying object of life —  you will be driven on by the 
necessity of the facts at least as far as the State, ana 
perhaps further."
If this conception of the State be regarded as a 
true one, it will readily be allowed that there may arise 
occasions when the State may have to "interfere" with the 
individual in his own interests. The citizen who shows 
loyalty to his State does not always know how to behave 
for his own and the general good; and even if he does, he 
has not always the will to sustain that behaviour. The 
State, acting through its executive, or code of laws, or 
public opinion, and representing the best thought which 
its members have been capable of realising, may have to 
step in and compel obedience to its decrees. This con­
stitutes interference, no doubt, but interference with 
a positive purpose. The aim is to bring the individual 
to his better self, to seek to make him realise the im­
plied object of his loyalty, It may indeed be regarded 
as interference with his lower self by his own better 
self, for he must be supposed to have realised, however
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unconsciously, the coramunity of purpose between himself 
as an individual and the State of which he has been as- 
sumed to be a member. "Force or automatic custom or 
authoritative tradition or 'suggestion* are not hostile 
to one individuality because they come from 'others' but 
because their nature is contradictory to the highest self- 
assertion of mind, because they are, so to speak, in a 
medium incompatible with its medium."
Spencer's mistake lies in supposing that any in­
crease in the power of the State or sphere of State action 
involves a proportionate decrease in individual liberty.
He chooses to ignore the fact that State interference is 
often necessary to ensure to the individual freedom to 
develop his capacities. It is not interference in itself, 
of course, that must alone be considered. The object of 
the interference and its de facto results must be taken 
account of. There are times when the encroachment of a 
government must be resisted in the interests of the gen - 
oral good, i.e. in the interests of the State itself; and 
there have been such occasions in the history of this 
country, notably in the seventeenth century when the 
Stuarts sought to identify the State with the monarchy.
The struggle for individual liberty may then be a means 
not of diminishing the power of the State through a limit­
ation of die power of the Ruler, but of actually increasing 
the force of the State as an agency for realising the 
common good. And the common good is best realised when 
each individual is enabled to live the best life, that
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being for man a life in society of the highest type, 
i.e. an organised society or State.
The Nature of Government.
The State functions through the institution of 
Government, so that government may be regarded as the ad­
ministrative or executive organ of the State. Government 
is an institution which has developed out of the fact of 
men's association in the State. It is not something alien 
to the individual, but an institution which he has estab­
lished to promote his own good. Now Spencer is in two 
minds about the nature of government, just as he is in 
two minds about the nature of society.
(a) In the Ess&y on the Social Organism, Spencer, 
as we have seen, protests against the popular notion that 
society is a manufacture and not a growth, and quotes the 
dictum of Mackintosh that "Constitutions are not made, but 
sL jL " grow" as a truism. This protest he repeats in The Sins of 
Legislators, amplifying it by insisting on the need of im­
planting in the minds of legislators "a scientific con­
ception of a society —  a conception of it as having a 
natural structure in which all its institutions, govern­
mental, religious, industrial, commercial, etc., etc., 
are interdependently bound —  a structure which is in a 
sense organic." From this quotation it would appear that 
governmental institutions are as natural as society, that 
they grow and are not made. Accordingly, since progress 
is assumed, it would seem to follow that they ought to 
be allowed to develop in conformity with their own nature
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(just like society itself), whether they legislate badly 
or well, sparingly or to excess. This inference is ex- 
plicitly made by Spencer himself when he says, "As I
(tU-’
heard remarked by a distinguished professor, whose studies 
give ample means of judging —  ’When once you begin to 
interfere with the order of Nature there is no knowing 
where the results will end.' And if this is true of that 
sub-human order of Nature to which he referred, still more 
is it true of that order of Nature existing in the social 
arrangements produced by aggregated human beings,"
Cb) But the whole tenour of The Man versus The 
State is that governments interfere with the natural 
growth of society. Government is begotten of aggression 
^2.. and by aggression and "ever continues to betray its origin­
al nature by its aggressiveness". The charge against 
government is two-fold. In the first place, it encroaches 
on the natural rights of the individualj and secondly, it 
interferes with the natural evolution of society. Parlia­
ment as a governmental institution has strictly limited 
functions. It is bound by the conditions of the implied 
articles of incorporation. These are the resisting of 
invasion, the preservation of security of life and property 
within the State, and the regulation of the use of the 
territory which the citizens inhabit. For the rest, 
Parliament must see to it that there are "few restrictions 
on men’s liberties to make agreements with one another," 
and that there is "an enforcement of the agreements which 
they do make." "If each, having freedom to use his
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powers up to the bounds fixed by the like freedom of 
others, obtains from his fellow-men as much for his ser­
vices as they find them worth in comparison with the ser­
vices of others —  if contracts uniformly fulfilled bring 
to each the share thus determined, and he is left secure 
in person and possessions to satisfy his wants with the 
proceeds; then there is maintained the vital principle 
alike of individual life and of social life. Further 
there is maintained the vital principle of social pro­
gress; inasmuch as, under such conditions, the individuals 
of most worth will prosper and multiply more than those 
of less worth. So that utility, not as empirically es­
timated but as rationally determined, enjoins this main­
tenance of individual rights; and, by implication, neg­
atives any course which traverses them."
The non-interference of government with the indiv­
idual is thus the fundamental condition of a healthy 
social life. Society is a growth, not a manufacture. 
Government must stand aside and let the fittest survive 
under a system of complete freedom on the part of the 
individual to make contracts, and of a rigid enforcement 
of such contracts as are made.
It is not possible to reconcile the two views.
Either "governmental institutions" are part of the social 
organism, and as such must be allowed to evolve in their 
own way without interference by Spencer or by liberals, 
old or new; or government is something outside the evolu­
tionary process and is not a natural growth but a manu­
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facture. In the case "how can we avoid the suspicion," 
as Ritchie asks, "that there is some flaw in Mr Spencer's 
scientific conception of society, and that it breaks down 
at Government?" Spencer cannot have it both ways; and in 
justice to him, it must be said that he would not wish to 
have it both ways. It is clear that he regards Govern­
ment as quite an "unnatural" institution which had best 
be limited to the protection of individual liberty, and 
allowed the barest minimum of "interference."
The Principles of State Interference.
Even if the view be accepted that the institution
ifie
of State is a natural and inevitable expression of the
A
human spirit, that it is 'the mind of man writ large,' 
it does not follow that its "interference" is always 
justifiable. As a human product it has its imperfections. 
We may therefore consider briefly the limits of State 
action, or the principles of State interference.
If the State continues in existence for the sake of 
the good life, its action must be directed to the further­
ance of the good life. But this good life is an individ­
ual life; and the problem is how the State may contrive 
to influence the lives of its individual members so that
they may be the better able to live fully and well. There
re r j
are certain things which by their^nature neither State 
nor any other external agent can directly effect. One of 
these is obviously morality, for an act is moral only in 
so far as it expresses an inner aspect of the agent's 
character, and no external power can directly compel the
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will. It is an old point that an act done under com­
pulsion is not a moral act. Similarly, the State can­
not, strictly speaking, be said to educate its citizens 
or their children. It can only provide the external con­
ditions which conduce to their receiving education. The 
State is therefore compelled to act indirectly and ex­
ternally. In a sense it is justified in "interfering" 
by the results of its actions. In considering State 
action, then, we may (following Ritchie) put to ourselves
questions:
(1) Is the object aimed at good? Is the action of 
the State likely to increase the general welfare? Is it 
an action in accordance with the spirit of the nation?
(2) Will the proposed means attain this end?
(3) Will they attain it at too great expense or not? 
Is the "interference" which they cause likely to result 
in a liberation of the human spirit greater than the 
possible restriction which they cause?
These questions can not be answered a priori, or 
by reference to an assumed existence of "natural rights" 
of the individual citizen. They must be answered by an 
examination of the possible or actual outcome of the 
State’s action.
Application to Education,
Let us try to apply these questions to State educa­
tion.
(1) Is universal education a good? Only one answer 
is possible. It is not difficult to show "a definite
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tendency to growth, or a definite reserve of capacity, 
which is frustrated" by illiteracy. Whatever may have 
been the case in the seventeenth or the eighteenth cen­
tury, there can be no doubt that formal education had be­
come a social necessity in the nineteenth century, or 
that it is an even greater necessity in the twentieth 
century. There may conceivably be difference of opinion 
as to how the education may best be given: there can be 
no gainsaying that somehow provision must be made for 
the education of the nation's children.
(2) Will compulsory State education result in all 
citizens having a minimum of culture, or is any other 
agency conceivable? History provides the best answer to 
this question. As we have seen, first the Church and 
then Charity Organisations attempted to bring a minimum 
of schooling within the reach of the working classes.
Both failed; and the State was reluctantly compelled to 
undertake the task. It has succeeded, because it is the 
one institution which compels all men’s loyalty, and which 
is able to make compulsory demands on all men’s resources 
to provide the wherewithal for the provision of schools 
and the payment of teachers. In this respect, as in many 
others, the State has simply taken over an enterprise 
which originated and developed independently of State con­
trol, because it had become impossible to continue it 
without the aid of the State’s resources, and because 
its continued existence and extension were vital to the 
welfare of the State. Thus education, taking its origin
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in the religious and charitable impulses of individuals 
or subordinate social groups, came gradually to be re­
cognised as a matter of universal social concern, and be­
came more gradually, but yet finally, a State enterprise. 
There could have been no system of universal, compulsory 
State education in 1870, if the nucleus of that system 
had not existed on the system of voluntary and Church 
schools. There would have been no opportunity for the 
State to make its first grant in 1833, had the machinery 
not been in existence to dispense that grant. State inter­
vention in education was in the nature of an evolution or 
development of what had for generations been shaping it­
self as the social purpose.
(3) The object aimed at in State control of educa­
tion is obviously, then, a good: it aims at developing
the capacity of every citizen, so that he may become an 
efficient and useful member of the community, with the 
chance of achieving some measure of real freedom; it pro­
tects children from the lack of foresight of their parents, 
or from their selfishness, ignorance or poverty. The 
means adopted to achieve the end, namely, universal, com­
pulsory education by State provision of schooling, have 
been proved to be necessary by the record of history; and 
no other agency has seemed likely to be able to take the 
place of the State. There remains therefore only the 
third question: What of the cost? State education in-
volves compulsion. According to Spencer, it involves 
' "interference" with the "natural rights" of the individ-
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ual owing to the levying of taxes to support schools, 
colleges, libraries, gymnasia, reading rooms, etc. Un­
doubtedly it does. The material goods of the citizens 
are decreased by their having to pay educational rates 
and taxes; but there is a disproportionately greater in­
crease in the spiritual good of the community which is 
worth achieving at the cost involved; and this spiritual 
good is of a kind that can be shared by others without 
our portion being diminished. The fact that the whole 
nation is educated increases the freedom of every indiv­
idual to a degree which vastly outbalances the restriction
of his freedom by his being called upon to pay taxes in
RiuLi support of universal education. "The existence of a mass
itvtuXûA ^ ’ 'P
^  of ignorance at the base of society is a grave danger to
the whole of the community and to every individual in it; 
and a danger against which we desire to be protected.
That is the case for State education in its very lowest 
terms." This protection is surely well worth paying for. 
We may conclude then that the liberation of the human 
spirit by the State enforcement of compulsory education 
is greater than the restriction caused by the levying of 
educational rates and taxes; and that State education is 
justified on all three grounds.
Spencer's Arguments against State Education 
in "Social Statics."
We are now in a position to take up in detail Spen­
cer's polemic against National Education as set forth in 
"Social Statics," and repeated in essence in "The Man 
versus The State."
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(1) As we have already shown, the sole function 
of government, according to Spencer, is the maintenance 
' V f f c A t / - o f  the individual's natural rights, "which are merely
A. 3^1•
 ^ subdivisions of the general liberty to exercise the
faculties." Now, if the State seeks to administer educa­
tion, it must levy taxes, and this involves taking away 
more of the citizen's property than is needful to main­
tain his rights, and is consequently wrong. To the ob­
jection that children's rights are involved in questions 
of education, Spencer replies that the lack of education, 
assuming that parents remain unmoved by affection for 
their children to provide education privately, does not 
curtail "any previously existing power to pursue the ob­
jects of desire," and hence children's liberty to exer­
cise the faculties is left intact, this freedom being 
all that equity demands. The reply to this argument has 
already been given. The State exists to promote the gen­
eral good, not to defend a wholly fictitious code of 
natural rights. The children of the nation are its future 
citizens. Their capacities are valuable not as "previous­
ly existing," but as fully developed; and it is in the 
interests of the general welfare^ and therefore an essen­
tial part of the State's function^to see that they are
fully developed.
(2) Spencer's second argument (one of which he is 
very fond) is a logical one. It is two-fold, (a) First, 
he tells us, there is no logical reason why the State 
should stop at education. There is not. If, says Spen-
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cer, government educates a man's children, why should 
"Jaxu^ it not feed and clothe them? "If the benefit. Import-
ance, or necessity of education be assigned as a suf­
ficient reason why government should educate, then may 
the benefit, importance or necessity of food, clothing, 
shelter and warmth be argued as a sufficient reason why 
government should administer these also." Where will 
parental responsibility be then? This objection has lost 
much of its force nowadays. We are accustomed to con­
template the provision of food and clothing to necessitous 
children who are not (otherwlsÿ^judg^ capabl^of profiting 
by the instruction given in school. Accordingly, we are 
not at all scared by the picture which Spencer conjured 
up in 1850. It is sufficient, perhaps, to point out that 
the cannons of formal logic are not applicable to social 
affairs. If it is in accordance with social logic that 
there should be State oversight of the bodily health of 
certain children, as well as the mental development of 
all children, so much the worse for formal logic if that 
involves any breach of its principles. Social develop­
ment is not a logical process: it is a human process, a 
psychological process. The great justification for the 
enlargement of the function of the school is that the 
State can do infinitely better by the children of many 
of its members than the latter can do as individual 
parents. That is not to say, however, that the State 
need, or will, try to do for all children what it may 
legitimately try to effect for some children. The three-
203.
quarters of a century which has elapsed since Spencer 
published his treatise has witnessed a great increase in 
State enterprise, but the State has not yet shown any in­
clination to take over the duties of family training in 
cases where it is satisfied that these duties are being 
performed by individual parents as well as, or better than, 
they could be by the State.
(b) Secondly, says Spencer, there is no logical 
reason why the State should stop at elementary education. 
Why should it not proceed to enforce university education 
on all? If it enforces the teaching of the three R's, 
why does it not also make compulsory the teaching of 
geography, history, drawing, natural science, geometry, 
chemistry, physiology, astronom^^, mechanics and geology? 
"Where is the unit of measure by which we may determine
j,.zQ3.
the respective values of different kinds of knowledge?
Or, assuming them determined, how can it be shown that a 
child may claim from the civil power knowledge of such 
and such values, but not a knowledge of certain less 
values?" To this the reply is that the State has success- 
fully survived the "ordeal of definition." It has so far 
decided that elementary education should be compulsory 
for all up to the age of fourteen, and it may at no dis­
tant date decide further to extend the age to fifteen or 
even eighteen. If it stops at eighteen, it will not be 
because it has reached a logical definition of what con­
stitutes the sphere of State education, but because it 
has come to the conclusion that the general welfare is
best served by making education beyond that age optional,
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and that the interests of university education are best 
served by leaving it in charge of a professional corpor­
ation of teachers with a minimum of interference by the 
central government. University education aims at the in­
crease of knowledge, the discovery of truth and the form­
ation of free and enlightened opinion; and, as we have 
already indicated, the State can interfere in this sphere 
only indirectly if at all. It can provide the external 
equipment, the material requirements of a university, but 
it is powerless to promote directly the growth of the 
university spirit.
(3) In Spencer’s opinion, State education clearly 
involves governmental definition of the aim of education, 
must first form for itself a definite conception of
yj ♦ 363.
a pattern citizen; and having done this, must elaborate 
such system of discipline as seems best calculated to 
produce citizens after that pattern." The result will be 
a dead uniformity in the product. This is Spencer's 
strongest argument. The State as the sovereign force 
must make its influence felt in all departments of social 
life; yet, as we have seen, its function is none the less 
negative. There are limits to State interference in edu­
cation. The State, or rather the Department which is 
charged with the carrying out of the general will, may, 
in contradiction of that will, attempt to prescribe the 
kind of influence which teachers are to bring to bear 
upon the minds and characters of their pupils in the 
interests of the existing conditions of social life.
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There is some truth in Spencer's charge that State 
education tends inevitably to be conservative, Edu- 
cation ought, he thinks, to be "the never sleeping agent
jy3-]2.
of revolution," whereas government tends always and 
Xx., 1^-371. everywhere to favour the status quo, to make people "con­
tent with that station of life to which it has pleased 
God to call them." Spencer points with some justice to 
the "attempt in Cobbett's day to put down cheap litera­
ture, by an act which prevented weekly publications be­
ing sold for less than sixpence," to "the reluctance with 
which the newspaper stamp duty was reduced, when resist­
ance had become useless," to the "doublefacedness of a 
legislature which professes to favour popular enlighten­
ment, and yet continues to raise a quarter of a million 
sterling yearly from 'taxes on knowledge'" —  adducing 
each of these instances as an example of governmental 
antagonism to the spread of knov/ledge and the free dis­
cussion of opinion. We may freely admit the danger. 
Parliament has never in this country shown any precip­
itate haste to "educate its masters". Public education 
began, says Bosanquet, "by standardising to a very com­
monplace standard 'an education contrived by clerks for 
a nation of working men,' and is very slowly being drag­
ged into the right path by public protest, social ex­
periment and, no doubt, the energy of the best officials."
Of some force too is the correlative objection that 
the existing government will tend to use the schools as 
channels for propaganda in its own support. If the State
I HVU i.
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80 orders its educational system as to control its teach­
ers by making them directly officers of state, then it 
may guide education along narrowly nationalist lines, as 
the Prussian government attempted to do with some consid­
erable success before the war, "A system of national edu­
cation is, as it were, a new tool in the hands of the 
State; and it may use the new tool for what it imagines to 
be its own ends. It may attempt a uniform prescription, 
from a central office, of a single code intended to real­
ise a national idea conceived in the brain of its own of­
ficials, and it may thus seek to defeat the right of self- 
determination which, in education no less than in other 
matters, is inherent in any democratically governed com­
munity. It may attempt, through the teaching of national 
history, and through the organization of the life of the 
school, to enforce the negative form of patriotism which 
is chiefly occupied in crying down the achievements of 
other nations. Political parties may seek to make schools 
partisan, seeing a ready way to victory in an alliance 
with teachers and an indoctrination of the young." But 
that has not been our experience of State education in 
this country. So long as teachers remain semi-independent 
of State control, there is no great risk of the schools 
becoming seed grounds of government propaganda, or turn­
ing out their pupils "content with that station of life 
to which it has pleased God to call them." Yet there is 
some force in Spencer's charge of conservatism against 
State schools. All institutions are conservative, the
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school included. It is not for a State department to 
fortify that tendency by a too rigid control of schools. 
The social purpose is best served by giving the schools 
freedom to approximate their atmosphere and methods to 
that purpose, to harmonise the life of the school with 
the best life of the community.
(4) Spencer's next objection is that "a government
/. Jf f.
cannot in fact educate at all, but can only educate some 
by une duo a ting others." This follows from his complaint 
that State education leads to the total annulment of 
parental responsibility; but it is connected in an inter­
esting way with the doctrine of evolution by natural se­
lection, through the survival and multiplication of those 
best fitted for their environment. Imprudence and lack 
of self-restraint are factors which lead to the growth of 
a pauper population. State provision of education, by 
diminishing parental responsibility, encourages imprudent 
and hasty marriages and thus interferes with the "discip­
line of nature," which adapts men to their circumstances 
by bringing the shiftless and imprudent face to face with 
"stern necessity," thereby strengthening their powers of 
self-restraint. Parental responsibility is the strongest 
incentive to self-restraint, so that, were the State to 
educate gratuitously, many a man even after marriage 
i jgg. "would not only cease to improve in power of self con­
trol as he is now doing, but would probably retrograde, 
and bequeath his offspring to a lower instead of a higher 
phase of civilization."
There are two objections to be made to this line of
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argument, not to mention the implied belief in the trans­
mission of acquired characteristics. In the first place, 
Spencer assumes that knowledge of consequences is an ade­
quate guide to conduct. Men are to be restrained from 
marrying and having children by the mere knowledge that 
they will be compelled to pay for their maintenance and 
education. As he himself has just been insisting in the 
same chapter, "mere ideas received by the intellect, ....
fyAsr.
are quite inoperative upon conduct, and are quickly for­
gotten upon entering into life." In the second place, 
Spencer expects us to contemplate with equanimity "the 
admirable silent-working mechanisms of nature," by which 
the survival of the fittest will be brought about at the 
cost of incalculable misery and suffering on the part of 
children as well as their parents. We prefer to see the 
State devising machinery to prevent this potential loss 
of human happiness and efficiency, or even life, by free­
ing individuals from the struggle for existence once 
characteristic of primitive man and still to be found
h u h . 38S- among animals. We can no longer afford to trust to Nature
/
"with a perfect economy," and a capital letter.
(5) There is still a further objection to compulsory 
education, which we must note before going on to con­
sider Spencer's substitute for the State as educator. He 
bids us beware of the fallacy that education is prevent­
ive of crime. As commonly understood, education means 
the mere training of intellect, whereas men are governed 
by their passions. Ordinary teaching will not eliminate
evil doing from the hearts of men: "their sins will mere-
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ly be made more Machiavellian." "Crime," Spencer tells
h.3t^.
US, Is incurable, save by that gradual process of adapt­
ation to the social state which humanity is undergoing. 
..... To hope for some prompt method of putting down 
crime, is in reality to hope for some prompt method of 
putting down all evils —  laws, governments, taxation, 
poverty, caste and the rest; for they and crime have the 
same root." The little that education can do to alter 
character, Spencer concludes, can be done only through a 
training of the emotions. If it is suggested that State 
education should take this form, Spencer replies in an 
Slrifujj-ss-sr. exclamation: "From all legislative attempts at emotional 
education may Heaven defend usi"
For good or ill we have decided not to leave crime, 
poverty and other social evils to cure themselves in the 
course of generations by a gradual process of elimination, 
accompanied by much suffering and waste. We have prefer­
red to use the other "evils" of "laws, governments and 
taxation" as means of combatting the forces which pro­
duce crime and poverty. If the education which the law 
prescribes, government enforces and taxation makes possible, 
is not the right kind, we can change it. The remedy is 
not less education but more and better education; and we 
heed have no special horror of "legislative attempts at 
emotional education." It cannot be seriously questioned 
that crime in this country has greatly diminished since 
1870. We need not claim all the credit for education.
There have been improvements of many kinds in social life—
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largely as a result of State intervention. But it is 
not hard to see that education has played a large part 
in making possible these very changes which have reduced 
the amount of crime, though few people assert that educa­
tion alone is a sufficient guarantee against anti-social 
conduct.
Spencer's Substitute for the State as 
Provider of Education.
What should be substituted for the State as the
agent of education? Spencer's reply to this question is,
Trust the individual parent. Parental affection is a :
strong enough incentive to ensure that children will be
educated in the absence of compulsion. That is Nature's
machinery for ensuring "the mental and physical develop-
ment of successive generations." Instead of leaving it
to Nature, however, "legislators exhibit to us the design
and specification of a state-machine, made up of masters,
ushers, inspectors, and councils, to be worked by a due
proportion of taxes, and to be plentifully supplied with
raw material, in the shape of little boys and girls, out
of which it is to grind a population of well-trained men
and women, who shall be 'useful members of the community' I"
If it be argued that parents do not know what good
instruction is, Spencer replies that a similar pretext
has served for all sorts of vexatious interference by
the government in other departments of life; and that
the assertion is false. Ignorant parents have three means
of estimating the quality of the education offered. They
can observe the effects of good or bad teaching on other
21 1 .
peoples children; they can follow the example shown 
them by parents better educated than themselves, and 
choose the same schools; and there is finally the test 
of price —  they will know that cheap education is nasty 
education and dear education is good education. Parents 
can be trusted to give their children the best education 
they can afford. In any case, even if mistakes are made, 
“SdtUjLt they will cure themselves. "The rising generation will
better understand what good education is than their par­
ents do, and their descendants will have clearer concep­
tions of it still."
State educationists show a childish impatience with 
the "ordained rate of progress." They are "dissatisfied, 
because the progress from general ignorance to universal 
enlightenment has not been completed in a generation."
H o^ .,^ .377 They ought to trust "natural forces." A natural and
spontaneous process will see to the unfolding of the 
national mind. It will be slow, no doubt, as all social 
transformations are slow, but it will be sure and certain. 
There is no need to try to hasten it by "legislative 
fingerings."
So far the arguments have dealt with the parents; 
but education primarily concerns children. Spencer's 
treatment of the rights of children, to whom as much as 
to adults he would apply the law of equal freedom, turns 
upon a distinction he recognises between 'faculties' act­
ually in existence and 'faculties' still undeveloped.
The child is to have perfect liberty to exercise his
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existing faculties, subject only toother people's having 
equal liberty. The child's liberty is therefore equal to 
that of the adult, though not the same,since the child has 
fewer developed faculties. There is nothing in this law 
which prescribes a child's right to education. Education 
has to do with the development of faculties, not with 
previously existing faculties. Hence denial of education 
does not infringe a child's liberty to exercise such facult­
ies as he possesses.
The chapter in "Social Statics" dealing with the 
rights of children is, as we have seen, concerned mainly 
with the evils of coercive discipline, and not, except by 
implication, with the relation of the State to education; 
but towards the end of the chapter there is an interesting 
paragraph in which Spencer makes clear his attitude to the 
institution of government. To the objection that "if the 
rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults, 
it must follow that children are equally entitled with 
adults to citizenship, and ought to be similarly endowed 
with political power," Spencer’s reply is that it is not 
the law of equal freedom which is responsible for the ab­
surdity, but the institution of government,which will not 
exist in a perfect society, "in which morality shall have 
become organic." If government does not exist, political 
power will not exist, and therefore neither children nor 
adults will possess political rights. "Were the moral law 
universally obeyed, government would not exist; and did 
government not exist, the moral law could not dictate the
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political enfranchisement of children. Hence the alleg­
ed absurdity is traceable to the present evil constitu­
tion of society, and not to some defect in our conclusion."
Spencer's expectations of the wisdom likely to be 
shown by "ignorant parents" are saved from being absurd 
only when it is recollected that in "Social Statics" he 
has in view the fully evolved society in perfect equilib­
rium with its environment. In the present imperfectly 
evolved society, State interference is justified precise­
ly because there are so many individual parents who are 
not able to judge properly what is in their own interest 
or in the interests of their children. "Ignorant parents" 
with no traditionsof culture are not likely to be able to 
discern the need for education of any kind, far less to 
be able to choose between good education and bad educa­
tion. Yet it is vital to the welfare of the State as a 
whole that all its members should have the chance of 
education. Parents have a moral duty to see that their 
children are educated. If they do not perform this duty, 
the State can not compel them to be moral ; but it can 
forcibly remove the obstacle in the path of children to 
the living of a moral life, an obstacle constituted by 
ignorance and illiteracy. And that, as we have seen, 
can only be done by the State's providing universal, com­
pulsory education.
State education is provided as much in the inter­
ests of the children as in the interests of the general 
good. We realise that children in our society have
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"rights" as well as adults. But these rights are, some 
of them, in the future, and not in the present. The 
nature of a human being is what he is capable of becoming 
as well as what he is. It is not enough to see that child­
ren have freedom to exercise "previously existing" fac­
ulties: the potentially existing faculties must have a 
chance to develop. Any adequate view of what constitutes 
human nature implies that at least.
Conclusion.
Much as we disagree with Spencer in his views on 
the right relation of the State to education, we shall be ■ 
less than just to him if we fail to appreciate the lessons 
he teaches with regard to the dangers inherent in an edu­
cational bureaucracy. Extreme centralization and minute 
oversight and control of education may well result in a 
uniformity which means death to the spirit of the pro­
cess; and that is too great a price to pay for mere 
mechanical efficiency. But State control of education 
need not necessarily mean State management. The State 
may hand over the control to locally elected bodies, and 
may thus permit and encourage diversities in method and 
curriculum, while still retaining responsibility for the 
general oversight of the process* State control need not 
mean direct control by the dentral department of State.
In the long run the State must be the ultimate arbiter, 
because education is of national, not local, concern; be­
cause nowadays it is a very costly enterprise and must be 
subsidised from the national exchequer; and because, for
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the proper co-ordination of the different stages of 
education -- elementary, secondary and university —  and 
the different kinds -- liberal and technical,—  some in­
stitution representative of the nation as a whole must 
have the deciding voice. But enlightened public opinion 
may well realise that education is an enterprise different 
in nature from that of the postal service or national de­
fence —  an enterprise which cannot be subjected to de­
tailed direction or minute and uniform codes of regulations 
without doing harm to its real efficiency. The State de­
partment may deliberately restrict itself to the collec­
tion and sifting of local experiments, the issue of gen­
eral directions, and the inspection of the results of 
educational enterprises locally initiated; while leaving 
the teacher a measure of freedom to experiment and plan 
his own courses of instruction.
In actual practice, education in this country, al­
though State-provided, is not by any means completely 
centralized. The local education authorities enjoy a 
very considerable amount of power and initiative; they are 
"perhaps the most powerful organs of local self-government
f?. in the country; and those who know their powers will read­
ily recognise that the principle of "balance" is still 
maintained ... by the condominium which associates the 
local authorities with the central Board in the admin­
istration of education." The very number of these author­
ities guarantees the maintenance of a wholesome diversity, 
corresponding to differences in local environment and
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local needs.
In addition to the State schools there are, es­
pecially in England, large numbers of private schools 
managed by governors, private associations or private 
persons, which keep alive the spirit of private enter­
prise, and make possible experiment and innovation to 
a degree hardly possible in a State institution.
In these two facts we have some safeguards against 
the dangers of State education; but the price of liberty 
is eternal vigilance, and to be aware of the dangers in­
herent in State education is a first step towards secur­
ing the benefits without the disadvantages of a national 
system of education.
REFERENCES:
Spencer: "Social Statics" (London, 1868. Reprint of
1850 edition); "The Man versus The State." 
(London, 1884.);
Ritchie: "Principles of State Interference." (London,
1891); "Natural Rights." (London,1903); 
Bosanquet: "The Philosophical Theory of the State."
(London, 1923);
Barker: "National Character and the Factors in its
Formation." (London, 1927).
See also General Bibliography.
217.
CHAPTER Z
RIGHT AIMD WRONG CONDUCT,
The Search for a Scientific Basis for Ethics.
’’Social Statics”: ’Pure’ Ethics.
Conditions of the Moral Life.
Conformity to these Conditions demanded by Applied Ethics. 
Pre-eminence of Justice.
The Intuitive Basis of Justice.
"The Data of Ethics."
Goodness and Badness determined by the Completeness of 
Man’s Evolution.
Happiness the Ultimate End of Life.
Right Conduct Pleasurable, Wrong Conduct Painful.
The Motives of Conduct.
Non-Moral Restraints.
Moral Restraints arise out of "Natural" Consequences. 
Agreement between "Social Statics" and "The Data of Ethics." 
Egoism and Altruism.
The Scope of Ethics.
"Justice."
Justice means Observing the Law of Equal Freedom.
Supreme Authoritativeness of Justice.
Criticism.
218,
CHAPTER X.
RIGHT AND WRONG CONDUCT.
The two preceding chapters have been concerned re­
spectively with Spencer’s social philosophy and his 
political philosophy. The present chapter will review 
his ethical philosophy as expounded in Social Statics,
The Data of Ethics, and Justice. It is designed to serve 
as an introduction to a more detailed criticism of his 
third essay on Education.
The Search for a Scientific Basis for Ethics.
’’Written as far back as 1842,” Spencer tells us in 
the preface to The Data of Ethics, ’’my first essay, con­
sisting of letters on The Proper Sphere of Government, 
vaguely indicated what I conceived to be certain general 
principles of right and wrong in political conduct; and 
from that time onwards my ultimate purpose, lying behind 
all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the 
principles of right and wrong conduct at large, a scien­
tific basis.” This scientific basis Spencer professed to 
find in the natural process of evolution. But, as we pro­
ceed to show, his characteristic theory of ethics was al­
ready almost fully developed, as were his social and 
political philosophies, in Social Statics, a book which 
appeared nine years before the publication of The Origin
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of Species. Consequently it would seem that the guid­
ance furnished by the theory of evolution must have been 
of the most general kind. The fact of the matter is, 
however, that Spencer’s ethical theory, even in its 
latest form, has little to do with the natural process of 
evolution at all. On the contrary it rests upon his in­
veterate individualism, garnished with a blend of hedonism, 
empiricism and intuitionism. The later expositions of 
it, in The Data of Ethics and Justice, are furnished with 
a good deal of evolutionary trapping, but it remains as 
it began - - a  system of a priori individualism.
"Social Statics"; ’Pure’ Ethics.
The main features of the ethical system may be set 
forth briefly. As we have seen, the theory advanced in 
Social Statics depends upon a belief in progress as a 
natural law. Evolution will lead men ultimately to a 
condition of perfect equilibrium with their environment, 
a condition in which morality will have become ’organic’ 
and all mankind will have become ’straight’ men and women. 
’Pure’ ethics deals with this Utopia, in which Spencer 
assumes the greatest general happiness will exist. This 
pure science of ethics cannot, therefore, take account of 
evil of any kind. Meantime what we need is a kind of 
applied ethics. In order to secure practical guidance in 
the conduct of life, we must ascertain and conform to the 
general conditions which will lead to that greatest happi­
ness which Spencer assumes it is the ultimate destiny of 
humanity to achieve. In other words, happiness must be
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pursued not directly but indirectly.
Conditions of the Moral Life.
The essential conditions of life are first of all 
the social state, since "men have multiplied until they 
are constrained to live more or less in presence of each/>
other." Hence "it follows that the men who are to realize 
this greatest sum of happiness, must be men of whom each 
can obtain complete happiness, without diminishing the 
spheres of activity required for the acquisition of happi­
ness by others." The fulfilment of this condition is ex­
pressed by the word, justice. Justice, we learn, con­
sists in the observance of the law of equal freedom. But 
greatest happiness cannot be achieved without certain 
other conditions being fulfilled. In addition to not 
trenching on one another’s spheres, men must act so as 
not to cause unhappiness to others. This constitutes the 
observance of negative beneficence. Men must also be so 
constituted as to share sympathetically in the happiness 
of others, or else general happiness will not be so great 
as it might be. This constitutes positive beneficence. 
"Lastly," says Spencer, "there must go to the production 
of the greatest happiness the further condition, that, 
whilst duly regardful of the preceding limitations, each 
individual shall perform all those acts required to fill 
up the measure of his own private happiness" (complete 
living). This is prudence.
Conformity to these Conditions demanded by 
Applied Ethics.
These are the conditions which must be fulfilled
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before greatest happiness can be achieved, and conform- 
ity to them is the proximate end of human life. "All ap-
j> ,
proach to greatest happiness presupposes an approach 
toward conformity with them. Schemes of government 
and culture which ignore them, cannot but be essential­
ly absurd. Everything must be good or bad, right or 
wrong, in virtue of its accordance or discordance with 
them. ...Greatest happiness is obtained only when 
conformity to them is spontaneous; seeing that the 
restraint of desires inciting to trespass implies pain, 
or deduction from greatest happiness. Hence it is for 
us to habituate ourselves to fulfil these requirements 
as fast as we can. The social state is a necessity.
The conditions of greatest happiness under that state 
are fixed. Our characters are the only things not 
fixed. They, then, must be moulded into fitness for 
the conditions. And all moral teaching and discipline 
must have for its object to hasten this process."
Pre-eminence of Justice.
Of the four conditions of morality just specified—  
justice, negative beneficence, positive beneficence, and 
prudence —  the most fundamental is the first, justice.
The other three are of "quite inferior authority" to the 
KJ. M.yf.yy. original law. "Instead of being like it, capable of
strictly scientific development, they (under existing cir­
cumstances) can be unfolded only into superior forms of 
expediency,” involving a quite impracticable calculus of 
pleasures and pains. They are very definite conditions 
of happiness for the ideal man; but meantime, since the 
ideal man does not exist, they are capable only of gen­
eral application and do not admit of scientific develop­
ment. Scientific ethics thus concerns itself chiefly 
with the development and application of the principle of 
justice.
It is to be noted that of these four conditions the
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last three alone directly involve the notion of happi­
ness and these three are of inferior authority to the 
first —  justice —  which does not directly imply happi­
ness, Hence morality depends ultimately not on any 
direct calculation of happiness or unhappiness, but on 
the observance of the law of equal freedom. Spencer’s 
system is, therefore, in the last analysis, not one of 
hedonism, but one which depends on an assumption of a 
law of individual liberty.
The Intuitive Basis of Justice.
This law of equal freedom is based upon a "Moral 
Sense" which gives the individual man an intuition of his 
liberty to exercise his faculties limited only by the 
like liberty of all. It may be inferred, according to 
FocAkA S-hdJxé''^ Spencer, that "there exists in man what may be termed an
h. (to .
instinct of personal rights —  a feeling that leads him 
to claim as great a share of natural privilege as is 
claimed by others —  a feeling that leads him to repel any­
thing like an encroachment upon what he thinks his sphere 
of original freedom. By virtue of this impulse, individ­
uals, as units of the social mass, tend to assume like 
relationships with the atoms of matter, surrounded as 
these are by their respective atmospheres of repulsion as 
well as of attraction. And perhaps social stability may 
ultimately be seen to depend upon the due balance of these 
forces." Not only, however, do men intuitively claim 
freedom for themselves, but they are also led to accord 
the same freedom to other men by a sympathetic affection 
of the instinct of personal rights. The instinct of
223.
personal rights is, it is true, of itself entirely self­
ish, merely urging its possessor to maintain his own 
privileges. But the sympathetic excitement of it leads 
him to accord as much liberty to others as he claims for
himself. "And thus," Spencer concludes, "in the average
h '7* of oases we may safely conclude that a man’s sense of 
justice to himself, and his sense of justice to his neigh­
bours, bear a constant ratio to each other." In brief, 
the supreme moral law, the law of equal freedom, is made 
known to man by an instinctive intuition, and it is to be 
gradually Conformed to by cultivating the subsidiary vir­
tues of negative beneficence, positive beneficence and 
prudence.
"The Data of Ethics."
Such in outline were Spencer’s published views on 
ethics when the Essay on Moral Education was written in 
1858. As we have seen, the system is based on a concep­
tion of a future state in which evolution has ceased and 
individual man lives a life of perfect freedom limited 
only by an instinctive inclination to allow all other men 
the same freedom. His next work on ethics, The Data of 
Ethics, was published in 1879. In this, as we began by 
pointing out, he aimed at establishing a more strictly 
scientific basis for morality in the light of the new 
biological knowledge and the latest developments of the 
doctrine of evolution. If his views had undergone any 
essential alteration, it would not be appropriate to 
refer to them in connection with his theory of moral edu-
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cation. But that, as we shall now see, was not the case.
Goodness and Badness determined by the Completeness 
of Man’s Evolution.
In considering The Data of Ethics we may at once pass 
over a good deal of the earlier chapters since they are 
concerned,like much of Spencer’s ethical writing, not with 
a discussion of the end of human conduct —  a strictly 
relevant ethical topic —  but with a biological and socio­
logical account of ’conduct in general’ and ’the evolution 
of conduct.’ We may begin by noticing that, in Spencer’s 
xo^ opinion, ’’Ethics has for its subject matter, that form 
which universal conduct assumes during the last stages 
of its■evolution." Conduct under its ethical aspects 
is to be judged good or bad "according as the adjustments 
of acts to ends are or are not efficient." But since 
9VL^.,j,.xz. "the entanglement of social relations is such, that men’s 
actions often simultaneously affect the welfares of self, 
of offspring, and of fellow citizens," conduct to be good 
must simultaneously promote the fullest development of in- 
dividual life "both in length and breadth"; make possible 
the rearing of healthy offspring; and further the com­
plete living of one’s fellows. In short, good conduct 
"simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life 
in self, in offspring, and in fellow men." Spencer pro- 
ceeds to ask whether there is "any assumption made in 
calling good^^lcts conducive to life, in self or others, 
and bad those which directly or indirectly tend towards 
death, special or general?" His answer is Yes, the as-
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sumption is that life is worth living; and this^without 
any adequate attempt at proof, is the assumption he goes 
on to make. He proceeds further to identify the good 
with the pleasurable by pointing out that both optimists 
and pessimists agree that to call conduct good implies 
that it brings a surplus of pleasurable feelings. Hence 
the end of human life is once more capable of being de­
fined as greatest happiness.
Happiness the Ultimate End of Life.
What we have now arrived at, then, is this. The 
moral end is not increase of life in self or others, not 
the perfect adjustment of actions to ends, but greatest 
pleasure or happiness. This is the same postulate as 
Spencer made in Social Statics, except that there it was 
identified with God’s will or the Divine Idea. Here,it 
appears to be based on the doctrine of evolution, but,of 
course, the doctrine of evolution cannot be used to settle 
the question of the end of human life, which is a question 
of values: it can only explain how, in fact, life does 
tend to develop. Spencer merely assumes that evolution 
works towards a condition of happiness.
- Right Conduct Pleasurable: Wrong Conduct 
Painful.
According to Spencer, it follows from this assump­
tion that "along with complete adjustment of humanity to 
the social state, will go recognition of the truths that 
actions are completely right only when, besides being con­
ducive to future happiness, special and general, they are 
Immediately pleasurable, and that painfulness, not only
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ultimate but proximate, is the concomitant of actions 
which are wrong. So that from the biological point of 
view, ethical science becomes a specification of the con­
duct of associated men who are severally so constituted 
that the various self-preserving activities, the activit­
ies required for rearing offspring, and those which social 
welfare demands, are fulfilled in the spontaneous exercise 
of duly proportioned faculties, each yielding when in 
action its quantum of pleasure; and who are, by consequence, 
so constituted that excess or defect in any one of these 
actions brings its quantum of pain, immediate and remote." 
Meantime, however, in man’s incompletely adapted state, 
Spencer allows that, owing to changes in the environment, 
many cases pleasures are not connected with actions 
which must be performed, nor pains with actions which must 
be avoided, but contrariwise."
The Motives of Conduct.
Passing next from the biological view of conduct 
to the psychological, Spencer deals with the motives of 
conduct. These show an increasing development from im­
mediate sensations of pleasure to the ideas of sensations 
' to come: "there is an over-ruling of presentative feelings 
by re-representative feelings." "The more ideal motives 
concern ends that are more distant; and with approach to 
the highest types, present ends become increasingly sub­
ordinate to those future ends which the ideal motives 
have for their objects. Hence there arises a certain 
presumption in favour of a motive which refers to a re­
mote good, in comparison with one which refers to a
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proximate good. "
Non-Moral Restraints.
This subordination of present ends to ends more re­
mote illustrates the kind of development which the moral 
consciousness has undergone. The process of subordination 
has in man been aided by certain extrinsic restraints on 
conduct, of which there are three main kinds: political, 
religious and social. But according to Spencer, political 
restraints, religious restraints and social restraints are 
none of them moral: they are only "preparatory" to the 
moral control —  "are controls within which the moral con­
trol evolves."
Moral Restraints arise out of "Natural"
Consequences.
What is the nature of the truly moral restraint?
The paragraph in which Spencer explains it is so import­
ant for its bearing on the doctrine of punishment by 
natural consequences that it may be given in full. "For
now we are prepared to see that the restraints properly 
distinguished as moral, are unlike these restraints out 
of which they evolve, and with which they are long con­
founded, in this —  they refer not to the extrinsic 
effects of actions, but to their intrinsic effects.
The truly moral deterrent from murder, is not constit­
uted by a representation of hanging as a consequence, 
or by a representation of tortures in hell as a conse­
quence, or by a representation of the horror and hatred 
excited in fellow men; but by a representation of the 
necessary natural results —  the infliction of death- 
agony on the victim, the destruction of all his possibil­
ities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to his be­
longings. Neither the thought of imprisonment, nor of 
divine anger, nor of social disgrace is that which con­
stitutes the moral check on theft; but the thought of 
injury to the person robbed, joined with a vague con­
sciousness of the general evils caused by disregard 
of proprietary rights. Those who reprobate the adulter­
er on moral grounds, have their minds filled, not with 
ideas of an action for damages, or of future punish­
ment following the breach of a commandment : but they are
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occupied with ideas of unhappiness entailed on the 
aggrieved wife or husband, the damaged lives of 
children, and the diffused mischiefs which go along 
with disregard of the marriage tie. Conversely, the 
man who is moved by a moral feeling to help another 
in difficulty, does not picture to himself any reward 
here or hereafter; but pictures only the better con­
dition he is trying to bring about. One who is moral- 
■ ly prompted to fight against a social evil, has neither 
material benefit nor popular applause before his mind; 
but only the mischiefs he seeks to remove and the in­
creased well-being which will follow their removal. 
Throughout, then, the moral motive differs from the 
motives it is associated with in this, that instead 
of being constituted by representations of incidental, 
collateral, non-necessary consequences of acts, it is 
constituted by representations of consequences which 
the acts naturally produce. These representations are 
not all distinct, though some of such are usually 
present; but they form an assemblage of indistinct re­
presentations accumulated by experience of the results 
of like acts in the life of the individual, super-posed 
on a still more indistinct consciousness due to the 
inherited effects of such experiences in progenitors; 
forming a feeling that is at once massive and vague."
The feeling of moral obligation in general origin­
ates in an abstract sentiment of duty generated (a) by the 
authoritativeness gradually felt to be possessed by remote 
benefits over present benefits, and (b) by the element of 
coerciveness present in the non-moral restraints of re­
ligion, social approbation and political laws. As man 
becomes perfedtly adapted to his environment, the re­
straints of religion, political government, and public 
opinion will pass away, and with them the sentiment of 
duty will likewise disappear. Men will be moral as a 
matter of course, in total disregard of the approval of 
their fellow beings or of the Divine Being.
Viewed next from the point of view of sociology, 
the perfection of morality involves a transition from the 
militant to the industrial form of society, which, as we 
have seen, was a characteristic postulate of Spencer’s
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social theory. In the completely industrialised soci­
ety justice will he observed in the requirement that 
"the units shall not directly aggress on one another;" 
negative beneficence will be observed in so far as the 
units will not "indirectly aggress by breaking agreements;"
and positive beneficence will be practised in "spontane­
ous efforts to further the welfare of others."
Agreement between "Social Statics" and "The Data
of Ethics."
These requirements, it is to be noted, serve to 
bring Spencer’s ethical theory into line with that of 
Social Statics. Despite,the appeal to evolution, despite 
the biological, psychological and sociological analogies, 
ethics rests, as it did before, on the basis of the prin­
ciple of justice, with the subsidiary principles of pru­
dence, negative beneficence and positive beneficence; and 
it is made to refer for a standard to a perfectly evolved 
society composed of ’straight’ men and set in the remote 
future. In explaining the genesis of this Utopia the 
biological factors of evolution —  the struggle for ex­
istence, natural selection of those fittest to survive, 
the elimination of the unfit, etc., —  are not made use 
of so much as is the assumption of progress as a univers­
al law of life.
Egoism and Altruism.
In considering the relation between egoism and 
altruism in this perfect society, Spencer concludes that 
egoism and altruism will be completely reconciled. Social 
life will so develop sympathy that altruism will come to
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be spontaneous and will yield the same gratification 
^ egoism, "From the laws of life it must be concluded 
that unceasing social discipline will so mould human 
nature, that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be 
spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous
to each and all  In natures thus constituted, though
the altruistic gratifications must remain in a transfigur­
ed sense egoistic, yet they will not be egoistically pur­
sued —  will not be pursued from egoistic motives." This 
would appear to mean that selfishness will be disguised 
as unselfishness; or, in other words, the individual will 
be pursuing his ov/n ends under the guise of promoting the 
ends of his fellowmen; for Spencer goes on to say "though 
pleasure will be gained by giving pleasure, yet the 
thought of the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not 
occupy consciousness, but only the thought of the pleasure 
given." Apparently the thought of the pleasure given will 
not be consciously pleasurable. If that is Spencer’s 
meaning it is difficult to understand how pleasure will 
be gained by giving pleasure, unless ’unconsciously.' in 
any case, it seems that altruism is only a form of egoism, 
and that the individual’s pleasure is the real end. This 
appears even more clearly in a significant passage in a 
rough draft of the chapter on Conciliation which Spencer 
published as an appendix to The Data of Ethics. He says 
tbere, "In % proportion as, with the advance of society to
a peaceful state, there increases the form of social 
life which consists in mutual exchange of services— in 
proportion as it becomes to the advantage of the indiv­
idual, and to the prosperity of the society, to regard
231.
other’s claims and fulfil contracts —  in proportion 
as the individual comes to he aided in leading a more 
complete life, by possessing a nature which begets 
friendship and kindly offices from all around; in such 
proportion does there continuously tend to take place 
both a strengthening of the altruistic emotions direct­
ly in the individual, and the increase of those indiv­
iduals who inherit most largely the altruistic nature."
The Scope of Ethics.
Concluding The Data of Ethics, Spencer divides the 
scope of ethics into two parts, individual or personal and 
social. Social ethics again subdivides into two: (a) ac- 
cording as conduct does or does not "interfere with the 
pursuit of ends by others"— just or unjust conduct; and 
(b) according as it actively or passively conduces to 
other®?welfare— positive or negative beneficence. Each 
of those divisions must be considered, first as a part of 
Absolute Ethics and then as a part of Relative Ethics.
But only one division is capable of scientific develop­
ment, namely, that which deals with the non-interference 
with the rights of others, which, as in Social Statics. 
Spencer terms Justice.
"Justice."
We now pass therefore to Part IV of The Principles 
of Ethics, Justice (1891). After an attempt to trace 
the evolution of justice from animal life through sub­
human life to human life, Spencer proceeds to show how 
the sentiment of justice originates. "Beginning with the 
joy felt in ability to use the bodily powers and gain the 
resulting benefits, accompanied by irritation at direct 
interferences, this gradually responds to wider relations,"
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and finally constitutes 'the egoistic sentiment of 
" ' B ^ x c j . justice,' which is "a subjective attribute which ans­
wers to that objective requirement constituting justice—  
the requirement that each adult shall receive the results 
of his ovm nature and consequent actions." The altruistic 
sentiment of justice comes into existence as a result of 
a pro-altruistic sentiment of justice compounded of- four 
varieties of fear, partly social and partly pre-social, 
namely, fear of retaliation, fear of social dislike, fear 
of legal punishment and fear of divine vengeance. With 
the development of gregariousness and sociality also, al­
truistic sympathy arises and forms the basis of the altru­
istic sentiment of justice. In course of time from those 
two sentiments there somehow or other gradually emerges 
the idea of justice. "The idea," says Spencer, "gradually 
emerges, and becomes definite in the course of the experi­
ences that action may be carried up to a certain limit 
without causing resentment from others, but if carried be­
yond that limit produces resentment."
Justice means Observing the Law of 
Equal Freedom.
The idea of justice is therefore compounded of two 
sentiments, an egoistic and an altruistic —  feeling for 
one's own rights and respect for the rights of others.
Thus the formula of justice must comprise these two ele- 
ment8, a positive and a negative, "It must be positive
in so far as it asserts for each that, since he is to 
receive and suffer the good and evil results of his 
actions, he must be allowed to act. And it must be
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negative in so far as, by asserting this of everyone, 
it implies that each can be allowed to act only under 
the restraint imposed by the presence of others having
like claims to act...... Hence that which we have to
express in a precise way, is the liberty of each limit­
ed only by the like liberties of all. This we do by 
saying:— Every man is free to do that which he wills, 
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any 
other man."
Supreme Authoritativeness of Justice.
11, This law Spencer regards as a fundamental law "de-
ducible from the conditions to be fulfilled, firstly for 
the maintenance of life at large, and secondly for the 
9^-1 maintenance of social life," and as being "an immediate
dictum of the human consciousness after it has been sub­
ject to the discipline of prolonged social life." Then 
"accepting the law of equal freedom as an ultimate ethic­
al principle, having an authority transcending every 
other," he goes on to deduce from it, as in Social Statics, 
the various rights which the individual man has to exer­
cise the faculties and the limits of State "interference" 
with these rights. This application of Justice is not 
substantially different from that made in the work publish­
ed forty years previously.
Criticism.
The cardinal weakness of Spencer's ethical theory 
is its dependence on a conception of a fully evolved state 
of society composed entirely of "straight" or ideal men. 
That a condition of complete equilibrium between man and 
his environment is ever, likely to be reached it is diffi­
cult to conceive; and it is certainly impossible to pre­
dict what that state is likely to be. Spencer's formula
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for evolution in general —  a progress from an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogene­
ity —  does not help us much. We are not much enlightened 
with regard to the nature of moral conduct, for example, 
by being told thatumoral man pays his debts promptly, 
keeps his appointments, is trustworthy, and in general be­
haves in a coherent way; or that the conscientious man is 
exact in all his transactions, supplies precise weight 
for a specified sum, tells the truth, keeps the marriage 
contract scrupulously, and in general behaves in a 
definite way; or, that the civilised man not only satis­
fies his personal needs, but attends to the needs of wife 
and children, undertakes social responsibilities, plays 
an active part in politics, cultivates the higher fac­
ulties both intellectual and aesthetic, and in general 
behaves in a more heterogeneous way than the uncivilised 
man.
Evolution is a different process for man from the 
adaptation to environment which goes on among animals.
That is because man’s environment is essentially different 
from that of the animals. It is psychical as well as 
physical, and therefore it is enormously more complex. It 
is different for different races of men, and different, 
indeed, for every individual man. Complete adaptation 
would mean a different kind and degree of adaptation for 
every single human being, unless eventually every man be­
comes like every other man —  a universe of Robots, Not 
only so, but man unlike the animals, or to an incalcul­
ably greater degree than the animals, is continually
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changing the environment. It is impossible to conceive 
that he would ever cease to wish to alter it, and there­
fore complete adaptation becomes impossible. The end 
state which Spencer looks forward to would, if it ever 
came, be a state of stagnation and death, not a state of 
complete living. Yet it is on this fanciful assumption 
that Spencer's whole system of ethics professes to be based, 
As we have shown, it merely professes to be based on 
evolution. In reality it is founded on a conception of 
Justice as a self-evident law of social life. Spencer, it 
is true, regards Justice as simply an extension among 
civilised human beings of the law of survival of the 
fittest among lower animals. But the two laws are essen­
tially different. Among animals the process of natural 
selection according to fitness for survival —  incident­
ally involving much interference with individual "rights" 
— admittedly operates: among civilised human beings it 
manifestly does not. Nor does Justice, which means the 
observance of the Law of Equal Freedom, at present meet 
with universal acceptance. Even Spencer admits this.
The Law of Equal Freedom is a law which will run univers­
ally only when men are perfectly adapted to their environ­
ment, physical and social. For the present it reduces it­
self to a law which, in Spencer's opinion, ought to be ob­
served. Thus it is not a "natural" law depending on the 
evolutionary process, but a man-made "ought," which a 
prejudice in favour of individualism has led Herbert Spen­
cer to elevate into "an ultimate ethical principle, hav­
ing an authority transcending every other." All the bio-
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logical studies of the years intervening between Social 
Statics and Justice have not essentially modified the 
position which Spencer was led to adopt in the days of 
his youth, when he set out to specify "the conditions of 
human happiness," and to develop the first of them, namely 
the law that "every man has [== should have] freedom to do
A  /If.
all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
freedom of any other man." The only major difference be­
tween the two sets of views is that in Justice the Moral 
Sense postulate is superseded by a "sentiment of justice" 
merging into an "idea of justice," partly as a result of 
individually acquired experience of the social resentment 
caused by certain forms of aggressive action, and partly 
as a result of the inheritance of acquired racial experi­
ence to this effect.
That Spencer himself was aware how little the theory 
of evolution had counted for in the development of his 
views appears from a significant passage in the Preface to 
fititicJ’ Negative and Positive Beneficence in which he says, "The
Doctrine of Evolution has not furnished guidance to the 
I n  J extent I had hoped* ? Most of the conclusions, drawn
empirically, are such as right feelings, enlightened by 
cultivated intelligence, have already sufficed to estab­
lish."
It was a damaging confession; and Spencer lost no time in 
modifying it. In the Preface to Volume II of The Prin­
ciples of Ethics issued subsequently, it appears thus. "If
it be said that throughout the final divisions of 
Ethics, dealing with Beneficence, Negative and Posit­
ive, the conelusions must, as above implied, be chiefly 
empirical; and that therefore here, at any rate, the 
Doctrine of Evolution does not help us; the reply is 
that it helps us in general ways though not in special
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ways. In tlie first place, for certain modes of con­
duct which at present are supposed to have no sanc­
tion, it yields us a natural sanction — ; shows us 
that such modes of conduct fall within the lines of 
an evolving Humanity —  are conducive to a higher life, 
and are for this reason obligatory. In the second 
place, where it leaves us to form empirical judgments, 
it brings into view those general truths by which our 
empirical judgments should be guided —  indicates the 
limits within which they are to be found."
Even if v/e grant for the sake of the argument that
pleasure or happiness is the chief end of man, it does not
follow that the more evolved life is, the happier it is.
The cause of evolution may, for all we know, be marked by
a progressive dulling of both pleasure and pain, until
finally total unconsciousness of either develops. "Why,"
Hu. t  of T ' A  •
L asks Sidgwick, "should not unconsciousness, 'without one
pleasure and without one pain,' be the ultimate end of 
evolution? Why should not actions become instinctive and 
mechanical?" Spencer assumes that progress is a law of 
life and that progress will lead to a condition of great­
est happiness —  all pleasure and no pain.
It is the weakness of this assumption that impairs 
the value of his discussion of the moral consciousness 
and the moral motive. There will be no moral conflicts 
for the ideal man. He will do right as a matter of 
course; not because he wills to do so, but because he can­
not help doing so. He will have no feeling of obligation 
or duty —  no moral consciousness. Meantime, all that im­
perfect man can do, while awaiting the natural cause of 
evolution, which he is powerless to control, is to prac­
tise subordinating 'extrinsic' motives to 'intrinsic' 
motives. No act is morally right unless it is done with
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foresight of its naturally necessary and remote conse­
quences. The individual must not he guided by represent­
ations of religious, legal or social restraints, nor must 
he be guided by a moral ideal with which he identifies 
himself, but by the representations of the consequences 
of his conduct to himself, to his family and to his fellow­
men. By and by, if men practise acting in this way, in 
the course of generations their descendants will inherit 
predispositiohs to act thus, and morality will become 
easy and effortless.
There is a palpable confusion in this way of looking 
to the natural process of evolution for a standard of con­
duct and at the same time exhorting men to act so as to 
hasten the desired consummation. If evolution tends to 
bring about the ideal society, it will do so whatever men 
do here and now. If men must be induced to guide their 
conduct by foresight of 'intrinsic' rather than 'extrinsic' 
consequences, then evolution obviously does not, in fact, 
guarantee the emergence of that ideal society. It is not 
legitimate to look to evolution to provide the moral end 
and at the same time employ the moral end as a means of 
guiding evolution towards the end one would like it to 
achieve.
Passing over that question, let us consider Spen­
cer's trick of contrasting "extrinsic" restraints ( re­
ligious, legal, social) with "intrinsic" restraints (fore­
sight of natural consequences). It is a false antithesis. 
One may detect in it the influence of his very imperfect 
realisation of the nature of society and his prejudice in
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favour of individualism. Religious, political or social 
restraints are as ranch intrinsic as that constituted by 
foresight of personal benefits or harm to come, for the 
individual in his ideal nature is not opposed to other 
individuals or the Divine Being, but is one with them. 
Accordingly the restraints they exercise are his restraints. 
Men are not, unless they are of the baser sort, restrained 
from doing wrong by the presence of a policeman or the 
fear of divine wrath to come. They are restrained because 
the social disapproval or the divine disapproval is disap­
proval of which they themselves approve, disapproval with 
which they identify their own better selves. The social 
code or the religious code is one to which their own 
reason assents. Social disapproval with, in certain cases, 
its machinery of legal punishment, is a means of bringing 
the offender back to a way of life more in accordance with 
his own true nature, and is not a mere external means of 
coercion. If men were law-abiding merely through fear of 
the policeman, or moral merely from dread of public opin­
ion, every second person would need to be a policeman and 
all private conduct would be immoral. It is therefore a 
misleading antithesis to contrast as extrinsic restraints 
constituted by fear of divine displeasure or social dis­
approval with the intrinsic restraints made up of mental 
representations of loss of happiness inflicted on others 
or diminished fulness of life on self. The one set are 
as intrinsic and natural as the other, and if a man is 
moral because he identifies himself with a moral code, 
fear of breaking that code is surely an intrinsic motive
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and a natural constituent of his moral consciousness.
Enough has been said by way of criticism of Spen­
cer's theory of right and wrong conduct to make it clear 
that it was not the doctrine of evolution, pre- or post- 
Darwinian, which inspired his views, but a preconceived 
prejudice in favour of individual rights. Once again, as 
in the case of his social and political philosophy, the 
key to his point of view is to be found in Social Statics. 
His system is not primarily one of hedonism nor one of 
utilitarianism but a system based upon, and sustained by, 
a fervent belief in individualism, and that individualism 
stands out most clearly and unambiguously in the book 
which Spencer published at the age of thirty.
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CHAPTER ZI.
PUNISHMENT BY NATURAE CONSEQUENCES.
♦
When Spencer came to write the Essay on Moral 
Education in 1858, his approach to the subject was some­
what different from that adopted in Social Statics. In 
the latter, as we have seen, his views were coloured by 
the conception of a final stage of evolution in which 
education would no longer be necessary, and children 
would "naturally" and spontaneously develop into com­
pletely moral beings.- Education should, Spencer advised, 
eschew coercion and go to work through the sentiments on 
the task of forming the type of character which deduction 
from the lav/s of life showed would be typical of perfect­
ly evolved man. So far as it goes, then, this early dis­
cussion is at least positive and constructive. Parents 
are to cultivate friendly relations with their children 
and endeavour to develop the sentiment of sympathy, or 
feeling for the rights of others (the germ of the "Moral 
Sense"), in order to foster self-control. Self-control, 
like other qualities of mind, is best developed through 
exercise; and children ought therefore to be encouraged 
to practise self-discipline as much as possible.
In Moral Education, on the other hand, the discus­
sion has in view the world as it is, not as it will be in
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an ideal future. The recommendations are concerned 
almost entirely with punishment and are therefore neg­
ative: not how to promote good conduct, but how to pun­
ish bad conduct.
The Criterion.
Conduct is not to be judged according to the approv- 
al or disapproval it meets with from parents, but by its 
results, imraediate and remote. "From whatever assumption 
they start," Spencer announces, "all theories of morality 
agree that conduct whose total results, immediate and re­
mote, are beneficial, is good conduct; while conduct 
whose total results, immediate and remote, are injurious, 
is bad conduct. The ultimate standards by which all men 
judge behaviour, are the resulting happiness or misery." 
Now in interpreting this dictum we mpst remember that 
happiness is convertible into pleasure, and misery into 
"Efk^'y pain. As we learn later in The Data of Ethics, "there is
no escape from the admission that in calling good the con­
duct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hin­
ders or destroys it, and in so implying that life a bless­
ing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that con­
duct is good or bad according as its total effects is 
pleasurable or painful." Hence we arrive at the central 
thesis of the chapter, namely that the pleasures and 
pains that are the necessary consequences of actions are 
Nature's method of moral discipline and ought to be fol­
lowed by educators. If this is hedonism, it is hedonism 
in the interests of individualism. Spencer is at pains 
to impress upon us that "the truly instructive and salut-
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ary consequences are not those inflicted by parents 
when they take upon themselves to be Nature's proxies; 
but they are those inflicted by Nature herself."
Before we proceed to examine the application of 
this theory, it is well to point out that we have no 
warrant for assuming that "Nature" has any interest in 
moralising human beings. Spencer assumes that evolution 
makes inevitably for progress —  progress in morality as 
well as progress in the degree to which men are adapted 
to their environment. It remains a mere assumption. 
Pleasures and pains may have become associated with acts 
respectively beneficial and harmful to life, but that 
does not make the acts either moral or immoral. Morality 
is a human conception and needs to be evaluated in terms 
of human judgements and human standards. It is social 
not natural. In other words, ethics deals not with the 
"is", but with the "ought to be"; and the"ought to be" 
has a meaning only when expressed in human terms and human 
values.
Nature and the Natural.
"When a child," says Spencer, "falls, or runs its 
head against the table, it suffers a pain, the remembrance
of which tends to make it more careful...... If it lays
hold of the fire-bars, thrusts its hand into the candle- 
flame, or spills boiling water on any part of its skin, 
the resulting burn or scald is a lesson not easily for­
gotten......  Now in these oases, Nature illustrates to
us in the simplest way, the true theory and practice of 
moral discipline." Here we have certainly one meaning
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oommonly attributed to Nature. The consequences which 
the child suffers are those which follow inevitably 
from contact between the physical nature of things and 
the psycho-physical nature of a human being. In such 
 ^ "bodily injuries and their penalties," according to
A • f3Q.
Spencer, "we have misconduct and its consequences reduced 
to their simplest forms." If those were the only sort of 
'natural consequences' which Spencer looked to to discip­
line children, he would be at least consistent. But no 
sooner does he proceed to illustrate Nature's reaction 
than the meaning of Nature undergoes a fundamental change.
The child who makes a litter is to suffer the conse- 
, quence of having to rectify the disorder, since "the lab­
our of putting things in order is the true consequence of 
having put them in disorder." The small boy who tears 
his clothes in a hedge must suffer the consequence of hav­
ing to repair the rents himself. The little girl, contin­
ually late for her walk, is punished by the 'natural' con­
sequence of being left behind. In these cases we discover 
that Nature, being powerless to apply her ovra reactions, 
is forced to have recourse to human agents in nurse and 
parents.
Passing now to later life, we find that "it is by 
an experimentally-gained knowledge of the natural conse­
quences, that men and women are checked when they do 
wrong." The idle youth suffers the "natural penalty" of 
being discharged and having to undergo the evils of a 
relative poverty. The unpunctual man has only his un- 
punctuality to blame for his inconveniences and losses.
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The profiteer 'naturally' loses his customers; the in­
attentive doctor, his patients; the too credulous 
creditor and the over-sanguine speculator, their money.
It is true that in these cases Nature has to rely on 
"social discipline," but this social discipline is 
analogous to "Nature's early discipline of infants." It 
is not the approval or disapproval of his fellows which 
serve to discipline the adult, but the consequences of his 
conduct which fall upon the individual himself. We notice 
that here again, however, Nature has had to invoke the aid 
of human agency.
Finally, for the more serious case of theft, Spencer 
has to admit that Nature is obliged to employ two man- 
made consequences: first, that of making restitution; and 
second, the grave displeasure of parents —  "a consequence
h. f^o.
' which Inevitably follows among all peoples civilized
enough to regard theft as a crime."
It must be apparent to everyone —  though Spencer 
tried to hide it from himself —  that the Nature which in­
flicts a burn as a consequence of holding a finger in a 
candle-flame is different from the Nature which makes a 
child pick up his scattered toys, discharges an idle ap­
prentice, or ruins a careless physician. Much more is it 
different from the Nature which, once a theft has been 
discovered, enforces restitution and manifests grave dis­
pleasure. The truth is that in all senses except the 
first Nature has ceased to mean inorganic nature and has 
come to mean human nature. The consequences have ceased 
to be natural reactions and have become social reactions;
247.
which, let it be admitted freely, are quite appropriate 
penalties, because they are the kind of penalties which 
are in force among people "civilised enough to regard 
theft as a crime."
It is surprising to what extraordinary expedients 
Spencer resorted to in order to get over the need of 
bringing social agencies to bear on the moralising of man. 
For example, in the passage from The Data of Ethics quoted 
in our last chapter, we saw that the truly moral restraint 
on theft was not the fear of imprisonment, nor the dread 
of divine displeasure, nor even the social disgrace suf­
fered by the known thief: it was the thought of injury to 
fzo. the person robbed, "joined, with a vague consciousness of 
the general evils caused by disregard of proprietary 
rights." Similarly the truly moral deterrent from murder 
/zo. consisted of an imagined idea of the "necessary natural 
results —  the infliction of death agony on the victim, 
the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness, the 
entailed sufferings to his belongings." The moral motive, 
Spencer says, consists of the imagination of the conse­
quences which acts naturally produce on others. This imag­
ination will be painful to the person who performs the 
acts, and this pain is the true moral deterrent.
Now in criticism of this, we may point out that the 
disapproval, resentment or retaliation of those offended 
against is as "natural," if not as "necessary," as the 
sympathetically imagined pain of the offender. For the 
time being, whatever may be the case in the remote future, 
they are more efficient moralisera than the purely selfish
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and imaginary sufferings of the tender-minded, altruist­
ic egoist of Spencer's Utopia. Spencer certainly allows 
that religious, legal and social restraints do play a 
part in the evolution of the moral consciousness. To­
gether they constitute one of the two elements in the 
feeling of moral obligation or duty; but that is a tempor­
ary feeling destined to pass away when evolution is com­
plete. The perfectly adapted man will have no feeling of 
duty or moral obligation; he will be automatically and 
spontaneously moral. Whether this is or is not conceivable, 
it is hardly necessary to decide; for meantime we have to 
do only with men in process of evolution, and in their 
case social approval and disapproval or resentment are 
assuredly 'natural' consequences of certain acts and are 
clearly of the utmost value in the moral education of 
mankind.
Alleged Advantages of Punishment by 
Natural Consequences.
Most of the advantages which Spencer brings forward 
in support of his system are highly doubtful. In the 
first place, he says, natural reactions are proportionate 
to the offence: a slight accident brings a slight pain; a 
more serious one, a Severe pain. Now proportionateness to 
the offence is just the quality which natural consequences 
usually lack, but which social penalties may be so adjust­
ed as to possess. Of two urchins who go sliding on a 
forbidden pond, one may fall through the ice and be drown­
ed, while the other may enjoy an afternoon's sport in per­
fect security. Both reactions cannot be proportionate to
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the same offence. Again the same result may mark quite 
different offences, for natural consequences cannot take 
any account of motives. One child may quite accidentally 
injure his companion with an open knife, and another in­
flict a similar injury in a fit of temper. Ought the 
punishment to be the same in both cases? Is there any 
natural reaction?
Spencer assures us that Nature's consequences are 
constant, direct, unhesitating and not to be escaped.
This is precisely what in many cases even of "physical 
sins" the natural consequences are not. Spencer mentions 
elsewhere cases of eyesight ruined for life through over­
study. Leaving aside the question of the proportionate­
ness of the consequences of what is on Spencer's theory 
undoubtedly "wrong" conduct (as leading to unhappiness 
and diminishing physical efficiency), we may affirm that 
the result is not direct; it is not constant; and it is 
in many cases escaped. Too often the natural consequences 
are so slow and insidious that they are not apparent un­
til it is too late for the 'culprit' to reform.
That natural consequences produce a right conception 
of cause and effect will only be allowed by one who ac­
cepts Spencer's peculiar theory of morality —  a theory 
which, as we have seen, rules out all ideal ends, and re­
duces the criterion of right and wrong to mere fitness 
or unfitness of the organism to survive. Doubtless it is 
advisable that children should learn what consequences to 
expect when they experiment with the physical environ­
ment; but the physical laws of cause and effect have little
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to do with the moral laws of right and wrong. Similarly 
objection may be taken to the claim that the discipline 
is one of pure justice. Nature, according to human stand­
ards, is notoriously unjust, and even Spencer is forced 
to counsel interference with her punishments. "A three- 
year old urchin playing with an open razor cannot be al­
lowed to learn by this discipline of consequences; for the 
consequences may be too serious."
More defensible are the claims that by avoiding ar­
bitrary punishment and making the penalty appropriate, or, 
to use Bentham's term, "characteristioal," the tempers of 
both parents and children are less likely to be ruffled, 
and as a consequence their relationship will be friendlier 
and more sympathetic. But the parents must make the con­
sequences appropriate: it cannot be left to Nature. Spen­
cer admits the need of cultivating sympathy between parent 
and child, since sympathy is essential to beneficent con­
trol. For Nature has no sympathy; and it is only the 
anthropomorphism of the savage which makes him dread 
■ offending her.
Thus the advantages claimed for discipline by natural 
consequences turn out to bear not even the most lenient 
scrutiny, and not even to be consistently maintained by the 
author of the system himself.
The Illustrative Cases.
In considering the changing meaning which Spencer 
attaches to Nature, we have already had occasion to 
notice that the natural consequences specified as appro­
priate in the illustrative cases chosen by h)m are not
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really natural. The "natural" consequence of a 
child's having made a litter is to revel in the dis­
order thus created and to add to the aausement by in­
creasing it. The consequence eventually is that the toys 
lie around until perhaps they are lost or broken. For the 
child to be made to collect them, or to be denied the 
use of them subsequently if he refuses, may be appro­
priate enough, but it is not "natural." The "natural" 
consequence of being late for a walk is to set out cor­
respondingly later. If the child is left behind, it is 
because his elders show a "natural"'resentment towards 
unpunctuality or disobedience in children. A boy who 
breaks his pocket-knife or loses it through carelessness 
"naturally" experiences the results of being deprived of 
it; but even the sternest of parents may consider the 
penalty too severe to mark the fault and be induced to 
circumvent "Nature" by replacing it. The boy who breaks 
his sister's doll and feels no sorrow or remorse will 
naturally seize the opportunity of breaking other toys 
unless the parents step in and enforce restitution, or 
mark their disapproval by some physical punishment.
Again the boy —  it is usually the boy who misbehaves —  
who tears his new suit naturally has to wear a torn 
suit which no known natural process, apart from human 
agency, will repair.
Even less "natural" are the penalties in adult life. 
Idleness is naturally pleasurable, and were it not repro­
bated by social disapproval and resulting inconvenience,
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it would no doubt remain in great favour. The pun­
ishment suggested by Spencer as appropriate for theft 
depends on the tl:^^f's being discovered. The natural 
consequence of stealing is that of enjoying the stolen 
goods. The murderer who goes undetected is not likely 
to be adequately punished by the mental representation 
of the deprivation of life and happiness he has inflict­
ed on his victim or the misery he has occasioned his de­
pendents. Doubtless all these and similar offences have 
a natural consequence in the deterioration of the offend­
er's character which they ultimately produce, but that 
deterioration is too slow and too inconspicuous to serve 
either as a punishment or as a means of protecting soci­
ety and marking its sense of disapproval.
The Maxims.
When v/e come to consider the scattered maxims which 
conclude Spencer's essay and are regarded by him as de- 
ducible from the principles he has laid down, we cannot
help being aware how difficult it is even for Spencer to
keep within his own theory. In the second maxim, for ex­
ample, parents are warned not to behave as mere passion­
less instruments of punishments which Nature is unable to 
execute for herself. Parental approbation or disapproba­
tion is also, we are told, a natural reaction and should
accompany the other penalties. And yet this accompani­
ment of feeling is obviously only a mere by-product of a 
system which is efficient in its absence; for have not 
parents been forbidden to act as Nature's proxies and
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advised rather to step aside and allow these conse­
quences to be experienced which would inevitably follow 
in the absence of social approval or disapproval?
The other maxims, sound enough in the main, contem­
plate a system not very different from that usually em­
ployed in the upbringing of children. Parents are to be 
consistent, albeit sparing, in their commands; to execute 
punishments previously threatened; to make allowance for 
the child's immaturity, which Spencer thinks will disap­
pear as the child recapitulates the race's development; 
to aim at fostering self-control by passing from absolut­
ism to abdication; and finally to welcome the appearance 
of considerable self-will on their children's part.
They are further enjoined to practise analysing their 
child's motives so that their control may be modified to 
suit the child's individuality. Why they should need to 
practise such analysis or to study human nature, if the 
physical consequences of conduct constitute the best pun­
ishment, Spencer does not say.
The Nature of Morality.
III later life Spencer was at pains to refute the 
suggestion that he had borrowed the idea of punishment 
by natural consequences from Rousseau; affirming that
^ Note: Spencer has often been regarded as a disciple of 
Rousseau. For example, Compayre in the Preface to his 
h/ï-rx voluiae on Spencer says, "Vve are acquainted with no more
* genuine disciple of the author of Emile than the writer
of the charming essay on Education. ... The whole book 
if full of inspiration from Rousseau, despite the fact 
that he is never mentioned in it."
This called forth a letter of protest from Spencer.
It seems not unlikely that Spencer may have met with
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he had never read the Emile and owed none of his 
ideas on education to it. He might have spared him­
self the trouble. No one who had followed his writ­
ings carefully and who understood Rousseau would have 
accused Spencer of plagiarism. Despite a superficial 
resemblance, the underlying theories of the two thinkers 
were quite different. According to Rousseau, punishment 
by natural consequences was to be employed in Emile’s 
case only during the preadolescent years when, in 
Rousseau's opinion, the individual is at the pre-social 
stage of his development and therefore non-moral. Ac­
cording to Spencer, punishment by natural consequences 
appeared to offer a means of reconciling the needs of 
education with a belief in individualism. Spencer's 
pupil would never become really social: Rousseau's was 
being educated to take his place in society. Rousseau 
distrusted the existing society and was anxious to re­
mould it nearer to his ideal of what society should be, 
but he had a very true belief that society was a neces­
sary and natural institution responding to needs which 
lay at the very heart of man's real being. Spencer, as 
we have seen, regarded society as certainly an inevit­
able condition of man’s existence but one which had the
the idea of punishment by natural consequences in the 
pages of George Combe, the phrenologist. See the 
letter's "The Constitution of Man considered in Re­
lation to External Objects." First edition, 1828. 
Seventh edition, Edinbqj%h, 1836. But Spencer was 
no slavish imitator or sedulous student of other 
men's books.
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effect merely of limiting the individual's natural 
rights to "complete living" by enforcing the observance 
of the Law of Equal Freedom.
Hence to Spencer, socially-inflicted punishment 
must have seemed, like government, "the offspring of im­
morality" —  something to be avoided or at least to be 
dispensed with as quickly as possible. The sooner the 
child could be trained to guide his conduct by foresight 
of the "necessary natural consequences," the better.
These necessary natural consequences were, of course, the 
so-called intrinsic restraints constituted by represent­
ations of the ultimate pleasure or pain likely to be in­
flicted on self, offspring or fellow beings. There was 
no higher moral law than that which prescribes compliance 
with justice; and Justice meant the right of the individ­
ual to exercise the faculties compatible with equal right 
to exercise their faculties on the part of others.
This lack on Spencer’s part of any appreciation of a 
moral purpose implicit in the social consciousness blind­
ed him to a necessary difference between the moral educa­
tion of children and the moral discipline of adults.
Children, it is apparent, need to be moralised; that is 
to say, in their case the training must be positive and 
constructive. Even when they are punished, they are pun­
ished with an educative and positive purpose —  to arouse 
in them an appreciation of the moral law. Adults, on the 
other hand, who'have undergone this education and who 
have reached an age of maturity may be presumed to be able
to distinguish betwean right and wrong, to be in possess-
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ion of moral standards. IfVhen they fall short of their 
own ideal, they may be presumed to suffer the inward dis­
appointment of vows unrealised. Certain kinds of wrong­
doing may even be appropriately punished by the law, and 
the punishment may be regarded as a demonstration that 
they have sinned against the light within them. The em­
phasis has shifted from the positive side to the negative, 
although the implied hope always is that punishment even 
of adults will be reformative, not vindictive nor merely 
deterrent. To Spencer, however, the process is the same
for the infant as for the adult. Nature, not society, 
will moralise children, if only Nature is allowed free 
scope; though one may reasonably ask why Nature should 
need to be allowed free scope, and whether parents and 
society are not "natural."
" .... Nature is made better by no mean,
^ j ■ But nature makes that mean: over that art
Which you say adds to nature, is an art
.^^ 1.  ^ That nature makes."
In fairness to Spencer, it must be remembered that, 
owing to his belief in the inheritance of acquired charac­
ters and his view of education as a passing necessity, he 
looked forward to the time when children would be born 
good and capable of developing spontaneously into ideal 
citizens of an ideal State. But in the meantime, as he 
admits, children are not born good owing to the imper­
fections of their parents. And they have moreover to be 
prepared for a still imperfect world. What is to be done? 
Submit them to the discipline of natural consequences?
Even Spencer cannot consistently advise compliance with
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his own theory. Even less can those who take a differ­
ent view of the nature of morality. Let us agree with 
Spencer that parents and teachers should not take upon 
themselves to be Nature’s proxies. Let us affirm in op­
position to Spencer that they must take upon themselves 
to be society's proxies; and society's proxies only be­
cause the social consciousness is held to embody at its 
best the moral law, the law which the most highly develop­
ed reason recognises as that which ought to guide man to 
the realisation of the best that he has it in him to be­
come, Parents are therefore, in so far as they educate 
rightly, the embodiment for the child of the moral law, 
and their approval or disapproval implies moral judgement 
of the child's conduct. If they proceed to express the 
approval or disapproval in reward or punishment, the re­
wards and punishments are not Nature's reactions but out­
ward expressions of moral judgements.
The aim of moral education is to instil the ethical 
code in the minds of children, so that when they come to 
maturity they may identify their wills with it and make 
it their guide. As children they are not to be expected 
always to act as adults are expected to act: they require 
training, guidance and direction. Thus moral education is, 
as we have already pointed out, a positive process based, 
it may be,largely on habit-forming. Spencer regards it 
as necessarily a negative process based on discipline and 
punishment.
We may concede that even under the best system pun-
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isîiments of some kind will still be necessary. ïVhat 
then is the nature of punishment and what forms should 
it take? V/e may note, in the first place, that natural 
reactions have no moral quality. Even when they are ex­
perienced, their moral value, if they have any, lies in 
this, that they serve as a reminder that a moral law as 
well as a physical law has been transgressed. For ex­
ample, if a parent allows a disobedient child to cut him­
self with a forbidden knife, the penalty, to be of use 
morally, must be felt by the child to be a penalty of dis­
obedience, not simply a necessary consequence of applying 
sharpened metal to the human integument. Or, to take one 
of Spencer's examples of so-called natural consequences, 
the child Y/ho is compelled by his nurse to pick up his 
scattered toys must have been previously forbidden to 
create disorder and must realise that the penalty is an 
outward expression of the nurse's disapproval of his dis­
obedience. It follows therefore, in the second place, 
that punishments must clearly convey this moral disappro­
bation to the understanding of the child. Parent or 
teacher must embody for the child the moral law; and 
their punishment should be such that it will stimulate 
in the child a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself, 
not merely one of resentment against his elders for 
gratuitous interference with his own self-will. If the 
relationship between child and parent is such as Spencer 
desiderates, disapproval will probably be in itself suf­
ficient punishment, without the addition of any material
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consequences. In the third place, most of children's 
offences do not arise out of disregard of physical laws; 
consequently they entail no necessary natural reactions. 
They are offences against a social code, and they have to 
he punished, if punished at all, by social agencies. 
Finally, punishment must be so adjusted as to take into 
account the motive underlying the offence. No purely 
natural reaction is capable of doing this. But social pun­
ishments have just this advantage: they can be made to fit 
the offender rather than the offence. The punishments may 
be made "characteristical," if the parent or teacher de­
cides that a punishment analogous to the offence is like­
ly to be more effective in the interests of moral educa­
tion. In fine, Spencer's method of moral education 
through the discipline of natural reactions is no method.
It is merely a device which may on occasion help the 
parent to choose a suitable punishment after he has de­
termined, on moral grounds, that some punishment is call­
ed for.
If now we proceed to ask what help Spencer's chapter 
on Moral Education affords to teachers, the answer is 
bound to be —  hardly any at all. In so far as his 
"method" is appropriate, its applicability is confined 
to the home, and even there it applies to offences which 
are scarcely moral —  "offences" arising out of the 
thoughtlessness and inexperience of children whose im­
pulse of curiosity leads them to take undue liberties 
with their physical environment. The home no doubt v/as
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the one institution simple enough to seem to conform to 
Spencer's ideal of an individualistic society. It is 
when Spencer goes beyond very early childhood, or consid­
ers more serious offences like lying or theft, that the 
system breaks down even in his own hands. He never gets 
the length of considering school offences. If he had, he 
would have been forced to realise that they carried with 
them no "natural" reactions, that they were offences 
against a social code, and that they could only be pun­
ished by social means.
We have seen therefore that where Spencer’s punish­
ments are appropriate, they are not natural, and where 
they are natural they are seldom, if ever, to be relied 
upon. The chapter affords a striking instance of how a 
man's social philosophy reflects itself on the views he 
holds on education and especially on moral education.
The whole discussion is negative, just as Spencer's view 
of the functions of the State is negative and just as 
his principle of Justice is essentially a negative prin­
ciple. The central topic of the chapter is punishment, 
and punishment must always at best involve an element of 
repression. It is apt in itself merely to check the out­
ward expression of vice. Some more positive treatment 
is needed for the inculcation of virtue.
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CHAPTEE XII.
THIS AIM AND CONTENT OF EDUCATION,
Spencer's Educational Bias.
Consideration of the essay on 'UYhat Knowledge is 
Most Worth?" may fitly begin with an estimation of 
Spencer's educational bias, especially in its bearing 
on the opposition between the study of science and the 
study of humanities. We have already had occasion to 
note that Spencer's own education v/as predominantly 
scientific. During its earlier stages his father had 
forbidden any teaching of grammar or of English History; 
and throughout its whole course Spencer's repugnance to 
rote-learning and his dislike of dogmatic teaching had 
prevented his making any progress in the learning of 
languages. His contempt for the Classics was unconceal­
ed; but it has to be remembered that it was a contempt 
based upon ignorance. He had no acquaintance with an­
cient literature even in translation. He recalls that 
he once tried to read a translation of the Iliad, but 
was unable to proceed beyond the sixth book, being 
wearied by the interminable descriptions of chariots and 
horses, and distracted by the lack of orderliness in the 
composition of the narrative. On several occasions he 
looked into Plato's Dialogues, but each time "with more
J , 44%
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or less irritation" he was impelled to desist by im­
patience with "the indefiniteness of the thinking," 
the mistaking of words for things," and "the rambling 
form of the argument." "To call that a 'dialogue'," 
exclaims Spencer, "which is an interchange of speeches 
between a thinker and his dummy, who says just what it 
is convenient to have said, is absurd," "Still," he 
is pleased to admit, "quotations from time to time met 
with lead me to think that there are in Plato detached 
thoughts from which I might profit had I the patience 
to seek them out." The like, he thinks,is probably 
true of other ancient writings; but of Aristotle he 
knew "even less than of Plato."
The borrowing of "detached thoughts" which fitted in 
with his own ideas describes very well Spencer's usual 
practice in studying other men's books. He confesses 
that except novels and travels in early life he read no­
thing continuously, being "an impatient reader." He once 
began to study a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, but speedily gave up reading when he found him­
self in disagreement with the author on his theory of 
the nature of space and time. "It has always," he says 
(p.253), "been out of the question with me to go on read­
ing a book the fundamental principles of which I entire­
ly dissent from."
Spencer's views on history are clearly enough ex­
pressed in the essay novf under review. He disliked
*
entirely the personal element in history, and could
# Note": In adult life. For his tastes as a youth, see
Chapter II of the present work.
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never endure the reading of gossip about persons, alive 
or dead. "I take but little interest in what are called 
histories, but an interest only in Sociology, which 
stands related to those so-called histories much as a 
vast building stands related to the heaps of stones and 
bricks around it.”
Poetry was not represented among the subjects pre­
scribed for Spencer during his ovm formal schooling. In 
discussing his tastes for that type of composition, he 
mentions as the first essential the quality of variety, 
comparing it in the same sentence with variety in food—  
as ministering to one of his "organic needs." Ballads 
with recurring burdens were thus distasteful. A second 
requirement was intensity. "If the emotion is not of a 
pronounced kind, the proper vehicle for it is prose." 
Spencer liked "little poetry and of the best;" and he was 
of the opinion that no one ought to write verse if he 
could help it, but if it burst forth in spite of efforts 
to suppress it, it might be of value.
His critical propensities prevented him from enjoying 
pictorial or plastic art. Describing a tour in Italy, 
which he made in 1867 at the age of forty-seven, Spencer 
takes the opportunity of venting his "heresies concern­
ing the old masters." These, he thinks, tend to be 
over-rated because of veneration for the Biblical sub­
jects so frequently chosen. He finds all sorts of faults 
in Guido's fresco, "Phoebus and Aurora"; the form of 
the draperies is wrong; the "utter divergence from the
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natural in respect of light and shade" is inexcusable; 
the torch carried by the flying boy radiates no light 
and is itself illuminated from without; and so on. "The 
first thing to be demanded of a picture," according to 
Spencer, "is that it shall not shock the perceptions of 
natural appearances —  the cultivated perceptions, I 
mean." Ancient sculpture, he thought, often failed in 
naturalness, the current opinion to the contrary not - 
withstanding; for Spencer no more pinned his faith on 
the opinions of a classically educated man about things 
Greek, than he pinned his faith on the opinions of a 
clergyman about things Hebrew.
Spencer, it must be conceded, was himself well aware
that the dominance of the critical tendency seriously
diminished his enjoyment of works of art. "Possibly," he
says, "there are perfections in various paintings of the
old masters which impress me but little, because I am 
keenly alive to the many mistakes of chiaroscuro which 
characterize them. These force themselves on my at­
tention in a way which they would not do were there no 
such constitutional aptitude for seeing the imperfec­
tions. When looking at Greek sculpture, too, Ï con­
stantly observe how unnatural and inartistic is the 
drapery. Though in a large measure I admire the more 
important parts of the works, my admiration is much 
less than it would be but for the vivid consciousness 
of this drawback. In some measure the like happens 
with music. Many years ago, when I attended the opera 
a good deal, I remarked to one who was frequently my 
companion —  George Eliot —  how much analysis of the 
effects produced deducts from the enjoyment of the 
effects. In proportion as intellect is active emotion 
is rendered inactive. And a like result necessarily 
accompanies criticism, since the critical process in­
volves more or less the analytical process. So is it 
also with my appreciation of literature —  more es­
pecially poetry." In these various cases it is not that 
I am reluctant to admire —  quite the contrary. I re­
joice in admiration; and rejoice when at one with 
others in their admiration. But it rarely happens
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that the work of art of whatever kind is so satis­
factory in every way as to leave no r o o m  for ad­
verse coEffiient. ”
In this passage of self-analysis Spencer undoubtedly 
places his finger on a serious defect in his character. 
Feeling and emotion were habitually repressed, intellect 
being predominant. For this one-sidedness his early ex­
perience and upbringing were largely to blame. His mother, 
as we have seen, was too self-effacing to count for much 
in Spencer's early development. His father, whether from 
ill-health or by nature, was hard and unsympathetic, 
though just and tolerant. Consequently Spencer's emotion­
al nature was starved and repressed in childhood. Hor were 
there any brothers or sisters to call forth his sympathies 
and develop his affections. He was a lonely child brought 
up in an atmosphere of self-help and independence, free 
for the most part to follow his own inclinations, but en­
couraged to turn his attention to nature-study and scien­
tific investigation, rather than to devote his time to the 
reading of literature or the study of the arts. It was a
*Note; "It seems probable," Spencer solemnly announces,
"that this abnormal tendency to criticize has been a 
chief factor in the continuance of my celibate life."
(Autobiography. II, 445.)
He more than hints that, had not physical beauty been 
'a sine qut non' with him, he might have married George 
Eliot. However, "it was an open secret that it was 
George Eliot who was in love with the philosopher, and 
when, on her death, newspaper paragraphs appeared im­
plying that he had been one of her suitors he con­
sulted my father about publishing the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth. 'My dear Spencer, 
you will be eternally damned if you do it,' replied 
my father." —  Beatrice Webb, "My Apprenticeship", 
p.31 note.
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misfortune, also, that during adolescence his education 
showed the same bias in favour of science, and the same 
neglect of literary pursuits, historical studies and the 
humanities generally.
The absence of any real acquaintance with history 
made Spencer, as he acknowledges, tend to undervalue the 
past. He made no pretence of ever mastering the reason­
ings and conclusions of others, even in those disciplines 
which he attempted to reform. Occasionally he made hur­
ried researches in books for facts unobtainable elsewhere, 
but he never tarried to learn what use his authorities had 
made of them. This intellectual arrogance, combined with 
a total neglect of other's opinions led to serious de­
fects in his own work, and constituted but an ill equip­
ment for one who would reform the school curriculum, or 
reshape the end of education. Spencer's own experience 
was apt to be the measure of all things; and in particu­
lar, as we proceed to point out, it led to a one-sided in­
sistence on the merits of science and a glorification of 
knowledge, combined with a neglect of the appreciation 
subjects, literature included, which minister to man's 
emotional and aesthetic nature, and open the doors to the 
whole world of social experience.
The End of Education.
Spencer begins his discussion of what knowledge is 
of most worth (as one who seeks to reform the curriculum 
must begin) by defining the aim of education. Departing 
from his earlier definition of it as the formation of
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character, he expresses it in utilitarian terras as "pre­
paration for complete living." As a general statement, 
the phrase is admirable. Difficulties and disagreements 
arise only when we seek to determine in more specific 
terms what "complete living" implies. To Spencer "com­
plete living" means primarily the completest possible ex­
ercise of the individual man's faculties —  the highest 
development of individual life both in length and breadth. 
But since the individual has also to make provision for 
the preservation of the race, —  though the ultimate end 
is "individual self-preservation," —  complete living in­
cludes secondarily the bringing-up of a family, and pre­
paring off-spring in their turn for complete living. 
ji-xs. Finally, "establishment of an associated state, both makes
possible and requires a form of conduct such that life may 
be completed in each and in his off-spring, not only with­
out preventing completion of it in others, but with fur- 
jrp.ks-i. therance of it in others." In short, "evolution becomes
the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously 
achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in off­
spring, and in fellow men." Complete living therefore 
depends on the observance of the Law of Equal Freedom, 
involving the principle of Justice, tempered by a due 
admixture of altruism and negative and positive benefi­
cence.
It is when we read the formula in this way and re­
member Spencer's biological standpoint and his individ­
ualism, that we begin to have doubts as to its adequacy 
as a statement of the end of education. We have already
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had occasion to note in considering his view of the 
relation of individual and society that the question,
What Knowledge is of most worth?, which forms the title of 
his essay can best be understood by being expanded into 
What knowledge is of most worth to the individual man with 
a view to his ultimate physical and economic efficiency.
It is this one-sided emphasis on the individualistic as­
pect of "complete living" to which objection must be made. 
"Complete living" demands not only physical or economic 
efficiency but social efficiency as well; and social ef­
ficiency implies that the individual has been trained to 
take his place among his fellow citizens and play his 
part in the community life of neighbourhood, city or 
State. That the full social life may be man's natural 
medium for the realisation of his rational or universal 
self —  his real self as distinct from his actual self —  
Spencer, owing to his preoccupation with "natural rights" 
and his endeavour to comprehend all evolution in a single 
abstract formula, could not perhaps be expected to real­
ise.
The Activities which constitute 'Complete 
Living."
As we have shown in a previous chapter (Chapter Y), 
Spencer endeavoured to make an analysis of life's leading 
activities by arranging them in five classes. The first 
comment suggested by this is that for the most part the 
classification is made from the point of view of the adult, 
whereas education is concerned primarily with the child.
A child has little or no interest in the propagation and I
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upbringing of a family, in the earning of a livelihood, 
or in judicious voting at the next election. In the 
second place, granting that as a rough classification 
the list covers life in "the widest sense", we may dis­
pute the assertion that the activities thus classified 
stand in their "true order of subordination." Spencer 
was no Aristotelian, but even he tells us elsewhere that
'I life is not for work but that work is for life, and that
a
the progress of mankind is, under one aspect, a means of 
liberating more and more life from mere toil and leaving 
more and more life available for relaxation —  for pleas­
urable culture, for aesthetic gratification, for travels, 
for games." Neglecting for the present this highly de-
bateable view of the purpose of leisure, we may note,
is
first of all, that if,it is true that leisure^more valu­
able than labour for the adult, much more is it true in 
the case of the child. Childhood is the time when the 
individual is shielded from the stress of economic nec­
essity in order that he may be educated in the most lib­
eral sense. It is the time when, according to Spencer 
himself, much must be given and little demanded; and 
often it is the only period during which preparation may 
be made for the profitable use in later life of that 
leisure of v/hich, again according to Spencer, more and 
more may be expected as man's "progress" continues.
Spencer insists that education should prepare for 
each of those groups of activities, but it is clear that 
he regards vocational preparation as most important and 
the leisure activities as of least value. Literature
and the fine arts are merely the relaxations and amuse­
ments which serve to occupy leisure hours. They are 
of value to the individual because they raise the tide 
of life: complete exercise of faculties involves the 
utilization of "those various sources of pleasure which
I, Sil,.
Nature and Humanity supply to responsive minds." Arohi-
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tecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry are the 
'efflorescence' of civilised life. They are made possible 
by the other activities which are more immediately con­
cerned with individual and social welfare. It would there­
fore be a great mistake for the educator to neglect the 
plant for the flower. The individual has first to ful­
fil his duties to self, family and fellow-men; and then 
the pleasure which he may take in literature and art has 
an "ethical sanction". Leisure pursuits must take sec­
ond place to the other activities which are "ethically en- 
fy.SfU-. joined." According to Spencer, the motive for seeking 
culture is an altruistic motive: it arises from the de- 
sire to become a "pleasure-yielding person." Acquaintance 
with literature and the arts makes the individual more in­
teresting socially and enriches his talk —  "in the ab­
sence of it conversation is bald." In short, man the 
social being means for Spencer man the sociable being.
We may admit that the arts flourish only when man 
has reached a stage in his development at which he has 
leisure time to spare after satisfying the primary needs 
of food, shelter and self-protection. So long as his 
energies are all absorbed in the pursuit of the bare nec­
essities of life, artistic creation is out of the question.
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In this sense, therefore, the arts represent the ef­
florescence of civilisation. But they are at the same 
time the crown and symbol of civilisation; and because 
education has as its aim to civilise the child, we demur 
to Spencer's precept that as 'the arts occupy the leisure 
part of life, so should they occupy the leisure part of 
education.' We should rather urge that as they represent 
the highest level of human achievement, being products of 
the highest stage of man's development, so should they 
constitute a most important part of the education of the 
child.
Although the essay under discussion is somewhat 
vague as to the actual time to be given to leisure subjects, 
there is no doubt that Spencer desired to cut down the 
literary culture normally included in education. "That a
fair amount of this [literary culture] should be in­
cluded in the preparation for complete living," he 
tells us later, "needs no saying. Rather does it need 
saying that in a duly proportioned education, as well 
as in adult life, literature should be assigned less 
space than it now has. Nearly all are prone to mental 
occupations of easy kinds, or kinds which yield pleas­
urable excitements with small efforts; and history, 
biography, fiction, poetry, are, in this respect, more 
attractive to the majority than science —  more at­
tractive than that knowledge of the order of things at , 
large which serves for guidance." It is under "Amuse­
ments" that he allows a place in life for the aesthetic | 
enjoyment of fine scenery, pictorial and plastic art, j
poetry, fiction, the drama and music. These all yield 
pleasure "resulting from the superfluous excitements of 
faculties," but it is a pleasure often indulged in to 
excess. "Perhaps," says Spencer, "such exaltation of feel-Sic.
ing as the reading of good poetry produces, is not 
sought in an undue degree; but, unquestionably.
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there is far too much reading of fiction; often ex­
cluding, as it does, all instructive reading, and 
causing neglect of useful occupations. While ethical 
approval must be given to occasional indulgence in 
that extreme gratification produced by following out 
the good and ill fortunes of imaginary persons made 
real by vivid character-drawing; yet there much more 
needs ethical reprobation of the too frequent indul­
gence in it which is so common: this emotional de­
bauchery undermihes mental health. Nor let us omit to 
note that while sanction may rightly be claimed for 
fiction of a humanising tendency, there should be no­
thing but condemnation for brutalizing fictions-for 
that culture of blood-thlrst to which so many stories 
are devoted."
Spencer, it is apparent, had outgrown his liking for 
"thrillers"; and he had obviously never met with the con­
ception of catharsis. A little more indulgence in the 
lighter kind of fiction might have purged him of some of 
the '^repressions" from which he suffered.
Knowledge for Guidance.
We may now go on to consider how the individual is 
to be prepared for each of the five classes of activities 
comprehended under "complete living." First of all, how­
ever, we may dravf attention to the undue emphasis on 
knowledge as a means of guiding the individual aright in 
the duties of life —  an over-emphasis for which Spencer's 
own education was largely responsible. Spencer, the in- 
tellectualist, appears to think that right knowledge will 
guarantee right conduct. The importance of habit-form- 
ation, except for the acquirement of manual skill, is 
much underestimated. Yet in a subsequent work, "The 
Study of Sociology" (1873), Spencer finds himself im- 
pelled to devote a chapter to demonstrating how little 
influence knowledge has on conduct. Rational legislation.
275.
we are told., must recognise as a datuDi the direct con­
nection of action with feeling; to which must be joined 
the truth that cognition does not produce action. Never­
theless, says Spencer, the contrary assumption underlies 
all pleas for State education, which are founded on the 
notion that spread of knowledge is the one thing needed 
for bettering behaviour,^neither will it guarantee'skill 
in maintaining health and avoiding accidents, or skill in 
manipulating the raw materials of industry, or skill in 
the upbringing of children. Preparation for complete liv­
ing is not to be had merely by imparting certain kinds of 
information, whether they are presented in their true 
order of relative importance, or not.
(a) Direct Self-preservation.
Even Spencer is forced to admit that direct self- 
preservation is so all-important that nature, unable to 
leave it to man's blundering, takes it into her o?m hands. 
To begin with, fear and the instinct of escape enable the 
infant to avoid the more obvious danger to life or limb; 
and thereafter the discipline of natural consequences is 
continually teaching the knowledge which subserves direct 
preservation of the body from mechanical injury. All that 
parents and "stupid schoolmistresses" need to do is to 
step aside and give free scope for the operation of this 
discipline. Besides physical injury, however, physio­
logical injury must be guarded against. In discussing 
this aspect of self-preservation, Spencer passes rather 
abruptly from the infant to the adult. If m ^  would only
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give heed to the promptings of their sensations, Nat­
ure would see to this also. But so great is the ignor­
ance of the laws of life that men do not even know that 
the sensations are their natural guides, and ( when not 
rendered morbid by long continued disobedience) their 
trustworthy guides. Hence there arises the need for 
knowledge of the principles of physiology. Necessity may 
often compel men to transgress the laws of life, and in­
clination may frequently over-ride prudence; but much 
may be done by including in a rational education an 
elementary course of physiology, which will afford an un­
derstanding of its general truths and their bearing on 
conduct. In any case, it is far better to know the pos­
ition of the Eustachian tubes, the actions of the spinal 
cord, the normal rate of pulsation and the means of in- 
flat ing the lungs than to be well up in the "superstitions 
of two thousand years ago"!
Here we have but one instance of how the adult point 
of view betrays itself throughout the whole discussion.
Yet Snencer has previously told us that Nature's method in
education must correspond with the natural unfolding of 
the child's faculties. If he had applied this principle 
to the present case, it would have shown him, surely, 
that it is inadvisable, if not impossible, to teach physi­
ology to a child. And perhaps a more profound knowledge 
of psychology would have indicated to him that it is not 
always beneficial to teach it to adults. Medical stu- 
f d e n t s ,  as Spencer elsewhere remarks, are not altogether 
prevented from taking risks of infection by their know­
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ledge of the oonsequenoes of the disease.
Apart from the efficacy or otherwise of a knowledge 
of the science of physiology, it would seem that Spencer 
much underrates traditional knowledge and habits in mat­
ters of health. There is a popular wisdom, often imper­
fect, occasionally even pernicious, which yet on the 
whole proves a good guide in a sphere such as this where 
a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. No doubt 
traditional practices are sometimes faulty and need to be 
revised in order to keep pace with the advancement of 
science; but having in view the people at large, we may 
claim that tradition serves them well, and may be counted 
on to undergo the necessary revision in the general 
spread of education and the multiplication of the channels 
of popular enlightenment.
(b) Earning a Livelihood.
Preparation for the earning of a livelihood is to be 
given also by means of science-teaching. In considering 
Spencer's recommendations for this group of life's act­
ivities, it is more than ever necessary to scrutinise 
the ages of the pupils whom he has in view. The only 
specific reference is to "youths." Apparently, then, 
Spencer thinks that youths before leaving school should 
have some "grounding in science" in preparation for the 
later learning of a business, since all businesses (and 
Spencer gives an elaborate catalogue raisonne of the in­
dustries which depend on the various applied sciences) 
demand, if not a rational knowledge, at least an empir-
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loàl knowledge of one or other of the soienoes. No ob- 
jection could reasonably be taken to this recommendation 
if the interpretation here given is the correct one, 
Spencer appears to be merely pleading the claims of 
science to a place on the school curriculum; and when it 
made, his plea was abundantly justified. "Had there 
^ ^  been no teaching but such as goes on in our public schools,
England would now be what it was in feudal times."
But the technical instruction which appears to have 
been in Spencer’s mind has its proper place, not at the 
primary stage of schooling, but at the post-adolescent.
Had Spencer made this clear, and had he refrained from 
putting science in so strong an opposition to the human­
ities, his advocacy of the cause of applied science would 
have been strengthened. England when he wrote was in the 
midst of the change over from small-scale to large-scale 
industry and was experiencing the labour troubles arising 
out of the introduction of steam-power and machinery and 
the consequent displacement of hand-workers. There was 
a widespread need, if not demand, for technical instruc­
tion, especially in the growing industrial cities; and 
the appropriate educational institutions were slow in 
coming into being. But it is one thing to argue for the 
teaching of science in technical colleges, or mechanics 
institutes, and another thing to seek to displace the 
humanities from the curriculum of secondary schools in 
general. And despite the ambiguity of the essay under 
notice, Spencer is not to be altogether absolved from
SUCH an imputation if one bears in mind bis prejudices
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and his taunt that scientific knowledge has had to he 
picked up in "nooks and corners," "while the ordained 
agencies for teaching have been mumbling little else but 
dead formulas."
In any case, it is difficult to see how Spencer's 
ambitious programme could be carried out so as to leave 
T/2Uxî?ï~ sij. reasonable time for other subjects. In the Ethics he 
speaks of the need of pupils' studying not only one 
special science but all sciences. Every occurrence, he 
says, involves at once mathematical, physical, chemical 
and vital phenomena so interwoven that to comprehend one 
set involves a partial comprehension of the others. Pre­
paration for this or that business being far too special, 
the pupil needs a training in all the sciences. "When 
education is rightly carried on, the cardinal truths of 
each science may be clearly communicated and firmly grasp­
ed, apart from the many corollaries commonly taught along 
with them." Only after that has been done, ought special 
training to be given for any particular occupation.
Now this is unambiguous enough; but we may well ask 
what sort of scientific equipment pupils would possess if 
they were forced to master the "cardinal truths" of all 
the sciences. By rote-learning (which Spencer detests) 
they might get up the results of a number of sciences; 
but as for their comprehension of the scientific method, 
or their appreciation of the scientific outlook —  those 
useful qualities would still be far to seek.
(c) Bringing up a Family.
Preparation for the duties involved in the right up-
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bringing of children affords Spencer a congenial oppor- 
tunlty (following lîarcel) of exposing the ignorance of 
f  parents. Their equipiiient is faulty in three departments—
physical, the moral and the intellectual. As regards 
the first, Spencer gives us a summary of the recommanda- 
tiens of his essay on physical education^, and denounces 
the fact that ordinary schooling makes no. provision for 
equipping prospective parents with a knowledge of the laws 
of physiology. For moral training the one thing needful is 
acquaintance with the science of "Ethology" —  a far more 
useful accomplishment than the ability to read Dante in 
the original or skill in translating Aeschylus, Ethology 
would inform the inexperienced and over-indulgent mother 
that the best discipline is the discipline of natural con­
sequences; and prevent the too-stern father from alienat­
ing his sonè! affections and making himself miserable in 
consequence of their rebellion. As regards the intellect­
ual training of children, a preparation in psychology is 
needed, or at least a study of Spencer's Essay on Intel­
lectual Education. This would show parents that book- 
knowledge is merely supplementary to that which the child 
acquires through spontaneous observation and exercise of 
the senses in nature-study and object-lessons. It would 
also show how method in education should eschew rote- 
learning; should be based as far as possible on self- 
discovery; should make instruction pleasurable; and should j 
conform to the laws of mental development, advancing from 
the concrete to the abstract, from the empirical to the 
rational and from the particular to the general.
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Onoe more, then, we find that for this third 
branch of the activities comprising complete living 
a knowledge of science is necessary; not an exhaustive 
knowledge but at least a knowledge, taught dogmatically 
if need be, of the general principles of the sciences 
specified, accompanied by explanatory illustrations. At 
what age this is to be given we are not defintiely told, 
although from a reference to a puzzled antiquary of the 
remote future examining a batch of "college examination 
papers" which have chanced to survive as the sole vestige 
of our civilisation, we may infer that Spencer had in 
view the college stage of education.^* If that is so, it is 
difficult to understand how the requisite knowledge could 
reach all parents, unless, of course, the State were to 
exercise its powers to compel all applicants for a mar­
riage licence to produce a certificate of proficiency in 
the specified sciences. Such interference would, however, 
be a gross breach of the Law of Equal Freedom. Thus we 
are left with a mere general recommendation unaccompanied 
by any specific proposals for giving effect to it. In 
any case, Spencer much over-rates the capacity of the 
average parent to profit by a knowledge of psychology or 
applied ethics. Principles, even if accompanied by
^  Note: Claude Marcel, one of Spencer's authorities for
his essay on "The Art of Education" (1854) had written: 
"It is especially in youth that the future parent 
should imbibe the notions which he shall afterwards 
so much need. Education will reach its proper stand­
ard only when it is placed on a footing with the high­
est branches of knowledge. In schools for either 
sex, —  in colleges and universities, the science of 
education in its three departments should be regular­
ly taught in connection with physiology, ethics, and
282.
illustrative examples, serve for guidance only to 
the wise. The ordinary parent would find them con­
fusing rather than enlightening and would be in a 
worse plight than before.
We may, on the other hand, agree with Spencer 
that affection and good-will are not alone sufficient 
to guarantee success in the rearing of children, though 
they furnish strong motives urging the parents to seek 
for information and guidance at a time when their in­
terest is most strongly aroused. Granted a sound gen­
eral education made compulsory by State authority, and 
we may expect parents to show more and more readiness 
to avail themselves of the services of child-guidance 
clinics or printed sources of information to supplement 
the ordinary practices handed down by tradition from 
generation to generation. Adolescent girls, too, may 
well receive a training in motheroraft before leaving 
school, though such training will need to be adjusted 
to suit the ages of the pupils concerned. It will not 
be confined to the exposition of the principles of the . 
sciences of physiology, psychology and ethology, but 
will rather take the form of practical demonstrations 
of infant-care and chiid-nurture. In this respect, at 
least, Spencer's wishes are more and more being ful­
filled in our State-schools.
mental philosophy, as is the practice in some German 
universities. It should be made an indispensable 
part of a complete course of instruction."— Marcel, 
"On Language, etc.," Vol.1,p.166, Sect.Ill —  Means 
of Enlightening Parents.
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(d) Discharging the Duties of Citizenship.
The fourth group of activities is that comprising 
the duties of citizenship. Spencer's interpretation of 
the civic function seems to limit it to the exercise of 
the franchise in order to secure observance on the part 
of legislators of the "right principles of political
h.sp
action." These are presumably to be found in Spencer's
own works and centre round the Law of Equal Freedom and
the principle of non-interference by the government with
the natural rights of the individual. "Ordinary school-
training," Spencer wrote the following year, "is not 
— a preparation for the right exercise of political
power...... The current faith in Reading, Writing and
Arithmetic, as fitting men for citizenship, seems to 
us quite unwarranted: as are, indeed, most other an­
ticipations of the benefits to be derived from learn­
ing lessons. There is no connection between the abil­
ity to parse a sentence, and a clear understanding of 
the causes that determine the rate of wages. The 
multiplication-table affords no aid in seeing through 
the fallacy that the destruction of property is good 
for trade. Lond practice may have produced extremely 
good penmanship without having given the least power 
to understand the paradox, that machinery eventually 
increases the number of persons employed in the trades 
into which it is introduced. Nor is it proved that 
smatterings of mensuration, astronomy or geography, 
fit men for estimating the characters and motives of 
Parliamentary candidates."*
To save the country from the extension of the franchise, 
^•y^.37 -^5-. Spencer looked to the "spread, not of that mere technical 
and miscellaneous knowledge which men are so eagerly pro­
pagating, but of political knowledge; or, to speak more 
accurately —  knowledge of Social Science. Above all, the 
essential thing is, the establishment of a true theory of
* Note : Did anyone ever make such claims on behalf of 
parsing, multiplication, penmanship, geography 
and the rest?
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government —  a true conception of what legislation is 
for, and what are its proper limits." The dangers can 
rxfgy y? be prevented "only by establishing in the public mind
a profound conviction that there are certain comparative­
ly narrow limits to the functions of the State; and that 
these limits ought on no account to be transgressed. 
Having first learned what these limits are, the upper 
classes ought energetically to use all means of teaching 
them to the people."
Surely one means of teaching anything to the people 
is first of all to give them a grounding in reading, writ­
ing and arithmetic together with some knowledge of litera- 
ji.zjx. ture, history and geography. Spencer agrees that "by
making the working man a good reader, we give him access 
to sources of information from which he may learn how to 
use his electoral power; and that other studies sharpen 
his faculties and make him a better judge of political 
questions." But he fears that he will read only litera­
ture that appeals to his prejudices and supplies him 
with fallacious arguments for the mistaken beliefs he 
naturally takes up —  the belief, for example, that the 
State ought to provide education or regulate the hours of 
labour.* Spencer would apparently keep the people ignorant 
of all ideas save those that the "upper classes ought 
energetically to use all means of teaching" —  a strange
*Hote: Of. also letter from Spencer to J.6 . Mill
(25th March, 1859} on the educational qualific­
ation for a vote. (Duncan, p.94).
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position for the advocate of "natural rights" and 
governmental non-interference to assume!
The discussion in "What Knowledge is of Most Vforth?" 
is,, however, not so much concerned with the right order­
ing of civic life as it is occupied with a polemic against 
History as ordinarily taught in schools, and a justific­
ation of Spencer's view of it as material for a science 
of descriptive sociology. Spencer is strongly opposed to 
the "great-man-theory of history, tacitly held by the 
ignorant in all ages and in recent times definitely enun­
ciated by Mr Carlyle"! This, he thinks, is the underly­
ing theory of those who prescribe the kind of history 
commonly taught. It is far too much concerned with the 
biographies of monarchs ( "and our children learn little 
else"), with court-intrigues, plots, usurpations and the 
personalities accompanying them, with details of battles 
and sieges and their attendant massacres and bloodshed, 
and with personal gossip of all kinds. He would sub­
stitute instead the "natural history of society", com­
prising the origin and nature of government, central and 
local, ecclesiastical and civil; the evolution of religi­
ous creeds; social customs; popular superstitions; the 
history of culture, art and morals; and the like. In 
Short, "the only history that is of practical value, is 
what may be called Bescriptive Sociology. And the high­
est office which the historian can discharge, is that of 
so narrating the lives of nations, as to furnish materials 
for a Comparative Sociology; and for the subsequent deter-
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lïiiïiation for the ultimate laws to which social phenom­
ena conform."
Information is again lacking as to the age at which 
this science of Sociology is to be begun, or of how pupils 
are to be prepared for understanding it. In a later dis- 
cussion, Spencer advises "each citizen" to try to obtain 
as much Historical knowledge as is needed for "political 
guidance", and points out that sociological generalizations 
are mostly based upon facts presented by "those savage 
and semi-civilized societies ignored in our educational 
courses." He allows, hov/ever, that "there are also re­
quired some of the facts furnished by the histories of 
developed nations," and that while it is the impersonal 
elements of history which chiefly demand attention, " a 
certain attention may rightly be given to its personal 
elements." This is certainly a concession to the inter­
ests of the ordinary man and more particularly to the 
interests of the child; but it is hardly in that spirit 
that Spencer makes it. The real value of history for him 
lies in the insight it affords into the laws of social 
evolution. If a "certain moderate number of leading men 
and their actions may properly be contemplated," it is 
because "the past stages in human progress which every­
one should know something about would be conceived in 
too shadowy a form if wholly divested of ideas of the 
persons and events associated with them. Moreover, some 
amount of such knowledge is requisite to enlarge adequate­
ly the conception of human nature in general —  to show 
the extremes, occasionally good but mostly bad, which it
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is capable of reaching."
Now it may be observed in criticism of this view 
that school-children are little interested in the laws 
of social evolution or the natural history of society, 
but they are capable of being interested in outstanding 
personalities of the past, who often express in their 
individual lives the spirit of the age in which they 
lived and sum up in their achievements the great ideas 
and great movements of whole periods of history. Spen­
cer admits that history furnishes the material for soci­
ological generalisations; and he has already told us 
that a right method in education demands that the teacher 
proceed from the concrete to the abstract, from the emp- 
iridal to the rational. The facts must be known before 
the generalisations can be understood. Moreover, what­
ever may have been the case in Spencer's day, the present 
text-books on history as used in schools are far from be­
ing adequately described as compilations of the biograph­
ies of kings; though there has been no disposition to 
adopt in their stead the "dreary folios of the "Descript- 
ive Sociology." "History with the human life taken out - 
of it," as Ritchie remarks, "dead, dried, and sliced up 
into columns, not even written in construable English, 
might indeed be 'crammed up' for an examination, but 
with somewhat disastrous results on the intellect of the 
patient. ...If it is a mistake to think of the history 
of the English Reformation as if it were only the pro­
duct of Henry VIII's change of wives, an account of the 
Great Rebellion, which relegates Charles I and Oliver
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Cromwell to a thin column, is equally mistaken and 
misleading."
Apart from the question of what history to teach 
children and when to teach it, there is the further 
question of how it is to help the individual in the per­
formance of his social duties. Spencer seems to think 
that men will he induced to vote more intelligently if 
they have previously mastered the 'laws of social evol­
ution'. Once again his intellectualism betrays itself. 
The average voter does not award his vote on a calm 
scientific analysis of the arguments of political parties 
and a comparative survey of past political history. Nor 
does it appear likely that he ever will, especially if 
Spencer's further requirement be insisted upon, namely, 
that a competent knowledge of biology and psychology 
must be secured before history can be properly interpreted.
Another of Spencer's allied notions may here be 
examined. If it be allowed that the ordinary man 
should master the science of sociology to prepare 
himself for the duties of citizenship, what quali­
fications are we to look for in the legislator?
This is a matter which Spencer discussed in two 
separate essays published respectively in 1857 and 
1860. In the first, "Representative Government:
What is it good for?", he advises legislators to get 
^sso^ If a knowledge of the social science — "the science in-
volving all others; the science standing above all 
others in subtlety and complexity; the science which 
the highest intelligence alone can master." The 
difficulty of the science being so great, it is not 
surprising that Spencer finds Members of Parliament 
wd&ully deficient in it. "That many of them are 
// “ ' very good classical scholars is beyond doubt: not a
fev/ have written first-rate Latin verses, and can 
enjoy a Greek play; but there is no obvious relation 
between a memory well-stocked with the words talked 
two thousand years ago, and an understanding dis­
ciplined to deal with modern society. That in 
learning the language of the past they have learnt
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some of its history, is true; but considering that 
this history is mainly a narrative of battles and 
intrigues and negotiations, it does not throw much 
light on social philosophy —  not even the simplest 
principles of political economy have ever been 
_  gathered from it." Spencer has no hesitation in
asserting "that without a knowledge of the laws of 
Life, and a clear comprehension of the way in which 
they underlie and determine social growth and organ­
isation, the attempted regulation of social life 
must end in perpetual failure."
In the second essay, "Parliamentary Reform: The 
Dangers and the Safeguards," the education of the 
^ governing classes is again found to be ornamental but
. • not useful. "Do but take a young Member of Parlia-
^ ’ ment fresh from Oxford or Cambridge, and ask him what
he thinks Law should do, and why? or what it should 
not do, and why? and it will become manifest that 
neither his familiarity with Aristotle nor his read­
ings in Thucydides have prepared him to answer the 
very first question a legislator ought to solve." 
Spencer's substitute for this education is, as before, 
the study of social science, which will show that Law 
ought to avoid interfering with the natural rights 
of the individual!
How ill-qualified Spencer was to judge of the 
value of a knowledge of history has already appeared. 
He was sure that had Greece and Rome never existed, 
human life, and the right conduct of it, would have 
been in their essentials exactly what they now are, 
determined in the same ways by the adjustment or 
non-adjustment of actions to requirements. This is 
the view of one who is unable to judge of the differ­
ence between a savage tribe with no history and a 
city-state conscious of its own aims and purposes, 
and impressing its thoughts and achievements upon 
the world throughout all subsequent ages. Both are 
regarded as equally capable of being carved up to 
fit the columns of a volume of Descriptive Sociology. 
The young graduate from the university steeped in 
his Aristotle and primed with instances from Thy 
Thucydides is better equipped for an understanding 
of modern politics than the disciple of Spencer, who 
in his ignorance despises history as the gossip of 
Kings and the chronicles of the amourous adventures 
of their mistresses. A study of social philosophy 
is doubtless an excellent propaedeutic for the task 
of government, but it must be a more adequate phil­
osophy than the biological sociology of Spencer, 
based upon a theory which regards society as a joint- 
stock, mutual protection company charged with the 
enforcement of contracts.
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(e) The Right Employment of Leisure.
Having satisfied himself that Science is necessary 
for guidance in the more important of life's activities, 
Spencer arrives finally at the leisure time of life.
This is the time for relaxation and amusement, for the 
enjoyments of Nature, of Literature, and of the Fine Arts, 
in all their forms. Important as these are, they must 
yield precedence to the afore mentioned pursuits; for, ac­
cording to Spencer, the things which a person does in 
leisure time will not enable him to earn a livelihood, or 
prepare him for the up-bringing of a family, or equip him 
for voting intelligently at a Parliamentary election* 
Spencer, as we have already noticed, is not prepared.to 
value leisure time for its own sake, as a time when a per­
son may hold communion with other minds through the medium 
of literature or art: leisure is of value only for amuse­
ment and relaxation, for that recreation which makes pos­
sible the adequate performance of the other, and relative­
ly more important, duties of life.
Without implying agreement with this view, we may 
consider how the individual may best be prepared to enjoy 
those "relaxations and amusements." Again the answer is, 
through knowledge —  not knowledge of comparative litera­
ture or of the history of art, but scientific knowledge 
of the psycho-physical principles underlying literature 
and the arts. "Unexpected though the assertion may be, 
it is nevertheless true, that the highest art of every 
kind is based on Science -- that without Science there 
can be neither perfect production nor full appreciation."
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Here are two separate assertions which may be con­
sidered independently.
(a) It is tiaae that there is a science of art.
There are general laws or principles discoverable in all 
artistic productions of the highest excellence. They are 
primarily psychological and secondarily physical or physi- 
g, ological principles. For example, the best musical com-
positions obey, or conform to,certain laws of melodic 
5<£ "motion" and harmony. Certain tonic intervals in music
' produce more complete consonances than others because of
the psycho-physical nature of sound and its relation to 
the physiological structure of the end-organ of hearing. 
The same is true for pictorial art in the visual spheres 
of colour and form. We may grant that the best artists 
conform to those laws. But that does not necessarily 
imply that they do so consciously or of set purpose aris­
ing out of scientific knowledge of the principles. The 
artist creates; and if his creation is good, the analytic­
al psychologist or critic may then proceed to lay bare 
the laws observed by his productions. Doubtless the art­
ist prepares himself as well as he can by studying the 
things he depicts; but a picture is not a photograph, nor /s 
a musical composition a phonographic record of a bird's 
song or of the natural language of the emotions. Spencer—  
somewhat irrelevantly, since the average man is not an 
artist— devotes considerable space to arguing that the 
artist should have a scientific knowledge of the physical 
laws of the object he represents. For example, the sculpt- 
or must study mechanics lest, like Myron, he carves a
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figure which a Spencerian observer expects every minute 
ijlll fall forward on to its face. The painter must 
study "physioscopy", i.e. the science of the physical 
appearances of the objects represented —  "the rendering 
of the phenomena of linear perspective, of aerial perspec­
tive, of light and shade, and of colour in so far as it is 
determined not by artistic choice, but by natural condi­
tions —  e.g. that of water as affected by the sky, the 
clouds, and the bottom." Similarly the musical composer 
must be familiar with the natural language of emotion, 
since, according to Spencer, music is but an idealization 
of that. The poet must pay attention to those laws of 
nervous action which excited speech obeys.
Spencer is on less disputable ground when he advises 
the artist to try to understand how the minds of spectat­
ors or listeners will be affected by the several peculiar­
ities of his work. The good artist satisfies the aesthet­
ic needs of those who contemplate his art, but it is more 
than doubtful whether he requires to be a scientific psy­
chologist in order to do so. Spencer thinks that not 
only should the artist have an immediate perception or 
intuition of these psychological principles and their 
corollaries on which the appeal of his art depends, but he 
should have an understanding of them. Even then something 
is wanting: his equipment is not complete unless he has 
genius and inspiration. The artist of every type is born, 
not made; and "only when Genius is married to Science can 
the highest results be produced."
(b) As has been already remarked, that part of Spen-
cer's discussion scarcely concerns the educator, 
since the latter has to deal with pupils who are not 
b o m  artists. For them appreciation is the important 
thing. Even here, however, we do not escape the clutches 
of the scientist. Science, it appears, is necessary for 
the full appreciation of the fine arts. Bearing in mind 
Spencer's own experiences, we may take leave to doubt it. 
The scientific attitude of mind is different from the 
aesthetic, and, in Spencer's case at least, the two were 
antagonistic. The predominantly analytical tendency of 
his mind destroyed for him a great deal of the pleasure 
and gratification he might have derived from literature 
&hd art. Of this, he was, moreover, well aware. "The 
* inability of a man of science," he says, "to take the
poetic view simply shows his mental limitation; as the 
mental limitation of a poet is shown by his inability to 
take the scientific view. The broader mind can take both. 
Those who allege this antagonism forget that Goethe, pre­
dominantly a poet, was also a scientific enquirer."
We may, however, agree with Spencer that the more 
cultivated enjoy art to a greater degree than the less 
cultivated, if by that he means that greater experience 
of literature and wider acquaintance with the qualities 
to be looked for in a work of art confer on their possess­
or a better understanding and a truer appreciation.
These qualities are surely to be acquired by the system­
atic reading of good books and continuous practice in 
listening to fine music, or in contemplating noble pic­
tures, statues or buildings, than by a study of the
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sciences, physical, physiological or psychological, 
underlying those arts. In other words, preparation for 
the use of leisure, even for the purpose for which Spen­
cer regards it as suitable, is not to be had through a 
study of science but through the cultivation of taste 
and the practice of the powers of appreciation.
Knowledge as Discipline.
We pass now to the question of mental discipline. 
Spencer does not doubt the possibility of certain kinds 
of information being able to confer a general mental 
training: he is concerned merely to discover what kinds
of knowledge involve "a mental exercise best fitted for
h - H .
' strengthening the faculties", and in particular whether
scientific or linguistic knowledge is the more suitable 
for the purpose. Obliged to treat this part of the sub­
ject with brevity, he summarily decides that it would be 
"utterly contrary to the beautiful economy of Nature, if 
one kind of culture were needed for the gaining of inform­
ation and another kind were needed as a mental gymnastic." 
He finds that "the highest power of a faculty results 
from the discharge of those duties which the conditions of 
life require it to discharge,” Hence "the education of 
most value for guidance, must at the same time be the 
education of most value for discipline." Nowadays, of 
course, the problem is neither so simply stated nor so 
easily solved; but Spencer has no difficulty in demon­
strating to his own satisfaction that science is superior 
to linguistics for training the rational memory, cultiv­
ating the judgement and exercising the understanding.
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In "The Study of Sociology" (1873) he shows in 
^ more detail how training in the Abstract Sciences*con-
fers on the student a due sense of the "necessity of 
relation"; cultivation of the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, 
a consciousness of "cause and effect"; and acquaintance 
with the Concrete Sciences, conceptions of "continuity, 
complexity and contingency." But the real reason which 
induced him to prefer Science to the Humanities appears 
when he claims for it the power of conferring a moral 
discipline. Science, he says, makes constant appeal to 
individual reason: each person can test the facts for 
himself, and the pupil especially may be made to think 
out his own conclusions and submit every step in a 
scientific investigation to his own private judgement.
In a word, science fosters "that independence which is
h- éo.
a most valuable element in character." On the other hand, 
the learning of languages increases "the already undue 
respect for authority” and results in a "tendency to ac­
cept without enquiry whatever is established"—  a tend- 
ency increased by the dogmatic method necessarily employed. 
Literature and history have similarly to be accepted by 
h U  j>’33^ the pupil on authority: hence they too "encourage sub­
missive receptivity instead of independent activity." 
Spencer distrusts all knowledge which has a social origin
*Note: The terms, Abstract, Abstract-Concrete, and Con­
crete, used to classify the sciences in Chapter I of 
"Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical" (1861), 
do not appear in the original Review Article (1859). 
They are the terms employed by Spencer in "The Class­
ification of the Sciences" (1864) ("Essays," III 
pp. 1-56. ).
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and is based upon social experience, Consequently 
literature is regarded by him as coming under the head 
of "amusements": it is a recreative subject which helps 
to make the individual fit for more useful activities.
That is its chief use; and Spencer pays but grudging 
tribute to its humanising value.
The schools have happily not seen fit to follow 
Spencer in thus belittling literary culture. On the con­
trary, they are tending to give more and more attention 
to the reading of vernacular literature as an essential 
part of a liberal education, and as a means of introducing 
the pupil to the inexhaustible store-house of national 
wisdom. The mental view is not narrowed but widened by be­
ing able to look out upon the world through the eyes of 
others; and a wise "recaptivity" is often the best prepar­
ation for an independent activity,"
Science as Poetical and Religious.
Spencer concludes his .glorification of science by 
claiming for it poetical and religious qualities. By say­
ing that science is itself poetic, he means that the con­
templation of nature gives food to the imagination and 
ministers to love of the beautiful. "Sad,indeed, is it to
see how men occupy themselves with trivialities, and 
are indifferent to the grandest phenomena —  care not 
to understand the architecture of the Heavens, but are 
deeply interested in some contemptible controversy 
about the intrigues of Mary Queen of Scots: —  are 
learnedly critical over a Greek ode, and pass by with­
out a glance that grand epic written by the finger of 
God upon the strata of the Earth:"
It is this aspect of Science that confers upon it its
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value as a religious culture .*» "True science and true 
religion," says Spencer quoting Huxley?^"are twin sisters 
and the separation of either from the other is sure to 
hU.,j^’G7. prove the death of both." The student of Nature "sees
that the laws to which we must submit are both inexorable 
and beneficent. He sees that in conforming to them, the 
process of things is ever towards a greater perfection 
and a higher happiness." The devotee of Science is led 
to realise the impossibility of comprehending the Ultimate 
Cause of things and humbles himself before the impenetrable 
veil which hides the Absolute and Unknowable, Here we 
have a summary statement of Spencer’s own negative re- 
ft, ligion, if "an indefinite consciousness of an utterly un-
 ^ knowable reality" can be called a religion.//"By con-
tinually seeking to know and being continually thrown 
 ^ back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of
knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is 
alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard 
that through which all things exist as The Unknowable.
* Note : Cf. Marcel "On Language, " I. p. 78
"The Study of nature, presenting endless illustra­
tions of the sacred volume, renders instruction 
the hand-maid of religion."
For further parallels between Spencer and Marcel, 
see Chapter XIII.
* ^ hNote: Spencer was Indebted to Huxley for other ideas be­
sides this on the relation between science and re­
ligion. See, for example, Huxley, "On the Education­
al Value of the Natural History Sciences", an address 
delivered at St.Martin’s Hall in 1854 and reprinted 
as a pamphlet the same year. (Republished in 
"Science and Education", pp.38-65.).
Note; This is ’"The Unknowable’ with a capital U; a special 
entity to which Spencer expects you to take off your 
bat." —  Elliot, "Herbert Spencer", p.224, note.
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Conclusion.
If we look to Spencer’s essay for guidance in the 
actual drawing up of a school curriculum, as we are 
surely entitled to do, disappointment awaits us. Spencer 
never condescends to specify definitely the ages of the 
pupils he has in view when he prescribes the teaching of 
science as the knowledge of most worth. As we have seen, 
it is the adult whom he appears to be thinking of most of 
the time. But it is not even the average adult; it is 
the highly intellectual and logical adult wrho bases his 
whole conduct on rational principles. The ordinary boy 
is not able to make much use of the science of physiology 
in maintaining physical fitness; or of the applied sciences 
underlying industry in fitting himself to enter upon ap­
prenticeship; or of psychology and ethology in preparing 
himself during boyhood for the important duties of parent­
hood; or of the science of sociology in anticipation of 
the privilege of exercising the franchise.
As regards preparation for the right use of leisure—  
one of the most important functions of the school —  Spen­
cer’s contribution is even more unsatisfactory. So far 
as it concerns the education of the ordinary pupil, it is 
a plea for the teaching of the sciences underlying the 
arts in the hope that the pupil will thereby be enabled 
the better to appreciate them. Literature and the arts, 
as the creations of the social mind at its best, are 
themselves neglected. Spencer’s view of leisure, moreover, 
is misleading. He regards it as a time of mere relaxation
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and amusement, worthless in itself and valuable only 
to the extent that it makes possible the performance 
of the more important duties of life. He does not re­
cognise that leisure may be the time when the individ­
ual is most free, when he may achieve the fullest self- 
expression, and is most likely to be an end to himself, 
not a means to the end of others; and that preparation 
for the right use of leisure is therefore one of the 
most important aims of education.
The very idea of education as a preparation for 
future life inevitably leads to a neglect of the in­
terests and capacities of the boys and girls who are to 
receive it. In his second chapter, Spencer aims at psy- 
chologising school method, but in this first chapter he 
betrays a strange inability to psychologise the subject- 
matter of the school course. Knowledge in scientific 
form is knowledge in adult form. The child is more in­
terested in his personal life and experiences than in the 
logically fomulated experience of the race. Remembering 
this, and remembering that it is one of Spencer’s own 
maxims of method that "the genesis of knowledge in the 
individual must follow the same course as the genesis of 
knowledge in the race", we may wonder why Spencer should 
insist on teaching science in systematised form to child- 
" ren. He tells us elsewhere that "science has gradually 
emerged from the crude knowledge of the savage," which 
"served for simple guidance of life-sustaining activities." 
It ought therefore to follow that "crude" knowledge is
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sufficient for the child, while science is a form of 
knowledge appropriate to the adult mind.
Again, the emphasis laid upon knowledge as the one 
thing needful for guidance shows Spencer’s one-sided in- 
tellectualian. In the early stages of education, train­
ing is more important than instruction; and virtue de­
pends a good deal more on the forming of right habits 
than on knowledge. There is no indication, either, in 
the present essay that pupils have hands as well as heads; 
or that besides determining what knowledge is of most 
worth, it also concerns the educator to determine what 
practical activities are of most worth. Spencer, it is 
true, comes nearer to appreciating this need when in the 
"SfbxJ'T s'fS' Ethics he advocates the teaching of manual skill. "That
this is a proper preparation for life among those occupi 
ed in productive industry, will not be disputed; though 
at present, even the boys who may need it are but 
little encouraged to acquire manipulative skill; only 
those kinds of skill which games give are cultivated.
But manipulative skill and keenness of perception ought 
to be acquired by those also who are to have careers 
of higher kinds. Awkwardness of limb and inability to 
use the fingers deftly, continually entail small dis­
asters and occasionally great ones; while expertness 
frequently comes in aid of welfare, either of self or 
others."
This much later addition to Spencer’s educational 
doctrine apart, there is no indication that preparation 
for complete living involves anything more than an en­
cyclopaedic knowledge of the various sciences underlying 
the five groups of activities which "complete living" in­
volves. There is no indication that adaptation to the en­
vironment in the case of man includes adaptation to a 
psychical environmentor that man has a social heritage
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as well as a biological inheritance. Neither is there 
any aaequate realisation that man is a social being with 
a nature which must realise itself in a social milieu, 
and nourish itself on the spiritual food afforded by 
literature and the arts. The individual, living in com­
plete isolation, would, as we have previously observed, 
cease to be a human being. Such a being would even cease 
to be a fit subject for education at all. Even the Robin­
son Crusoe individual imagined by Rousseau as fit for 
Emile’s imitation in pre-adolescence, is a social being, 
separated for the time being from physical contact with 
his fellows, but not divorced from the ’plexus of ideas 
and sentiments’ by which his individuality has been 
shaped. The Wild Boy of Aveyron would be a fitter pupil 
for Spencer to dose with science as a preparation for 
"complete living" than the Emile of Rousseau’s romance.
If it was a handicap for Spencer to have been brought up 
on science and deprived of most of the normal social con­
tacts during youth, it is a greater handicap on the in­
fluence of his educational views that they are correspond­
ingly biased by his individualistic outlook, and fail to 
appreciate the social side of education at anything like 
its true worth, or to value the humanities as entitled to 
a place on the school curriculum alongside the sciences, 
and, like the sciences, as capable of yielding "guidance" 
for the various activities involved in complete living.
Note on Spencer and Priestley,
An attempt has been made by H.G. Good ("Journal 
of Educational Research," Vol.13, No.5, May,1926,
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pp.325-335) to prove Spencer’s indebtedness for the 
argument of the essay on ’’What Knowledge is of Most 
Worth?’’ to the following works of Joseph Priestjy: 
"Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civil and 
Active Life" (1760); ’’Remarks on a Proposed Code of 
Education" (1765); and’"Piisce 11 aneous Observations 
relating to Education" (1780), In the present writ- 
e2fs opinion the attempt does not succeed. As we have 
already seen (Chapter I) Spencer held substantially 
the same views on the relation of the State to educa­
tion as Priestley and Godwin, and may have been ac­
quainted with these eighteenth century writers and 
others of the same school. But although there are 
points of resemblance between Priestley and Spencer 
in their ideas of the aim and content of education, 
a perusal of Priestley’s works on education, as above, 
produces on the whole a different impression from that 
obtained by reading Spencer’s first chapter. Spencer’s 
borrowings from Priestley, if any, seem to have been 
slight and unimportant. In the other three essays of 
Spencer there are references to authorities by name; 
and there does not seem to be any reason why Priestley 
should not have been cited in the first essay if there 
had been any conscious borrowing. Spencer had too 
few authorities on education not to wish to make the 
most of them. A much stronger case indeed could be 
made out for Claude Marcel and George Combe as the 
sources of many of Spencer’s ideas. —  For Marcel, 
see next chapter; and for Combe, see "On Popular Edu­
cation." (Lectures delivered to the Edinburgh Philosoph­
ical Association in April, 1833. );
"On Secular Education" (Article in the"Westminster 
Review" for July, 1852. hew Series, Vol.II, No.l.)'
"On Teaching Physiology and its Applications in 
Common Schools." (Pamphlet, 1857) The foregoing are 
reprinted in "Discussions on Education." By George 
Combe. (London, 1893). The last mentioned recommends 
the teaching of simple physiology (to"young persons of 
ten years of age and upwards") together with the 
"applications to practical conduct of which it is 
susceptible." See also "Education: its Principles and 
Practice." By George Combe. Edited by William Jolly. 
(London, 1879).
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CHAPTER XIII.
METHOD IN EDUCATION.
Spencer's Authorities.
The chapter on Intellectual Education was the first 
of Spencer's four essays to be written. It is noteworthy 
for the frequency, relatively to the others, with which 
references are made to authorities. Of these there are 
mentioned by name, Marcel, Wyse, Pestalozzi, Fellenberg, 
Tyndall, Horace Mann and Professor Pillans. This list iç, 
for Spencer, quite extensive; for it was not his habit to 
rely much on the work of previous writers. On the con­
trary, he rather prided himself on his originality. It 
would seem to be a legitimate inference, therefore, that 
in discussing method in education, he felt somewhat un­
certain of himself and realised the need to document his 
argument with unusual care. The inference is partly 
justified by an investigation of the sources. While 
Fellenberg, Tyndall, Horace Mann and Professor Pillans 
are represented by isolated quotations, the references 
to Marcel, Pestalozzi and Wyse recur from time to time 
in the course of the discussion. These, it turns out.
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are Spencer's principal authorities for his views on 
educational method.
Claude Marcel (1793-1876)
Claude Marcel was a Frenchman who lived a large 
part of his life outside of France and was thus induced 
to interest himself in the learning and teaching of mod­
ern foreign languages. While French consul at Cork, he 
published in English his chief educational wor%. This was 
"Language as a Means of Mental Culture and International 
Communication; or Manual of the Teacher and the Learner 
of Languages," by C. Marcel, Knt.Leg.Hon. : French Consul. 
(2 vols. London, 1853). The title of the work is hardly 
comprehensive enough. Marcel surveys the whole field of 
education, and devotes the first four books, comprising 
the greater part of his first volume, to a discussion of 
such topics as aim, method and curriculum. It is to this 
preliminary discussion that Spencer is most indebted; and 
from it that he borrowed, without acknowledgment, several 
of his "guiding principles" of method.
The agreement between Spencer and Marcel is not con­
fined to the essay on Intellectual Education. For example,
the two writers agree in their denunciation of the mon- 
opoly enjoyed by the Classics in education; in insisting 
on the need to determine the "relative importance" of
alted opinion of classical learning, and a total 
d.isr©§Q-rti of mod-Bm s c i b u c b s  âiid. p3?o.c1iicQ.l good, s b h s b *
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I Ifu'f the "acquirements which a complete education should oom-
^ I n S - , . prise" —  a task for which "until now materials were
wanting;" in dividing education into its tliree branches, 
Physical, Intellectual and Moral; in advocating the study 
of "such branches of knowledge as best discipline the 
intellect and are of practical utility throughout life;"
. in thinking that while the "information most required by
individuals varies indefinitely with their diversified 
pursuits in social life, ... that which offers the best 
prospect of being useful, and which should have precedence 
over the others is .... an acquaintance with the laws of 
nature";’^ in concluding that "utility is the test by which 
the value of instruction ought to be estimated"; in de- 
hU.jji./if. nouncing "the ignorance of parents on the subject of educa-
tion"; in lamehting the fact that "neither at home nor at 
school is a single fact or principle taught, which has 
direct reference to the judicious fulfilment of offices 
which are to become the subject of La parent's] anxious 
thoughts and feelings"; in condemning premature intellect- 
ual training whereby "both the minds and bodies of the 
little sufferers have been enfeebled by an over-exertion 
of the brain, when as yet imperfectly formed"; in opining 
that "intellectual precocity is but too frequently attended
^Note: Cf. Spencer, p.106. ,  ^ ^
"It will by and by be found that a knowledge of the 
laws of life is more important than any other knowledge 
whatever —  that the laws of life underlie not only all 
bodily and mental processes, but by implication all the 
sections of the house, and the street, all commerce, 
all politics, all morals —  and that therefore without 
a comprehension of them, neither personal nor social 
conduct can be rightly regulated."
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by premature death or debility through life"; in finding 
i3(. that "what renders physical [science] studies most suit­
able to childhood, is their moral and religious tendency";
and so on. Such a list of agreements between the two 
writers, apart from the question of method, could be easi­
ly extended; but sufficient has been quoted to indicate 
the source from which Spencer derived many of the ideas 
which he proceeded to work into the context of his own 
thought or affiliate to his own personal experience.
On educational method the indebtedness is even more 
evident. In the essay, Marcel is quoted or referred to 
by name six times, but Spencer's borrowings are more 
frequently unacknowledged. First and foremost, the idea 
of basing method on the laws of mental development and 
following the order of Nature is Marcel's. "In aiming at 
the complete development of all the primitive powers of 
the child," says Marcel, "the educator should observe, as 
nearly as he can, the order of Nature"; and he further 
advises that "the educator should make himself perfect 
master of physiology, moral science, and mental phil­
osophy; the instructor, especially, should study mental 
philosophy, which contains the fundamental principles of 
Vfy. the art of teaching." "Education," he continues, "is, in 
fact, the most useful part of the science of the mind.
It may be considered as a science in itself, it has its 
fixed laws, and the principles on which it is founded are 
drawn, by inductive reasoning, from the physical and in­
tellectual organisation of man, as also from his social
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condition; it demands, in order to be well understood 
and properly applied, the deepest thought and most patient 
investigation." Spencer, it is true, refers the principle 
to Pestalozzi, but, as we shall show, his acquaintance
hytf.
with Pestalozzi was limited to the extracts printed in 
Biber's "Life"; and he at once goes on to quote Marcel in 
support of Pestalozzi —  thus "'The method of nature is 
the archetype of all methods,’ says M. Marcel."-^
In the second place, the subjects which Spencer 
chooses to illustrate his principles of educational method 
accord closely with those recommended by Marcel, the agree­
ment extending even to the suggestions made as regards the 
methods of teaching them. Marcel advises parents to be- 
(S gin with sense-training. "The exercise of the senses,"
he tells us, "is essential as a means of intellectual edu­
cation; for primary ideas can be received only through 
their medium: our sensations are, in fact, the origin of 
A./y. our knowledge." "It is by varying the objects of percep­
tion," he continues, "that they [the senses] are cultivated
^Note: Spencer omits to give the second part of Marcel's
7 dictum, which is "and especially of the method of teach­
ing languages." It does not suit Spencer's purpose to 
follow Marcel unreservedly.
Two further instances of incomplete quotation occur 
u in the essay. The first is on p. 74 where Spencer, quot-
7 ^^ ^^  ing Marcel, says, "It may without hesitation be affirmed
that grammar is not the stepping-stone but the finishing 
instrument." Spencer omits the rest of the sentence —  
"by which we improve and perfect the practical knowledge 
of a language we already know." The other is on p.85 
^ ^  A.go where Spencer is quoting from Biber. In this case the
omission is without significance.
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their diversities, and that the mind is, through
 ^OA-A
"JL their means, stored with varied intuitive knowledge."
-»/kx J w 6 x ^  ,
This accords with Spencer's recommendation that "we should 
provide for the infant a sufficiency of objects presenting 
different degrees and kinds of resistance, a sufficiency 
of objects reflecting different amounts and qualities of
A- 92
light, and a sufficiency of sounds contrasted in their 
H o ^ v ^  l  ^ loudness, their pitch and their timbre. " After sense- 
cU j^  |T. training, Marcel advises conversational object-lessons,
quoting in support, Pestalozzi, Fellenberg and Pere Girard 
of Fribourg. Spencer makes the same transition. "Pass- 
ing on to object-lessons, which manifestly form a natural 
continuation of the primary culture of the senses," Spen- 
cer takes occasion to make his one criticism of Marcel 
for asserting that a child should be shown how all the 
parts of an object are connected. This injunction violates 
one of Marcel's own principles of method (adopted by Spen­
cer) that education Should be a process of self-instruction. 
Passing ever Marcel's discussion of arithmetic (which, 
however, Spencer commends elsewhere) and his suggestions on 
geography^and history, Spencer goes on to advocate nature— 
study much in the same way as Marcel advises excursions 
into the country. Drawing is the next of Spencer’s ex- 
amples. "Nature," says Marcel,"admirably favours the
^Note.^^^^^ apparently a reference to Marcel's method 
of teaching geography in Spencer (p.76) where the "use 
of geographical models" is commended.
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early learning of linear drawing: children, from the 
most tender age, evince a strong desire to sketch famil­
iar objects in their most complete form; they delight in 
imitations which speak to their imagination; but all inter­
est would be lost, if they were desired to draw only de­
tached parts of objects. We should, then, in this point, 
follow the dictates of nature, and present at first to 
the child complete but simple forms. In this, as in every­
thing else, the learner must pass gradually from the sim­
ple to the complicated. It is by attending to the general 
outline of a model, whether an object or a copy, that the 
eye is educated, that the proportions of the whole are 
understood, that harmony is introduced in the arrangements 
of parts, and that a bold and rapid execution may be ac­
quired." Thus Marcel. Spencer's more graphic version be- 
gins as follows: "The spreading recognition of drawing
as an element of education, is one among many signs of 
the more rational views on mental culture now beginning 
to prevail. Once more it may be remarked that teachers 
are"at length adopting the course which Nature has per­
petually been pressing on their notice. The spontan­
eous attempts made by children to represent the men, 
houses, trees, and animals around them —  on a slate 
if they can get nothing better, or with a lead-pencil 
on paper if they can beg them —  are familiar to all.
To be shown through a picture-book is one of their 
highest gratifications; and, as usual, their strong 
imitative tendency presently generates in them the 
ambition to make pictures themselves also. This effort 
to depict the striking things they see, is a further 
instinctive exercise of the perceptions a means 
whereby still greater accuracy ana completeness of ob­
servation are induced. And alike by trying to interest 
us in their discoveries of the sensible properties of 
things, and by their endeavours to draw, they solicit 
from us ]just that kind of culture which they most need."
Spencer, it is true, objects to the practice of drawing
from copies (as his father had done before him), but Marcel
312.
permits it only as a supplement to drawing from nature.
"It must also be borne in mind," he says, "that drawing 
from nature is one of tne ends proposed; the objects 
themselves must therefore be early presented for imitation 
in their various aspects; this will accustom the eye to 
judge of their forms and proportions, as also of the 
effect of light and shade, better than could be done from 
drawings and pa.intings: but, as it is useful to study the 
manner in which artists have themselves represented these 
objects, the learner should sketch sometimes from nature 
and sometimes from approved original works." Wyse, an­
other of Spencer's authorities, also objected to drawing 
fpom copies. "The imitation of an imitation in this
j>. IZS.
[beginning] stage, is preposterous."
Wyse is Spencer's main authority for the teaching of 
geometry, but Marcel (possibly himself following Wyse,
 ^ whom he names twice among his references) recommends the
use of a collection of small geometrical solids in teach­
ing the elements of geometry. With geometrv, the list of 
subjects with which Spencer illustrates his principles 
comes to an end. We may be sure that, had space allowed, 
he would have proceeded to discuss the teaching of the 
various sciences in an analogous fashion, but it is not 
likely that he would have followed Marcel into a dis­
cussion of the teaching of languages, ancient and modern.
We may now go on, in the third place, to consider 
Spencer's seven guiding principles of method based upon 
the "mode and order of unfolding" of the faculties. Of 
the seven, only one is referred back to a previous writer,
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Comte, who is credited by Spencer with having 
enunciated the parallelism between the genesis of know­
ledge in the individual and the genesis of knowledge in 
the race. The others are stated without reference to 
any authority. Most of them are borrowed or adapted from 
Marcel. In Book III, Chapter III, Marcel discusses the 
"Characteristics of a Good Method." After pointing out 
that, among other qualities, a good method favours self­
teaching; is in accordance with nature; comprises analysis 
and synthesis; is both practical and comparative; and con­
fers a mental discipline; Marcel proceeds to state sum- 
marily the "General Principles on which a Rational Method 
is Based." "Although," he says, "no method can be point­
ed out for the acquisition of any branch of knowledge, 
which would suit every individual and every circumstance, 
there are,nevertheless, general laws, deduced from the 
function of the human mind and from the nature of the 
knowledge to be acquired, which can be made to bear on 
the study." Marcel sets forth twenty of these "axiomatic 
truths of methodology", from which Spencer makes a selec­
tion to suit his own ideas. Here are the "axiomatic 
truths" of Marcel which are to be found embodied in Spen­
cer's essay:-
h u  L,,. " 1 . The method of nature is the archetype of all
T  ■ methods, and especially of the method of learning
/ "5. Examples and practice are more efficient than
'/ 7^' precept and theory.
J
Note: Quoted, in part, by Spencer, p.79.
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"1 2- exercise should be so difficult as to dis­
courage exertion, nor so easy as to render it un­
necessary: attention is secured by making study in­
teresting. ^
learner discovers by mental exertion 
IS better known than what is told him. i- 
”15. Learners should not do with their instructor 
what they can do by themselves, that they may have 
V, _ îo?® %^th him what they cannot do by themselves.
20. Young persons should be taught only what they are 
capable of clearly understanding, and what may be use­
ful to them in after life."
How close an agreement subsists between Spencer and 
Marcel on these maxims of method may be seen at a glance 
if we quote Spencer's own summary of his "guiding prin­
ciples" :
 ^ "The foregoing outlines of plans for exercising the
perceptions in early childhood, for conducting object- 
lessons, for teaching drawing and geometry, must be 
' considered simply as illustrations of the method dictated
Note: Marcel says (p.209), "The reason of the inefficiency
of synthesis is, that a knowledge of principles imply­
ing a knowledge of the particulars on which they are 
founded, principles and all abstract notions are 
difficult of comprehension and application to him who 
is unacquainted with those particulars."
Spencer states (p.90), Those who advocate the teach­
ing of formulas "have forgotten that a generalization 
is simple only in comparison with the whole mass of 
particular truths it comprehends —  that it is more 
complex than any one of these truths taken singly —  
that only after many of these simple truths have been 
acquired, does the generalization ease the memory and 
help the reason —  and that to a mind not possessing 
these single truths it is necessarily a mystery."
Of. also Marcel, p.210. "In a rational method we 
should follow the natural course of mental investiga­
tion; we should proceed from facts up to principles, 
and then from principles down to consequences; we 
should begin with analysis and conclude with synthesis."
f Note:
Quoted by Spencer, p.122.
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by the general principles previously specified. We 
believe that on examination they will be found not 
only to progress from the simple to the complex, 
from the indefinite to the definite, from the con­
crete to the abstract, from the empirical to the 
rational; but to satisfy the further requirements, 
that education shall be a repetition of civilization 
Tu little, that it shall be as much as possible a pro­
cess of self evolution, and that it shall be as pleas­
urable.”
The idea that the natural exercise of the faculties 
is pleasurable, that in consequence instruction which ac­
cords with the natural development of the mind will be 
pleasurable, and that ”a final test by which to judge any 
plan of culture” is its capacity for creating ”a pleasur­
able excitement in the pupils,” is also to be found in 
Marcel. Man, says Marcel, ”is the more prompted to ex­
ercise these faculties, the essential elements of his 
constitution, as their very action is a source of pleas­
ure to him, —  a pleasure which increases, as they are 
invigorated by exercise. A want thereby arises, the sat­
isfying of which calls for their constant activity. Thus 
has the Creator provided for their exercise, and pointed 
out to us the path we should follow. ^
^  Note: It is interesting to note the strong resemblance
which Marcel's next paragraph bears to what we have 
found to be the guiding principle of Spencer's 
"Social Statics”:- "Freedom is indispensable to man’s 
perfectibility; he has, in consequence, been created 
a free agent, and he claims from society, as his im— 
prescriptible right, that liberty of thought, of 
speech and of action, without which he could not cul­
tivate ’and completely unfold all his faculties. So 
deeply implanted is the innate sense of this right, 
that a^es of oppression and slavery have been unable 
to root it out of the human heart" -Marcel, I. pp.5-6. 
mrcel's book appeared three years after Spencer’s 
"Social Statics." Perhaps their indebtedness was
mutual.
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We have not yet exhausted the resemblances between 
Spencer and Marcel. For example, the idea of Spencer's 
opening paragraph, so often quoted, in which he draws a 
parallel between systems of education and social institu- 
ny-SO' Tions can be found in germ in Marcel. "It is consistent,” 
says the latter, "with despotic governments that the 
ferula of school tyrants should prepare children for the 
iron rod of their future political tyrants; but, in con­
stitutional countries where every individual enjoys the 
noble privilege of a free man, the child must not be early 
taught that brute force is a principle of government; he 
must not acquire notions and habits incompatible with the 
dignity and duty of a freeman.” "Along with political 
despotism," says Spencer, "stern in its commands, ruling
by force of terror, visiting trifling crimes with death, 
and implacable in its vengeance on the disloyal, there 
necessarily grew up an academic discipline similarly 
harsh — a discipline of multiplied injunctions and 
blows for every breach of them —  a discipline of un­
limited autocracy upheld by rods and ferules, and the 
black-hole. On the other hand, the increase of polit­
ical liberty, the abolition of laws restricting in­
dividual action, and the amelioration of the criminal 
code, have been accompanied by a kindred progress to­
wards non-coercive education: the pupil is hindered
by fewer restraints, and other means than punishment 
are used to govern him."
In his reference to the "eventual failure of juvenile 
 ^^  prodigies"; to "plans based on the spontaneous process
followed by the child in gaining its mother tongue"; to 
"that intensely stupid custom of teaching grammar to 
children"; to the employment of "the ball-frame for the 
first lessons in arithmetic"; to the need for teaching 
particular truths before the generalizations based on 
them- _ in all these respects Spencer shows further
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agreement with Marcel.
If, however, we have thus sought to trace the 
origin of Spencer*s views on educational method to a 
writer whom he names from time to time in his dis­
cussion, it is not with a view altogether to impugn his 
originality. As we have already remarked, the inference 
that Spencer felt the need in this essay of relying on 
previous writers is only partly justified. It happened 
that many of Marcel's suggestions fitted in well with 
Spencer's own views, or could be adapted to fit the gen­
eral view of evolution —  which included mental evolution 
— that was already taking shape in his mind. Spencer 
borrowed only what he approved; and in using Marcel he 
took care to pass over the letter's arguments for nation­
alising education, and for the teaching of language, 
literature and history. In one important respect, indeed, 
Spencer failed to.avail himself of Marcel's guidance.
The latter, apparently following Rousseau* is at pains to 
fioA^ cxJ, T  j> fi lay down the "four educational periods of youth" —  Infan­
cy (0-6), Childhood (6-12), Adolescence (12-16), Puberty 
(16-21) —  as a preliminary to the drawing up of the ap­
propriate courses of study. Spencer neglects altogether 
to specify the ages of the pupils he has in view —  a 
defect which, as we have seen, diminishes the value of 
his views on "VThat Knowledge is of Most Worth. " Spencer's
Note: It seems likely that the influence of Marcel,
himself a disciple of Rousseau, accounts for the 
similarity between many of Spencer's ideas and 
those of the "Emile."
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whole thought on education would have gained in effect­
iveness if he had kept the ages of the pupils constantly 
in view when he set down his recommendations for reform­
ing the content and method of instruction. But Spencer 
hardly ever thinks of education in terms of the child. 
Pestalozzi (1746-1827).
Spencer was unable to read German. Thus even if 
there had been no other source of information, we might 
have felt sure that it was an English work on Pestalozzi 
to which he had recourse. However, Biber's "Life of 
Pestalozzi" is one of the books which appear at the head 
of the original review-article on "The Art of Education" 
in "The North British Review" for 1854. On page 17 of 
his "Autobiography," Spencer makes reference to enquiries 
"some 40 years ago" which prompted a reference to Dr. 
Biber's "Life of Pestalozzi." The "Autobiography" was com­
pleted in 1894, exactly forty years after the first ap­
pearance of "The Art of Education." These two facts serve 
but to confirm the internal evidence of the essay itself. 
All Spencer's quotations from Pestalozzi are to be found 
I in Biber, and he also quotes Biber himself, though with-
acknowledgment.
The introduction of Pestalozzi's views is made mainly 
I for the purpose of criticising them. Spencer appears to
have made some enquiries regarding the success achieved by 
schools conducted on Pestalozzian principles, and to have 
been dissatisfied with the results. In 1848, having 
entertained the thought of "reverting to the ancestral 
profession" he had given consideration to a project for^*”^
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up, in company with his father, a Pestalozzian instit­
ute near Bath. The idea had been suggested to him by a 
similar institution near Derby, conducted by a Dr. 
Heldenmaier with whom his father had made acquaintance. 
Spencer’s idea was "not, indeed, to carry out the prin­
ciples of Pestalozzi, in particular, but to initiate an 
advanced form of education," especially in the sciences 
of mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc. This 
project fell through, but not before Spencer had made some 
enquiries. As Heldenmaier’s institute —  "a kind of Sng- 
lish Hofwyl" —  had been set up "a dozen or more years 
previously," Pestalozzi’s methods were apparently known 
to Spencer early in life. It is clear that they did not 
gain his unqualified approval. In "Intellectual Education" 
they meet with severe, though in the main just, criticism. 
Spencer’s strictures on the "Mother’s Manual", the con- 
I tents of which were known to him from Biber, are sound; as
is also his condemnation of Pestalozzi’s geography methods, 
though the latter criticism is merely repeated from Biber. 
yy. Spencer concludes that while Pestalozzi's principle "that 
alike in its order and its methods, education must conform 
to the natural process of mental evolution" is sound, his 
methods of applying the principle are faulty owing to his 
inadequate knowledge of psychology. Spencer therefore 
abandons Pestalozzi in order, following Marcel, to lay
down "certain guiding principles? which, failing the exist­
ence of a "rational psychology," make "empirical approxim­
ations towards a perfect scheme." Spencer is here more a
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Maroellian than a Pestalozzian.
Thomas Wyse (1791-1862).
In 1836 there was published at London "Education
''^ uJ tXiihat^ LA, .^V.
Reform; or, The Necessity of a National System of Educa- 
tion", Vol. I., by Thomas Wyse, Esq., M.P. This is the 
work which Spencer quotes on three occasions, twice in 
support of Marcel. His borrowings from Wyse are not 
I extensive. Apart from a rather long quotation designed
I / to exhibit "a rational mode of conveying primary concep-
I tions in geometry", there is little further evidence of
I
Spencer’s indebtedness to the Irish educational reformer. 
Wyse’s book is not nearly so comprehensive nor so well 
wofth attention as Marcel’s; and Spencer seems to have 
confined himself for the most part to the later authority.
General Criticism.
Having investigated the sources of Spencer’s views 
on educational method, we proceed to estimate their worth.
It is to be noted, in the first place, that the chap­
ter is rightly entitled "Intellectual Education." There 
is no attempt made to survey the whole process —  to show 
the right methods of teaching subjects such as music or 
literature which call for appreciation on the learner’s 
part, or to deal with the education of the hands or heart. 
In the case of the knowledge or information subjects, even, 
the illustrations are confined to object-lessons, nature- 
study and geometry; for it is to such subjects as these 
that Spencer’s "guiding principles" of method are most ap­
plicable. In this respect the chapter is really a fore-
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shadowing of the plea embodied in the first chapter for 
the teaching of science as the knowledge of most worth.
But even as an attempt to analyse the general prin­
ciples underlying the method of teaching science subject^, 
the chapter is disappointing. It is without doubt a sound 
principle that method must be based on the laws of mental 
development; but, as Spencer rightly points out, before 
that can be done, we must be in possession of an adequate 
psychology of mental development. This was certainly not 
at Spencer's service. "At present," he says, "we, have ac­
quired, on this point, only a few general notions. These 
general notions must be developed in detail —  must be 
transformed into a multitude of specific propositions, be­
fore we can be said to possess that science on which the 
art of education must be based." Even if Spencer's chapter 
had been based on his own psychology —  the subject which, 
he tells us, was then occupying his mind —  it would still 
have been of doubtful value, since Spencer's psychology is 
a very crude kind of mechanical associationism —  certain­
ly not an adequate basis for the construction of an educa­
tional method. As we have just seen, however, Spencer's 
recommendations are in the main taken from Marcel with 
just the adaptation necessary to bring them into accord 
with his principles of cosmic evolution.
It is a moot point whether a science of school method
* Note: "When he comes to deal with methods," says Archer, 
"Spencer finds his hands tied by the curriculum which he 
has already laid down." ("Secondary Education in the 
Nineteenth Century",p.122). The effectiveness of this 
comment is lost when it is recollected that the essay on 
"The Art of Education" (Chap.II of "Education") was writ­
ten in 1854. five years before "What Knowledge is of Most 
Worth?" (IQi^)•
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will ever be constructed. Individual differences are so 
great that teaching method must always be varied to suit 
the individualities of the pupils. Hence the need, which 
Spencer recognises, for an art of education as well as a 
science of education. Still, if we can discover the gen­
eral principles of cognition, we are in a better position 
to make application of psychology to the practical art of 
teaching.the subjects which aim at enlarging the pupils' 
knowledge. What is the value of Spencer's "guiding prin­
ciples" of cognition?
The Theory of Education: Mental Development.
(a) The Mind Develops from the Homogeneous to the
Heterogeneous.
This principle is Spencer's translation of Marcel's
"axiomatic truth" that method in education must proceed
from the simple to the complex. It is the application to 
Séencer^â
f ù v À mind of^h*» well-known definition of evolution as "an 
integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of :
motion; during which matter passes from an indefinite, in­
coherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogene­
ity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a 
parallel transformation." The statement is so general 
that, even granting its validity, it could afford little 
; practical help to the teacher. Spencer interprets it to
mean that in teaching we should proceed from "the single 
 ^ to the combined" not only in each subject but in "know­
ledge as a whole," beginning with but a few subjects 
and successively adding to them until finally we carry 
on all abreast. It hardly needs the heavy artillery of
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an evolution-formula, one may well think, to support 
this common-sense maxim.
(b) The Mind Develops from the Indefinite to 
the Definite.^
The experiences of the undeveloped mind are vague, 
lacking niceness of discrimination. Hence in teaching 
we should begin with crude notions, gradually making them 
clearer and clearer as experiences accrete until the defin­
itions of advanced knowledge are reached. These defin- 
itions lead up to scientific formulae, which "must be 
given only as fast as the conceptions are perfected."
This maxim like the first is of very limited practical 
value. It confuses the supposed mode of the mind's devel­
opment with the method of presentation in teaching. The 
teacher has generally to present definite ideas to the 
pupils and seek by illustrations and applications to make 
them clear. Thus it is equally true to say that the 
teacher should begin with definite knowledge and see that 
it is definitely apprehended by his pupils.
(c) The Genesis of Knowledge in the Individual 
follows the Same Course as the Genesis of Knowledge
in the Race.
The assumption made here is that characteristics ac- J 
quired by individual members of the human race in the :
past are passed on to their descendants; or, in particular, 
hu.,{j.cr/ that since there has been "an order in which the human 
race has mastered its various kinds of knowledge, there 
will arise in every child an aptitude to acquire these
kinds of knowledge in the same order." The assumption
^Note:This second principle does not appear in the origin­
al article on "The Art of Education" in "The North 
British Review" for 1854. It was added by Spencer,
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is highly doubtful. Even if it were true, it would 
obviously be a very uneconomic procedure to carry ihe 
child through the process by which scientific knowledge 
has been won in the course of humanity’s development.
The education of the individual is largely a process of 
"short-circuiting", not a "repetition of civilization in 
little." No one wou^d think, for example, of teaching 
alchemy before chemistry, astrology before astronomy, 
phrenology before psychology, or the Roman system of 
notation before the Arabic. The child, furthermore, is 
a child, not an adult in miniature. His interests are 
not those of the adult whether savage or civilised. Hence 
the knowledge suitable for a child is not the same as that 
which appeals to the adult. In any case, there is no 
reason to suppose that the mind of a child of to-day is 
essentially different in constitution from the mind of a 
child of two thousand or ten thousand years ago. liYhat is 
vastly different is the social heritage, the environment 
of ideas and ideals by which the modern individual is 
surrounded. Spencer, having stated that "in deciding upon 
the right method of education, an inquiry into the method 
of civilization will help to guide us," proceeds to state 
as one of the conclusions to which such an inquiry leads 
that every study should have a purely experimental intro-
when, in 1861, the four essays were collected to form 
the book on "Education: Intellectual, Moral, and 
Physical!?. It is another echo of the famous defin­
ition of evolution. First Principles originally 
appeared in 1862.
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duotion. Either his knowledge of the history of science 
was seriously at fault, or —  more likely —  he is mere­
ly attempting to bolster up a favourite idea by wrapping 
it around in high-sounding phrases. The genesis of know­
ledge in the individual must be radically different from 
the genesis of knowledge in the race if civilization is 
to be maintained, and even more if it is to be advanced. 
The Theory of Education: Principles of Method.
From the laws of mental development Spencer descends 
to more strictly practical maxims of method.
(a) Proceed from the Concrete to the Abstract.
■ This maxim is a corollary of the principle that we 
should proceed from the simple to the complex. It means 
in practice that "the mind should be introduced to prin- 
ciples through the medium of examples." Following Marcel, 
Spencer points out that generalizations are simple only 
in comparison with the whole mass of particular truths 
they comprehend, but are difficult of comprehension to a 
mind which does not possess a store of the single truths 
they embody. Spencer's example is found earlier in the 
9Vi4., . Chapter, where he points to the abandonment of "that in­
tensely stupid custom of teaching grammar to children."
The advice is sound in the main, although there may be 
occasions when teaching may begin by laying down a prin­
ciple and explaining it by examples. Like the other max­
ims, this one is too general to be of much help in plan­
ning instruction in any particular subject.
(b) Proceed from the Empirical to the Rational.
y Spencer deduces this maxim from his "Inquiry into
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the method of civilization." It is merely a variant 
of the preceding maxim —  from the concrete to the 
abstract —  and, like it, is exemplified by the "modern
! jf'ff 2.
course of placing grammar, not before language, but after 
it." "During human progress," says Spencer, "every 
science is evolved out of its corresponding art," and he 
concludes, again rather unhistorically, that every study 
should have a purely experimental introduction. As a 
guide to teaching, the advice is no more helpful than be­
fore.
(c) Encourage the Process of Self-development 
to the Uttermost.
In justification of this maxim, the recommendation 
of which by Marcel confirmed Spencer's own personal ex­
perience of it, Spencer makes the doubtful assertion that 
j).(^3 "humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction."
Children, he says, "should be told as little as possible, 
and induced to discover as much as possible." This is 
one of many agreements between Spencer and Rousseau —  
agreements produced through the intermediary of Marc el, 
whose language in many places is simply a free translation 
of the'"6iile'? Like the heuristic method, as later elabor­
ated, the maxim is not of universal application. It suits 
best the science subjects, though even with them it may 
lead to an unnecessary waste of time if it is honestly 
applied. It is least applicable to the humanities. Man­
kind has not progressed solely by self-instruction; and 
children would make no progress in their education if 
they were left to find out everything for themselves.
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Self-aotivity, indeed, is necessary in all learning, 
but there may be self-activity in the mastery of other 
people's ideas as well as in discovery of them anew for 
oneself.
(d) See that your Instruction creates a Pleasur­
able Excitement in your Pupils.
This means, in other words, that all instruction 
should be made interesting to the pupils. The maxim, as 
we have seen, was commended to Spencer by the experience 
of his own education, which was marked by the absence of 
coercion and the encouragement of self-activity. It re­
mained only to justify it by connecting it with the 
h c o \ ^ T  5~. natural development of the mind. Marcel had pointed out 
that the activity of the faculties is naturally pleasur­
able; and Spencer applies the converse by pointing out 
that the test of the’naturalness’ of any method or ar­
rangement of studies is its capacity for arousing pleasure 
or interest. So far as the instruction of quite young 
children is concerned, the interest-test is sound. The 
problem is not so simple where older pupils are concerned. 
There may be subjects which it is necessary to teach, but 
which do not arouse immediate interest. A certain amount 
of coercion in education may be justified. Spencer appears 
realise this. "It is true," he tells us, "that some of
/kf. fi-?.
the higher mental powers, as yet but little developed 
in the race, and congenitally possessed in any con­
siderable degree only by the most advanced, are indis­
posed to the amount of exertion required of them. But 
these, in virtue of their very complexity, will, in a 
normal course of culture, come last into exercise; and 
will therefore have no demands made on them until the 
pupil has arrived at an age when ulterior motives can 
be brought into play, and an indirect pleasure made to 
counterbalance a direct pleasure."
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Apart from the assumption of faculties "congenitally 
possessed" as a result of ancestral experience, the view 
is sound that with older pupils indirect motives may take 
the place of direct motives. Otherwise expressed, this 
means that older pupils are capable of volitional atten­
tion, and are fit for "work" —  in the psychological sense 
of the term —  as distinct from "play."
together
Perhaps the best comment on Spencer's maxims taken^ 
that made by Quick with reference to Marcel's axiomatic 
truths of methodology: "I confess they bring into my
mind the advice given to a learner in billiards: 'V/hen in 
doubt cannon and pocket the red.' First catch your 'Method 
of Nature,’ as Mrs. Glass might have said." The beginner at 
teaching is not made much the wiser by being told to pro­
ceed from the simple to the complex, from the empirical 
to the rational, from the concrete to the abstract; or to 
make the mode and arrangement of his instruction accord 
with the education of mankind considered historically.
The weakness of such abstract and general principles lies 
in the difficulty of interpreting them and of applying 
them to the actual process of teaching any particular 
subject.
The Practice of Education, 
ït was doubtless a consciousness of this weakness 
which led Spencer to "pass from the theory of education to 
( BcUcoà^''} practice of it", with the two-fold object of exempli-
fying his guiding principles and of "making sundry specific
suggestions."
Sense-Training.
Spencer agrees with Pestalozzi that education
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should begin from the cradle, but differs from him in 
the application of the idea. Citing from Biber the 
case of spelling, he criticises Pestalozzi's analysis of 
the elements of language into its constituent sounds, 
which are to be repeated to the infant in the cradle. 
Spencer, following "the course which psychology dictates," 
finds that the earliest impressions which the mind can 
assimilate are the undecomposable sensations produced by 
resistance, light, sound, etc. These, according to Spen­
cer, must form the elements of instruction. Beginning 
thus with different degrees and kinds of resistance, dif­
ferent amounts and qualities of light, differences in 
pitch, timbre and loudness of sound, we shall be following 
the "necessary law of progression from the simple to the 
complex."
In criticism of this we may in our turn cite Spen­
cer's criticism of Pestalozzi and say that his notions of 
early mental development are too crude to enable him to 
devise judicious plans of instruction. The whole realm 
of cognition can no doubt be shown to be based upon the 
elements oftsensation; but the sensations are elements 
only for the analytical psychologist: they are not nec­
essarily elements for the child. It is an old point in 
psychology that a pure sensation is never perceived. As 
soon as the mind becomes conscious of experiences, it 
has reached up at least to the level of perception, and 
perhaps beyond. Hence it is psychologically unsound to 
begin instruction by a formal training of the senses, 
even if such a "training" be possible.
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We need not follow in detail Spencer's remarks on 
the advisability of encouraging the child to familiarise 
itself with its physical environment. On the whole they 
are sound enough, although they were better expressed by 
Rousseau a century before Spencer published his book,
Object-Lessons.
Spencer's contribution to the method of giving object- 
lessons, "which manifestly form a natural continuation of 
this primary culture of the senses", is his insistence that 
the child should be told as little as possible and encour­
aged to discover as much as possible for himself. By this 
method, he tells us, the mother is simply aiding self­
evolution, which corresponds with the process displayed in 
the evolution of humanity. Otherwise, Spencer accepts the 
then current practice of the Pestalozzians of giving les­
sons on the attributes of objects, —  hardness, softness, 
colour, taste, size, etc., —  together with their names.
His justification of this training in perception is that 
. in later life "when there are no longer teachers at hand,
the observations and inferences hourly required for guid- j 
ance, must be made unhelped; and success in life depends I 
upon the accuracy and completeness with which they are j
made."
Nature-Study. :
Passing to nature-study, which he regards as inter­
mediate between object-lessons and the investigations of 
the naturalist and the man of science, Spencer draws large- i 
ly on his own early experiences for his suggestions. From i 
the mere collecting of wild-flowers, pebbles and shells, ,
331.
the child is to pass to an elementary study of botany 
and entomology. He is to be shown how to preserve bot­
anical specimens and be supplied with the apparatus needed 
for keeping the larvae of the common butterflies and moths 
' through their transformations —  "a practice which, as we
can personally testify, yields the highest gratification."*" 
Those pursuits serve as an admirable introduction to the 
study of physiology, and in addition open up a world of 
beauty to the trained observer. More important than any 
other knowledge whatever, they afford the young observer a 
knowledge of the laws of life, which underlie not only all
Note: How this nature-study appealed to one of Spencer’s 
little disciples appears from the following instructive 
and amusing passage:
"To the children of the household the philosopher 
always appeared in the guise of a liberator. His de­
lightful axiom 'submission not desirable’ was adorned 
and pointed by detailed criticism of the ways of gov­
ernesses and other teachers: 'stupid persons who taught 
irrelevant facts in an unintelligible way’, a criticism 
which made even my mother uneasy, and which infuriated 
the old-fashioned dame who presided for many years over 
the activities of the schoolroom. 'You can go out this 
morning, my dears, with Mr Spencer,* said the governess 
to her pupils, after listening with pursed up lips to 
one of the philosopher's breakfast tirades against dis­
cipline, 'and mind you follow his teaching and do ex­
actly what you have a mind to.' Whether due to an'un­
desirable submissiveness' to the governess or to a 
ready acquiescence in the doctrine of revolt, the phil­
osopher found himself presently in a neighbouring 
beech-wood pinned down in a leaf-filled hollow by little 
demons, all legs, arms, grins and dancing dark eyes, 
whilst the elder and more discreet tormentors pelted 
him with decaying beech leaves. 'Your children are 
r-r-r-rude children,' exclaimed the Man versus the State 
as he stalked into my mother's boudoir. But for the 
most part he and we were firm friends: we agreed with 
his denunciation of the 'current curriculum’, history, 
foreign languages, music and drawing, and his preference 
for 'science' —  a term which meant, in practice, scour­
ing the countryside in his company for fossils, flowers 
and water-beasties which, alive, mutilated or dead, 
found their way into hastily improvised acquariams, cab­
inets and scrap-books —  all alike discarded when his 
visit was over. Speaking for myself, I was never inter­
ested in these collections of animate and inanimate
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bodily and mental processes, but by implication all the 
transactions of the house and the street, all commerce,all 
politics, all morals. In a word, science, beginning with 
nature-study, is the knowledge of most worth, as leading to 
those great generalizations by which actions may be rightly 
guided. Here in a paragraph we have the thesis of Spencerfe 
first chapter, written five years after the present essay.
Drawing,
Spencer has much to say on the subject of drawing. It 
should begin with the spontaneous attempts made by child­
ren to depict the comiuon objects and animals of their en­
vironment. Colour being, in Spencer's opinion, psycholog­
ically prior to form, practice in colouring ought not to 
be postponed until after "a dreary discipline of copying 
lines." Colouring "should be continually employed as 
the natural stimulus to the mastery of the comparatively 
difficult and unattractive form." Spencer's psychology in 
this case does not seem to be quite sound. Discrimination 
of colour as a mental experience precedes perception of 
form; but children’s first efforts at drawing consist of 
attempts to render form in outline. Spencer is on less 
disputable ground when he advises that the objects chosen 
for the child’s imitation should be real. He condemns the 
practice of drawing from copies: "and still more so that 
formal discipline in making straight lines and curved lines 
and compound lines, with which it is the fashion of some 
teachers to begin." The teaching of such a^grammar of 
form’ which was usual among the Pestalozzians, violates
things, even when looked at through his microscope or 
pulled to pieces by teasers." — Mrs.Beatrice Webb, "My 
Apprenticeship." pp.25-26.
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all the guiding principles of method: it begins with 
the definite instead of the indefinite, the abstract in­
stead of the concrete, the rational instead of the em­
pirical; and is the counterpart of beginning a language 
by learning its grammar.. Drawing lessons will lead up 
to a mastery of the principles of perspective; and Spen­
cer concludes his discussion of this subject by suggesting 
an apparatus for teaching perspective experimentally. Run­
ning through the whole passage is the assumption that the 
main object of teaching drawing is to develop the "facult­
ies" of observation, perception and colour, and to give a 
training in the powers of manipulation. No stress is laid 
on drawing as an aid to appreciation or as a means of self- 
expression. Perspective is to be taught so that a pupil 
may learn "the true theory of a picture (namely, that it
f>. f a.
is a delineation of objects as they appear when projected 
on a plane placed between them and the eye)"; and empirical 
perspective is to culminate in scientific perspective. It 
should be remembered in this connection that Spencer’s ac­
quaintance with the "true theory of a picture" was an al­
most insuperable barrier to his appreciation of its 
aesthetic merits.
Geometry.
Geometry is to have a purely empirical introduction
^^,^124-30 ' after the method suggested by Wyse. It is to begin with 
pe/L A. ra.
> f solids and progress to the drawing of plane figures,
rectangles, circles and the like. The pupil is then to 
be practised in testing the correctness of figures drawn 
by the eye, as artisans have to do. In this way the learn-
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ing of geometry follows the development of geometrical 
ideas in the history of the race, since geometry origin­
ated in the need of accurate measurements of areas, 
foundations of buildings, etc. Like the primitive builder, 
the child will be limited at first to tentative processes 
of measurement which will constitute a "valuable discip- 
' line of the perceptions." "If," says Spencer, "in the
early civilization of the child, as in the early civiliz­
ation of the race, science is valued only as ministering 
to art; it is manifest that the proper preliminary to 
geometry, is a long practice in thoæ constructive pro­
cesses which geometry will facilitate." Later on the 
time arrives for "empirical geometry; that is —  geometry 
dealing with methodical solutions but not with the demon­
strations of them." The method as far as practicable is 
9 ^  jy US' to be that of discovery. "To bisect a line, to erect a
perpendicular, to describe a square, to bisect an angle, 
to draw a line parallel to a given line, to describe a 
hexagon, are problems which a little patience will enable 
[the pupil] to find out." Here Spencer draws upon his 
own successful experience as a teacher to illustrate the 
feasibility of his method, and refers for further particu­
lars to his father’s little book on "Inventional Geometry." 
This empirical geometry is to be continued along with 
other studies for years and is to culminate in rational 
geometry as in Euclid accompanied by the solving of such 
problems as are to be found appended to the successive 
books of Chambers’s"Euclid." This self-help will not only 
be of intellectual value, but will help to provide a
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moral discipline.
Conclusion.
Here ends Spencer's illustrations of his guiding 
principles of method, and his'feundry specific suggestions." 
To have continued them further would, he thinks, have 
been to write a detailed treatise on education, which he 
did not propose to do. He concludes the essay by once 
more drawing the reader's attention to two of the princip­
les which he ragards as most important and least attended 
to, namely, the principles that all education should be a 
process of self-instruction, and that it should be pleas­
urable. Self-discovery ensures a firmer mastery of the 
knowledge gained, and at the same time provides a valuable 
moral discipline by calling for courage in attacking dif­
ficulties, patient concentration of the attention, and 
perseverance through failures —  qualities which after­
life specially requires.
Spencer’s reason for limiting his examples to sense- 
training, object-lessons, nature-study, drawing and geo­
metry may have been, as he says, to avoid writing a detail­
ed treatise on method; but it is rather significant, es­
pecially in view of his later essay, "What Knowledge is of 
Most Worth?", that he chooses only such subjects as lend 
themselves easily to experimental and investigational 
teaching, and appear to conform well to the guiding prin­
ciples which for Spencer constitute the theory of school 
method.
It is even more significant,in view of Spencer's 
inveterate individualism,to note the omissions from his
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list. There is no mention of reading, writing, com­
position, history, music or literature. In the case of 
these subjects, which cannot readily be taught by the 
process of self-discovery, it is much more difficult to 
find examples of a progress from the simple to the com­
plex, the empirical to the rational, the concrete to the 
abstract, and so on. They do not embody truths which the 
pupil can discover for himself or verify experimentally. 
The ideas dealt with in the history or literature lesson 
must be taken on trust: they have their justification in 
the social experience of the race. Spencer distrusts soci­
ety and its products: he has little respect for authority: 
the knowledge of most worth for him is the organised know­
ledge of science. Hence it is much more congenial to him 
to select the subjects which appeal to his love of science 
and to neglect the humanistic subjects, which find due . 
place in the work of Spencer's authority, Claude Marcel.
Even as an essay on method in science-teaching, the 
chapter is of no great value. The recitation of a number 
of ambiguous general maxims, which are supposed to have 
psychological justification, is an inadequate analysis of 
the learning mind, and of little practical value for the 
planning of instruction or the teaching of a particular 
lesson. Had it been written in a style less graphic, or 
been the work of a lesser man than Herbert Spencer, the 
essay would long ago have ceased to attract attention in 
the literature on education.
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CHAPTER XIV.
CONCLUSION.
Popularity of "Education: Intellectual,
Moral, and Physical,"
Whatever may be thought of Spencer's actual influ­
ence on educational theory or practice, there can be 
no doubt about the very great popularity enjoyed by his 
essays on Education, His article on"What Knowledge is 
of Most Worth?", despite its anonymity, at once attract­
ed attention. Spencer's American friend, Professor 
E.L. Youmans, recognising the authorship, desired to 
include it along with another essay of Spencer's in a 
book, "Modern Culture; its True Aims and Requi:^ents"
QujU  (London, 1867), which he intended to bring out. "I
"Jui.
concluded, "he wrote to Spencer, "before I had read a 
 ^ page of it that you wrote it: the full perusal strength-
ened conviction". Spencer, however, having had the
h-v.
intention from the outset of including the four Review 
articles in a book, withheld his permission. By 1878, 
when the first cheap edition was published, "Education: 
Intellectual, Moral,and Physical" had been translated 
into French, German, Italian, Russian, Hungarian, Dutch 
and Danish"; by 1884, there had been added versions in
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Spanish, Swedish, Bohemian, Greek, Japanese and Chinese; 
and since then there have been translations Into several 
of the languages of India. Spencer was specially ploaeud 
when he learned that the first chapter which the Greeks 
had chosen to translate (1880) was "What Knowledge Is of 
Most Worth?" —  "Anomalous enough! While in England the 
educational authorities cry 'Greek Literature rather than 
Science’, in Greece they cry 'Science rather than Greek 
Literature'." —  On the other hand, he raised no objection 
to a proposal of the French Minister of Education to pre­
pare for official distribution a translation of "Educa­
tion" from which the first chapter should be omitted, be- 
yond stipulating that the extent and nature of the part 
omitted should be specified in the preface. As late as 
1901, Spencer was "both 'surprised and gratified' by an 
application from Mr. Brant-8ero (an Iroquois) for per­
mission to translate "Education" into the Mohawk language," 
8o much for the dissemination of his views abroad.
At home the "Education" was very widely read, especially 
after Spencer had achieved fame through his labours on 
the Synthetic Philosophy, In 1884, "The Journal of 
Education" offered its readers a prize'for the best list 
of the seven greatest living English Educ&tionistsI 
Bpeacer hoaded the list to which the prize was awarded aaP 
also polled the highest number of votes. The issue of a 
cheap edition of the'Education" in 1*78 and of a slzpenny 
edition by the
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R.P*A. in 1903 (to which Spencer*s consent had been 
obtained the previous year) betoken the continued 
popularity of the work.
Limited Extent of Spencer's Influence.
Yet despite wide spread knowledge of Spencer's views, 
it is doubtful whether they exerted any very great influenee 
on educational thought or practice. Spencer has not 
succeeded in founding any school of philosophy; and his 
views on education remain characteristic of Spencer him­
self rather than of any influential body of disciples.
His educational doctrine is of interest and value as an 
ex%ample of how a man's philosophy, especially his social 
philosophy, influences his educational outlook, rather 
than as an expression of any widely held point of view 
of his own age. Indeed, his individualist standpoint 
is more typical of the eighteenth century than of the 
nineteenth century. Individualism and the laissez- 
faire attitude towards State intervention persisted,it is 
true,into the nineteenth century; but Spencer's champion­
ship of them was upheld by only a few individual follow­
ers (for example, Auberon Herbert); and they had ceased 
to be quite typical of English thought even when Spencer 
puplished that early confession of his faith,
"Social Statics" (1850).
What helped to give "Education: Intellectual,
Moral, and Physical" its popularity was that soon after 
he published the book, Spencer began to gain a reputation 
as the philosopher of evolution; the appearance of
343.
"The Origin of Species" in 1859 having the effect of
making Evolution the gospel of science throughout the
remainder of the century. Even those who did not care
to tackle the Synthetic Philosophy, or who were offended
by Spencer's rationalism,could at least read the
philosopher's little book on Education with ease and
often with approval. Another cause of the book's
popularity was the excellence of its expository style.
Spencer is a lucid ,interesting and, despite frequent
logical fallacies, a convincing writer.
The Value and Opportuneness of Spencer's Plea for
Physical Education.
Of the four chapters of the "Education", the last, 
on Physical Education, is least open to criticism.
Spencer did good service by insisting on the claims of 
the body at a time when physical education was in danger 
of being neglected even in the great public schools, and 
when much harm was being done to the nation's physique 
by the conditions under which children were living in 
the industrial towns* The lesson which Spencer taught 
in 1859, that "to be a nation of good animals is the first 
condition to national prosperity", was not thoroughly 
learned until two wars had made it disastrously clear 
to the people of this country that modern industrial 
conditions were pressing heavily on the nation's man­
hood and womanhood. But it is significant of how far 
we have departed from Spencer's views in other respects 
that it was left to the State to organise measures for
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the medical inspection of school children and the treat­
ment of physical defects as part of a national system of 
aompulsory education*
Science Enters the School,
Though it has been perhaps the most criticised of 
all the essays, the one which forms the first chapter 
of the "Education" has contributed most to Spencer's 
reputation as an educationist and is probably the best 
known of the four. It is Spencer's plea for the 
recognition of Science as the most valuable of all the 
subjects of instruction. Alfred Russell Wallace has 
called the nineteenth century the "Wonderful Century" 
on account of the advances made in scientific knowledge 
and its applications. A growing interest in science 
was manifest from the middle of the century onwards; and 
there was increasing recognition of the need for reform­
ing the school curriculum so as to bring it more into 
touch with modern requirements. But Spencer's plea for 
science as the knowledge of most worth is too one - sided 
to be considered a typical statement of the aims of the 
educational reformers. "When the essay was v/ritten'^859}, 
 ^ he tells us, " its leading thesis, that the teaching of the
classics should give place to the teaching of science, was 
regarded by nine out of ten cultivated people as simply 
monstrous. Even now [1894] changed though the general 
feeling is, more space for science is but reluctantly 
yielded; and in such places as public schools is still 
very small". It was perhaps natural that a man like 
Spencer should seek to challenge the monopoly held by
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the classics in secondary education by boldly trying to 
displace them altogether and substitute science. And 
no doubt there was need for some such arresting challenge 
to disturb the conservatism of the schools. But once 
the gauntlet had been thus violently thrown down and the 
battle joined, the more moderate demand of such men as 
Tyndall, Huxley or Buskin and of actual teachers like 
J.M. Wilson^ Science Master at Rugby, carried greater 
weight than the more extreme and more intolerant views 
of Spencer. Huxley, for example, was free from that bias 
against literary culture which disfigured Spencer's present-
" A . -ation of the case for science. Huxley would have 
A/f- U.
h (lŸî-x) included in the curriculum for "every English child"
reading, writing and drawing; the elements of physical 
science; the elements of the theory of morals and of 
political and social life; the history of our ovm country 
treated as part of the history of civilisation; incidental
-4-
geography; English literature and composition: translations
^ Note: See Essay VI, "On Teaching Natural Science in Schools," 
of "Essays on a Liberal Education", Edited by F.W.
Farrar, (London, 1867.). Wilson gave evidence before 
the Royal Commission on Scientific Instruction (1871-5): 
(Sixth Report). See Turner, "History of Science Teaching 
in England," pp.92 and 96.
Note: "I have said before, and I repeat it here, that if a
man cannot get literary culture of the highest kind out 
of his Bible, and Chaucer, and Shakespeare, and Milton, 
and Hobbes, and Bishop Berkeley, to mention only a few 
of our illustrious writers —  I say, if he cannot get it 
out of those writers, he cannot get it out of anything; 
and I would assuredly devote a large portion of the time 
of every English child to the careful study of the models 
of English writing of such varied and wonderful kind as 
we possess, and, what is still more important and still 
more neglected, the habit of using that language with 
precision, with force, and with art." — Huxley, "Science 
and Education", p.185.
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of ancient and modern foreign literary masterpieces; 
and lastly music or painting. For the few who were able 
to spend more time on education, he would have added one 
or two foreign languages, preferably Latin and German. 
Spencer, on the other hand, wished the pupil to master 
the cardinal principles not of one science only but of 
all sciences, and he would have reformed the curriculum by 
excluding the classics altogether and by reducing liter­
ary instruction to a minimum.
The schools certainly needed reforming when Spencer
wrote his article. Even in 1859, there was still much
truth in Huxley’s picture: "If," says Huxley, "I am to
understand by that term [literary education] the edu­
cation that was current in the great majority of 
middle-class schools, and upper schools too, in this 
country when I was a boy, and which consisted absolute­
ly and almost entirely in keeping boys for eight or 
ten years at learning the rules of Latin and Greek 
grammar, construing certain Latin and Greek authors, 
and possibly making verses which, had they been Eng­
lish verses, would have been condemned as abominable 
doggerel, —  if that is what you mean by liberal educa­
tion, then I say it is scandalously insufficient and 
almost worthless. My reason for saying so is not 
from the point of view of science at all, but from the 
point of view of literature. I say the thing professes 
to be literary education that is not a literary educa­
tion at all. It was not literature at all that was 
taught, but science in a very bad form. It is quite 
obvious that grammar is science and not literature.
The analysis of a text by the help of the rules of 
grammar is just as much a scientific operation as the 
analysis of a chemical compound by the help of the 
rules of chemical analysis. There is nothing that 
appeals to the aesthetic faculty in that operation; 
and I ask multitudes of men of my own age, who went 
through this process, whether they ever had a concep­
tion of art or literature until they obtained it for 
themselves after leaving school?"
But by 1859 a beginning had been made towards recognising
the claims of science to a place on the school curriculum.
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and owing to the continued agitation of scientists, 
Spencer included, and others interested, the study of 
science has gradually come to be regarded as forming an 
essential part of a liberal education. It is now recog­
nised that an education which does not comprise some 
study of science and some appreciation of the scientific 
outlook is incomplete as a preparation for life in a 
great industrial State. Science, moreover, is itself be­
ing "humanised", and in consequence of this there has 
taken place a softening of the antagonism between the 
sciences and the humanities.
Due place began to be given to science as a subject 
of study in University and school about the middle of the 
century. In 1851, the Natural Science Tripos was founded 
at Cambridgd, and two years later the Honours School for 
Natural Science was instituted at Oxford. In 1853, the 
Department of Science and Art was set up; and in 1856 it 
was removed from the charge of the Board of Trade and 
placed under the Committee of Council on Education. It 
first of all established Science Schools in various tovms 
and later began to give grants in aid of science classes 
held in connection with existing schools. The Public 
Schools Commission recommended in 1864 that all boys 
should receive instruction in one branch at least of
^One example may be found in the volume, edited by 
E.L. Youmans and published simultaneously in Britain 
and America, entitled "Modern Culture: its True Aims 
and Requirements." (London, 1867.).
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Natural Science, preferably either chemistry and physics, 
on the one hand, or comparative physiology and natural 
history, on the other. In 1866, a committee of the 
British Association (founded, 1831) examined the question 
of the teaching of science in schools and drew a useful 
distinction between scientific information and scientific 
training. In 1867, the Education Department first recog­
nised natural science as a subject of instruction in the 
upper classes of elementary schools. From 1871 to 1875 
the Royal Commission on Scientific Instruction issued a 
series of reports recommending the inclusion of scientif­
ic teaching in all grades of education. And so by the 
end of the century. Science had ceased to be the Cinder­
ella in the family of knowledges, condemned to be a house­
hold drudge, in order that the Humanities, her haughty 
sisters,might flaunt their fripperies in the eyes of the 
world. For this reestimation of scholastic values, Spen­
cer deserves a due measure of credit.
Spencer’s Views on Method too Formal.
Spencer’s contribution to the establishing of an 
adequate Method in Education is less noteworthy than 
either of the two chapters previously noticed. The first 
of the four essays on Education to be written, it depends 
closely on the.work of Claude Marcel, although it is 
ostensibly a restatement of Pestalozzi's doctrine of 
Anschauung. Spencer has little to add to the methods he 
found good in his own education. And apart from the 
formulation of sundry general processes thought by him to
be characteristic of mental development, and the deducing
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from them of one or two maxims of method, what Spencer 
has to say about the process of instruction and the sub­
jects likely to arouse the self-activity of the learner 
had been better said by Rousseau; from whom indeed the 
ideas had descended to Spencer at second-hand. In his 
personal intercourse with the few children with whom he 
was intimate Spencer appears to have been quite popular; 
and he was successful during his brief experience as a 
teacher; but it seems that his theories did not always 
work out well in practice. Himself a bachelor, and dur­
ing childhood cut off from almost all contact with those 
of his own age, Spencer had too little Insight into the 
child mind. His educational writings, unlike those of 
Rousseau, are not marked by any strong sympathy with the 
child's point of view: they are more logical than psycho­
logical.
Spencer's Views on Moral Education marred by his
Individualism and Naturalistic Standpoint.
Although Spencer, like most of the educational writers 
of his time, was interested in moral education, his in­
dividualism and his naturalistic philosophy proved insup­
erable obstacles to a fruitful understanding of the 
nature of morality or to the formulation of any adequate 
theory of punishment. Distrusting society and its re­
straints, he looks to physical Nature for guidance and to 
natural consequences as the proper punishment for wrong­
doing. The result is a completely negative theory of 
moral discipline based upon impersonal punishment. The 
theory, however, breaks down even in the author's oivn
350.
"iJzLuy?,..
P'*7'
exposition of it. Behind it lies Spencer's early ac­
quired and persistently maintained belief in "natural 
rights" and the "law" of equal freedom.
Unrelenting Antagonism towards National 
Education.
On the question of National Education Spencer's mind 
was made up at the age of 2 2, when he published the 
Letters on the Proper Sphere of Government in the "Non­
conformist." Society in his opinion is a 'growth and not 
a manufacture’; but government is an artificial institu­
tion which ought to be restricted within the narrowest 
possible limits. It never occurs to him that government 
may be a natural "organ" of society, or that State inter­
ference may be a "natural" process making for the greater 
"integration" of the "social organism." In the matter of 
education, Spencer expects the individual parent to be a 
better judge of what is suitable for his children than the 
collective wisdom of the State as expressed by a popular­
ly elected Parliament acting through carefully chosen and 
highly trained officials; he would trust the parent "to 
decide whether his children should learn to read and 
write or should spend all their youthful days toiling 
underground in the mines". The Education Acts passed 
since 1870 have certainly "interfered" with many persons 
— if there had been no need for interference, there would 
have been no Acts —  but they have helped to secure for 
all children the minimum amount of schooling without which 
individual development would be stunted and such social 
progress as has been made in the last half century would
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not have been possible.
Spencer's continually uttered warnings against the 
dangers and shortcomings of bureaucracy, educational 
bureaucracy included, should, however, be counted to his 
credit. "No one can read Spencer," we may agree with 
j ÿ ''/* Professor Barker, "without learning a lesson which it is
good to learn, that the State after all only acts through 
the finite intelligence of its officials. We must not 
expect more from it than we expect from our own equally 
finite intelligence." But neither should we expect less 
from it; and we are certainly not without good reason for 
thinking that the intelligence of the "State" is at least 
as good as the average intelligence of the individuals 
who compose it, and better than the intelligence of the 
poorest^ who stand to benefit most by its "interference."
In any case, Spencer has few followers nowadays in 
the lifelong campaign which he kept up against State edu­
cation. No one will dare to claim that all the expect­
ations of the early reformers have been realised: every 
ill of the body politic has not been cured. But it is 
ggW'VkvW surely "irrationally sanguine" for anyone to think that:
* "If there had been no compulsory education, the bulk of 
the people would still have been educated in private 
schools. Only the surplus of the population would have 
remained unable to read or write; and there are only too 
many occupations where reading and writing are unnecessary. 
The immense taxation on account of education would have
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been non-existent* and the money so saved would have 
gone to stimulate industry and added to the capital of 
the country."
General Estimate.
To say that Spencer's was "probably one of the 
greatest minds the world has ever known" is a gross 
overstatement; and it is hardly more true to say that 
he was "the only educational writer of (his] country to 
make much impression on the times," Spencer was a great 
généraliser, fertile in inventing theories capable of 
comprehending large masses of facts; but he was too 
often content to generalise on insufficâent knowledge;*^ 
and he appears to have been uncritical of the "facts" 
which were supplied to him. Mrs. Beatride Webb, for ex­
ample, tells of how she used, out of curiosity about the 
working of his mind, to invent illustrations for Spencer 
of the "laws" which he had formulated in the course of 
hasty reading or limited observation, and of how "he was 
the most gullible of mortals and never scrutinised the 
accuracy of my tales." Spencer's own later account* "^"^of
Would the private schools for "the bulk of the people 
have supplied education free?
^  Of., for a neatly told example of this, Galton's story 
of the tragedy of the 'slaying of a beautiful deduction 
by an ugly fact' in Duncan, "Life and Letters of Herbert 
Spencer," p.502. Of. also "Feeling versus Intellect", 
("Facts and Comments.'9
ttDuncan, pp.417-19.
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his methods of work bears out the reported reply of 
g.  ^ Huxley (1887) to the suggestion that Spencer "had worked
out the theory of evolution by grasping the disjointed 
theories of his time and welding them into one." "'No,’
said Huxley, ’Spencer never knew them: he elaborated his 
theory from his inner consciousness. He is the most or­
iginal of thinkers, though he has never invented a new 
thought. He never reads: merely picks up what will help 
him to illustrate his theories. He is a great construct­
or: the form he has given to his gigantic system is en­
tirely original: not one of the component factors is new, 
but he has not borrowed them’." This judgement is fur­
ther confirmed by a character sketch contributed by 
Francis Galton, that very shrewd and competent observer 
of human nature and of the workings of the mind.*
Note:."If you ask," Spencer wrote to Leslie Stephen in 
1899, "how there comes such an amount of incorporated 
fact as is found in "Social Statics," my reply is that 
when preparing to write it I read up in those directions 
in which I expected to find materials for generalization. 
I did not trouble myself with the generalizations of 
others.
And that indeed indicates my general attitude. All 
along I have looked at things through my own eyes and 
not through the eyes of others. I believe that it is in 
some measure because I have gone direct to Nature, and 
have escaped the warping influences of traditional be­
liefs, that I have reached the views I have reached.
My own course —  not intentionally pursued, but 
spontaneously pursued —  may be characterized as little 
reading and much thinking, and thinking about facts 
learned at first hand.... " — Duncan, pp.418-19
"That [Spencer] lost by this restricted reading 
cannot be doubted. It gave colour to the not ill- 
natured remark of one of his friends: ’Scratch Spencer, 
and you come upon ignorance*."— Duncan, p.416.
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Another limitation of Spencer’s, not unconnected 
with the last, was his proneness to cling to views formed 
early in life even when new knowledge had come to him. 
Thus, as we have seen, "Social Statics", written when he 
was thirty, remained characteristic of his views on ethics 
and politics and on education throughout his whole life, 
despite the subsequent adoption by him of the doctrine of 
evolution, with which he attempted to redo the the old 
ideas. There is dramatic truth in the story that he once 
replied to criticism with the words: "That can’t be true, 
for otherwise my First Principles would have to be re­
written —  and the edition is stereotyped." If Spencer 
had had the patience to devote more time and attention to 
the mastery of other men’s ideas, if he had been less con­
cerned about his own originality and more content to look 
at some things through the eyes of others, he might not 
have finished the whole of the magnificently accomplished 
task of writing a completed system of Synthetic Philosophy, 
but he would probably have used his great mind to better 
advantage and have made a more lasting contribution to 
philosophic thought.
His views on education suffer from similar defects. 
There is an originality about his presentation of them 
which conceals their uhoriginality. He was very little 
acquainted with the views of educational thinkers of the 
past, and ’read up only in directions in which he expect­
ed to find materials for generalizations.* His own personal
% e e  lists of books prefixed to his original Review
Articles.
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experience was apt to be the measure of his estimation 
of the thoughts of others on education. The four essays 
which he wrote in his thirties, and which constitute the 
only systematic presentation of his educational ideas,
4 though they were originally composed "with a view to their
^ republication in a united form, are only loosely connect-
ed; and can hardly be regarded "as forming a tolerably 
complete whole." They betray a very inadequate appreci­
ation of the essentially social nature of the educative 
process, to which is joined an almost total neglect of 
the humanistic subjects of instruction. For these de­
fects Spencer’s early experiences as a child and the one­
sided nature of his own education, together with his 
early accepted philosophy of life, must be held largely 
accountable. Spencer never really learned the lesson 
which Rousseau taught, and which has revolutionised 
modern thought about education, namely, the all-import­
ance of setting the child in the centre of the process 
and relating all education to the age and stage of devel­
opment of the pupil. He failed adequately to psychologise 
education; and too frequently gave way to the temptation 
of regarding it from the adult point of view. Neverthe­
less, his views were presented in a style so brilliant and 
with a wealth of illustration so original and convincing 
that he remains the best known, if not the most influen­
tial, educational writer of his time. The study of his 
views in the context of his age and against the background 
of his social and political philosophy will always be a
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profitable exercise in clarifying the student’s own 
thought about education and in rethinking his concep­
tions of those ultimates on which the practice of educa­
tion will continue to depend.
a E. H E R A L B I B L I 0 0 R A P H Ï
O P  B O O K S  U S E D .
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